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Abstract  
 
The research presented in this thesis is a study of union responses to subcontracted 
labour in England and Korea. Subcontracting leads to separation of employers, and 
places existing union structures and resources, and traditional collective bargaining 
systems under strain. A study of union representation in relation to subcontracted 
workers is important because it can address how unions deal with more complex 
employment relationships. This also helps explore which factors contribute to 
patterns of union responses.  
 
This research conducted a comparative study of eight branches of the largest unions 
in the English and Korean health sectors with different institutional settings. This 
employed qualitative case studies using fifty-three semi-structured interviews, 
observation, and document analysis. Evidence showed that typical responses 
between the two varied, but there were also two outlying cases in Korea, showing 
similar responses to those in England. Differences in the institutional contexts of the 
source of restructuring, legal regulations, collective bargaining systems and union 
structures explained why English union branches adopted more inclusive strategies 
toward subcontracted workers than those in Korea. However, empirical evidence 
showed that union responses were also influenced by some non-institutional factors 
such as branch leadership, the attitude of the represented and effective working with 
allies in the community. Despite the importance of institutions in shaping union 
responses, they are not sufficient alone to explain variations in union responses and it 
is necessary to consider an integrated approach considering both institutional and 
non-institutional factors in a single analytical framework.  
 
This study contributes to the field of comparative industrial relations research in 
three ways. First, it extends the scope of research on union responses to contingent 
workers by investigating responses to subcontracted workers. Second, it goes beyond 
classifying union responses by presenting their underlying dynamics. Third, it 
challenges existing ways of conducting comparative industrial relations studies 
predicated upon the staple proposition that ‘institutions matter’, highlighting the 
importance of an integrated approach.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
The research presented in this thesis is a study of union responses to subcontracted 
labour in the English and Korean health sectors. In recent years union have faced the 
challenges stemming from declining union membership and increasing contingent 
workers. In particular, the emergence of subcontracted workers has provided unions 
with another challenge of triangular employment relationships as the organisational 
boundaries between companies have increasingly blurred. Little emphasis has been 
so far placed on this challenge facing unions. This study presents patterns in union 
responses and factors explaining a particular response by conducting a comparative 
study. The importance of an integrated approach between institutional and non-
institutional factors in explaining union behaviour is highlighted. This chapter 
proceeds in four main stages. Firstly, background and aims of the study are 
explained. Secondly, research themes of the study are illustrated, followed by 
demonstrating scope of the study. Lastly, the structure of the thesis is presented.  
 
1.1. Background and aims of the study 
 
A notable labour market trend in recent years has been an appreciable increase in 
different forms of contingent labour in developed countries (Eun et al., 2008; Heery, 
2004; Osterman, 1999). Coping with changes in labour markets, unions have been 
faced with the need to develop new strategies to deal with new environments (Katz 
et al., 2003; MacKenzie, 2000). Existing evidence shows that unions have made an 
effort to offset numerical declines in traditional union membership through recruiting 
contingent workers into the organisations and to prevent the undermining of terms 
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and conditions of existing members (Heery, 2004; Pernicka, 2005). This link 
between unions and contingent work  relates to the debate on the revitalisation of 
unions and the need to adjust forms of representation to a changing workforce 
(Heery, 2003: 279-283). 
 
What differentiates unions from most other organisations is their ‘representative 
logic’ (Hyman, 2001: 211). Unions are in general considered as agencies whose 
main role is to represent members’ or, more broadly, workers’ interests (Hyman, 
1997b; Simms and Charlwood, 2010). However, it has been widely asserted that 
trade unions’ capacity of representation is in crisis, reflecting the fall in membership 
rates and that their limited membership domain has centred more on existing 
permanent workers than other emerging groups of workers (Cerviňo, 2000: 4). 
Compared to regular jobs, contingent work is generally associated with relatively 
low wages, employment insecurity, exclusion from social protection, and other 
precarious working conditions (Cerviňo, 2000: 5-6). Accordingly trade unions need 
to develop new strategies to reconcile the seemingly different interests of workers 
that unions seek to represent (Hyman, 1999). 
 
Of various forms of contingent labour, this study pays attention to subcontracted 
workers. Subcontracting generally refers to the business practice where a client firm 
contracts out part of its services to a subcontractor (Cho, 2012b: 4). Subcontracted 
workers are those employed by subcontractors who allocate these workers to 
undertake part or all of a service offered by client firms that they have contracted 
with (Lee and Frenkel, 2004: 509; Watanabe, 1971: 54). With the growth of this 
group of workers (Eun et al., 2012a; Wills, 2009), a study of subcontracted workers 
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in relation to union representation is important because it can show how unions deal 
with more complex employment relationships. This chapter explains the main 
features of this type of employment arrangement in detail, in order to demonstrate 
the importance and timeliness of this study as an example.  
 
The first feature is the separation of employers. Subcontracted workers experience a 
dual relationship with two or more employers who either employ or use their 
services. Subcontractors provide intermediary functions in the labour market by 
supplying labour to client firms, which has caused the division of employers (Wills, 
2009: 443). This feature distinguishes workers employed by subcontractors from 
those with a single employer. Under traditional employment arrangements, 
employees sell their labour power to their employer, while the employer takes 
responsibility for employees by providing decent wage and working conditions and 
social security, and by protecting employees from unfair dismissals.  
 
This understanding has historically been based on the International Labour 
Organization (hereafter ILO) declaration (Declaration of Philadelphia) which states 
that ‘labour is not a commodity’ (ILO, 1944: Annex I (a)). This means that every 
practice that treats workers as commodities should be prohibited. It has been argued 
on this basis that economic contracts through subcontracting or labour procurement 
should be changed into employment contracts (Eun et al., 2011). One of the 
fundamental principles on which the ILO is based is an employment relationship 
based on two parties, employer and employees. Following this principle, labour laws 
and labour practices have been developed across countries with the aim of 
preventing unfair contracts between the two parties who have unbalanced contractual 
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powers (Eun et al., 2011). Despite the importance of the ILO principle, most 
developed countries have seen the spread of more complex employment 
arrangements as the number of the indirectly employed such as subcontracted 
workers and temporary help agency workers has increased. 
 
The second feature of subcontracted labour as an example of more complex 
employment relationships is related to employment security. Subcontracted workers 
tend to have an open-ended employment contract with their contractual employer 
and normally work eight hours a day (Park et al., 2009). These features may make 
these workers look like permanent workers but it is not the case. Subcontracted 
workers are likely to feel uncertain as to the continuity of their work since the 
contract depends mainly on a business contract between a subcontractor and a user 
company (Eun, 2012: 86-87). The temporary nature of the contract encourages the 
temporary status of these workers (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011: 296). 
 
The third way in which subcontracted labour illustrates issues in more complex 
employment relationships is caused by the first and has significant implications for 
conditions, experience and politics of work (Wills, 2009: 444). These workers 
experience relatively inferior wage and conditions of employment as explained 
below and in Chapter 4 in further detail. Responsibility for these workers seems to 
be ambiguous. Subcontracting is an effective way for employers to shed 
responsibility and thereby subcontracted workers have ‘no industrial relations 
contact with their “real employer”’ (Wills, 2009: 444) (see further in Chapter 5). 
Furthermore, the emergence of subcontracting has fragmented existing workforce 
arrangements, resulting in a multi-tier workforce (Perrons, 2004). 
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This form of employment arrangement is involved in the ‘triangular’ or ‘tripartite’ 
(Davidov, 2004: 729) or ‘triadic’ (Olsen, 2006: 94) employment relationships, 
together with temporary help agencies It clearly draws a distinction with the 
traditional employment relationship based on an employment contract under which a 
worker agrees to perform certain work for his or her employer (Lee and Frenkel, 
2004; Wills, 2009). These features raise the question of how unions perceive this 
more complex form of employment arrangement subject to at least three parties 
involved in the supply and management of labour and that of how they deal with the 
issue of subcontracted workers. While issues of contingent workers directly 
employed present unions with the challenge of whether or not unions accept them as 
part of membership, those of subcontracted workers present unions with additional 
challenges. As seen in Figure 1.1 below, unions need to decide whether to include 
these workers employed by the third party, subcontractors and whether to accept 
subcontractors as counterparts in their collective bargaining unit (Heery, 2004). It 
includes the issue of whether or not unions confer legitimacy upon this type of 
employment arrangement in the labour market.  
 
In this study union branches based on workplaces are taken as the unit of analysis, 
such branches are mainly organised by regular workers who have employment 
contracts with a company (Figure 1.1, upper A), which is a user company for 
subcontracted workers. Workers employed by a subcontractor (lower A) work at the 
workplace of the user company with whom a subcontractor has contracted to supply 
labour (B). Between a user company and subcontracted workers (C) there is no 
formal relationship theoretically. But the relationship may not be always clear-cut in 
practice (Kalleberg, 2000: 350; Olsen, 2006: 97) as there is a scope for a user 
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company to be involved in supervision, as discussed in Chapter 5 in considerable 
detail. In this context, it is important to investigate the ways in which the interests of 
emerging subcontracted workers have got represented in existing industrial relations 
institutions. This is the starting point of this study.  
 
Figure 1.1 Challenges to labour 
 
 
Prior to substantive discussion in the following chapters, there is a need to mention 
the difference between subcontracting and temporary help agencies. Despite the 
common feature of the triangular employment relationships in that both 
subcontracted and temporary agency workers are employed by means of 
employment intermediaries (Olsen, 2006: 97), these two types of employment 
arrangements differ. First, temporary help agency workers are supervised by 
managers of a user company at the workplace so the relationship between the two is 
clearer than that of subcontracted workers (Kalleberg, 2000; Kang, 2011; Olsen, 
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2006). Second, agency workers are more likely to work side-by-side with workers on 
permanent contracts for a relatively short duration, as contrasted to subcontracted 
workers who mainly carry out distinct functions with, to some extent, stable 
relationship with subcontractors (Davidov, 2004: 728; Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011: 
299). This difference of labour process at workplace, or in other words the structure 
of work organisation, influences the ways in which workers’ consciousness is 
formed (Burawoy, 1985), which is discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
To summarise, the subcontracted work arrangement presents union branches with a 
new challenge: how to deal with a third party (subcontractors) and its employees 
(subcontracted workers). In this circumstance, union branches have to decide 
whether to accept subcontracted workers into their membership and subcontractors 
as counterparts in their bargaining unit (Heery, 2004: 435). 
 
As such, the emergence of subcontracted labour gives an additional challenge to 
unions that traditionally have focused mainly on permanent workers who have a 
single employer and on collective bargaining with the employer to improve 
conditions for existing union members. The increase in the number of subcontracted 
workers adds urgency. Traditional models of union organisations and 
representational activities may not be adequate for dealing with this emerging 
workforce and for reconciling the seemingly different interests of workers on 
different employment contracts. Hence, studying how unions cope with more 
complex employment relationships may provide new perspectives of union 
representation.  
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1.2. Research themes of the study 
 
This study contributes to the field of comparative industrial relations research in 
three ways. Firstly, the study extends the scope of research on union responses to 
contingent workers by investigating the ways in which unions have responded to 
subcontracted workers. This shows how unions have dealt with the triangular 
employment arrangement with three parties involved compared to the traditional one 
with only two parties. Research on union responses to contingent workers has tended 
to deal with this group as a whole (Cerviňo, 2000; Heery, 2009; Heery and Abbott, 
2000; Heery et al., 2004a). Considering that contingent workers are not a 
homogeneous group (MacKenzie, 2000), dealing with contingent work as a whole 
may hinder us from understanding distinctive features of each contingent 
employment arrangement. Although there were some studies with a focus on a 
particular type of contingent work, for instance temporary agency work (Heery, 
2004) and self-employed freelancers (Heery et al., 2004b), little emphasis has been 
placed on analysing union responses to subcontracted workers.  
 
Studies on subcontracting have focused on relatively inferior pay and terms and 
conditions of employment, for subcontracted workers (Allen and Henry, 1996; 
Cooke et al., 2004), management preference for subcontracting (Eun, 2008), the 
economic and societal effect of using subcontracting (Davies, 2008; Eun, 2011a), or 
social relationships between workers on different employment contracts (Lee and 
Frenkel, 2004). The issue of how unions have represented these workers appears to 
be a gap in knowledge which this study has addressed. Examining union responses 
to subcontracted labour is of importance in that the traditional employment 
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relationship subject to two parties involved can be threatened by this form of 
triangular employment relationships with three parties (Broughton et al., 2010): 
subcontractors, workers employed by them, and the client company where the work 
is performed. 
 
Secondly, this study goes beyond mapping and evaluating union responses. To 
address the challenge of the increase in subcontracted labour, unions need to decide 
how and why they respond, adapt and develop new strategies. The ways in which 
unions behave is conditioned by ‘their own structures and ideologies, the national 
industrial relations system in which they operate, the economic situation and other 
factors’ (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011: 297). Hence studies with a focus on 
classification of union behaviour have difficulty in developing an understanding of 
why unions respond in a particular way rather than another and what might explain 
the behaviour of unions in their responses to contingent workers. With a comparative 
research design between the English and Korean health care sectors, this study 
presents underlying dynamics of union responses to subcontracted workers. As Frege 
and Kelly (2003: 10) point out, comparative studies in industrial relations are being 
asked to look beyond explaining actors’ behaviour with a focus on quantitative 
indices or the classification of types, structure or identities of unions. This study 
enables us to understand which factors have reliable explanatory power to explain 
complex dynamics of union behaviour. The issue of which factors contribute to 
patterns of union responses leads to the next point. 
 
Thirdly, this study challenges the existing ways of conducting comparative industrial 
relations study predicated upon the staple proposition that ‘institutions matter’. By 
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investigating union responses to subcontracted workers between countries with 
different institutional settings, England and Korea, this study provides support for a 
claim that institutional factors alone are not sufficient to examine the complex 
dynamics of union behaviour and then suggests the need to integrate institutional and 
non-institutional factors into a single analytical framework. 
 
1.3. Scope of the study 
 
There are four notes to be made regarding the scope of the analysis presented here. 
Firstly, this study identified two contexts to reflect the research concern with 
different national and industrial settings but with unions facing a similar challenge, 
the increase in subcontracting. The health care sectors in England and Korea were 
selected for the study. The key features of health care systems such as the source of 
financing, the main body for health care delivery, and industrial relations institutions 
such as collective bargaining systems varied markedly in the two national settings, as 
explained in Chapter 4. Despite different institutional arrangements, both these  
settings have seen a rise in numbers of subcontracted workers. 
 
It is also noteworthy that subcontracting is far more widespread than other forms of 
contingent working both in the UK (Wills, 2009: 443) and Korea (Eun, 2008: 126-
127). Taking the UK case first, as many as 93 percent of two thousand UK-based 
workplaces had outsourced at least one service by 2002 (White et al., 2004) and the 
2004 British Workplace Employee Relations Survey (hereafter WERS) found that as 
many as 59 percent of workplaces subcontracted building service maintenance, 
which was followed by 52 percent cleaning, 34 percent training, 29 percent 
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transportation of goods and documents, 29 percent security, and by a quarter 
computing services (Kersley et al., 2006). The latest available data, the 2011 WERS 
reported that employers had not changed their use of subcontractors from 2004 to 
2011, despite the economic climate having changed (Wanrooy et al., 2013). This 
trend was no exception in the health sector. As outlined in more detail in Chapter 4, 
since the Conservative government pushed contracting-out in earnest in 1983, there 
has been a steady decline in the number of staff in the infrastructure support category 
including cleaning, laundry, catering, and maintenance (Kersley et al., 2006; NHS, 
2006; Revill, 2005).  
 
The Korean labour market has also witnessed a considerable number of 
subcontracted workers. The latest survey of companies with 300 or more employees, 
conducted by Ministry of Employment and Labor (MoEL, 2010) showed that 41.2 
percent of surveyed companies (799 out of 1,939) subcontracted at least one service 
as of 2010. Among the total number of workers in the companies using 
subcontracting, subcontracted workers counted for 24.6 percent, which means that 
one in four workers in these companies were employed by subcontractors not their 
user companies. Subcontracting has been considered to be a practice often used in 
the manufacturing sector but it has become widespread in the hospital sector, as 
explained in more detail in Chapter 4.  
 
Second, related to the first, given that this analysis is based on a comparative study 
of unions, it needs to start with establishing conceptual equivalence (Wailes et al., 
2011). Two main concepts to be clarified before moving on are the meaning of 
subcontracting and subcontracted workers, and union branch. The term 
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subcontracting in this analysis refers to the employment arrangement which a client 
firm performs its business, using workers employed by the third party that has 
contracted to supply labour with the former (Kang, 2007: 4). The workers involved 
in this form of business activities are called as subcontracted workers. Although the 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations (the TUPE 
regulations) defines a subcontractor (a subsequent contractor) as a person who 
carries out business activities previously carried out by a contractor on the client’s 
behalf, this analysis uses the terms subcontracting, subcontractors and subcontracted 
workers because this type of employment arrangements tends to present a multi-
layered structure. In Korean literature (among others, see Eun et al., 2012a; Lee and 
Eun, 2011; Park et al., 2010) the terms inside subcontracting and in-house (sub-) 
contracting were found, which reflects the fact that subcontracted workers are likely 
to work in the client’s workplace with full time permanent workers employed by the 
client. 
 
There is a need to consider whether the term union branch in both countries is 
equivalent. The union branch is considered as the bedrock of both unions, UNISON 
and KHMU which are mainly composed of members who have the same employer. 
Every member of UNISON belongs to a branch which is made up of people working 
for the same employer or sometimes working for the company which is used by the 
main employer (UNISON, 2011). In a similar manner, every branch of KHMU is 
based on a particular workplace (KHMU, 2011). Hence the term union branch is 
considered as the equivalent organisation in both unions (see Chapter 7 for further 
discussion of this point). 
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Thirdly, with regard to the UK, the analysis focuses primarily on union responses in 
England, rather than in the UK as a whole. The reason for this is that NHS services 
in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland were managed separately, 
although funded centrally from national taxation (NHS, 2012a). There were 
important differences in the legislative and political context of procurement between 
the countries (UNISON, 2009: 1). The Scottish government, for instance, has 
announced an intention to exempt all cleaning, catering, and other soft facilities 
management service from being contracted-out in future, followed by the similar 
announcement in Wales and in particular, the majority of services in Northern 
Ireland have been retained in the NHS (UNISON, 2010a: 7). Although it is said that 
NHS systems in four countries remain similar in most respects and belong to a single, 
unified system despite some differences (NHS, 2012a), this analysis is confined to 
the English case for reasons discussed above. Throughout the thesis, the term 
‘England’ or ‘English’ is used to indicate this, unless otherwise noted. 
 
Lastly, with regard to the period of time covered in the analysis, this study explores 
the status quo and also traces back when particular changes took place such as the 
introduction of subcontracting, industrial action in pursuit of retaining services in-
house or securing workers’ employment and their terms and conditions, legal 
struggles against misusing subcontracted workers, and other internal changes within 
the unions and their branches. This analysis pays attention to these events because 
they are considered to have far-reaching effects on forming union behaviour. 
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1.4. The structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of key debates 
and arguments relating to unions’ responses to contingent workers. As previously 
mentioned in this introduction, existing literature has tended to deal with these 
workers in general despite increasing heterogeneity amongst them and to catalogue 
different types of responses rather than seeking underlying relationships contributing 
to a particular response. After reviewing the relevant literature three theoretical 
approaches are described to comparative industrial relations: market forces, 
institutions and actors’ strategic choices and critically reviewed. Each of these offers 
ways to encompass the complexities and deeper dynamics of union responses.  
 
This chapter argues that an integrated approach considering institutional and non-
institutional factors in a single analytical framework is important for a 
comprehensive understanding of union behaviour in a comparative analysis. The 
analytical framework used in the study is then introduced and a brief overview of 
how union responses to subcontracted workers are analysed throughout the study is 
provided. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology employed in this study, explaining the process 
by which the fieldwork data was collected and analysed. Looking at epistemological 
issues and research methods, this chapter presents the ways in which the empirical 
study was designed and carried out as well as the process by which research 
questions were approached. It also addresses the reason this study adopts a 
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comparative analysis with a focus on union branches’ behaviour as the unit of 
analysis and provides a rationale for the selection of research sites. 
 
Before moving on to a discussion of the main issues in the following chapters, 
Chapter 4 provides the background to the context of this study. It explores the 
distinct features of the health sectors in England and Korea with a focus on the 
relationship between financing and delivery systems, which allows for analysis of 
the impact of differences in institutional arrangements on union behaviour. The 
health sectors in both countries have faced similar challenges towards cost savings 
and flexibility that have allowed subcontracted workers to flourish in the context of 
changes in the labour market. This chapter then provides a brief explanation of the 
main actors in industrial relations in each country. 
 
Based on the analytical framework and the epistemological and methodological 
position established in Chapters 2 and 3, the subsequent chapters discuss the findings 
of this research through the empirical study of union responses in both countries. 
The main questions of how unions have responded and which factors help explain 
similarities and differences in patterns of union responses are presented in each 
chapter structured in a thematic way: the source of restructuring, legal regulation, 
collective bargaining systems, and union governance. This structuring helps us 
understand that institutions matter in shaping union behaviour but institutions alone 
are not sufficient enough to explain it so that there is an urgent need to establish an 
approach that integrates both institutional and non-institutional factors in a single 
framework. 
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The extent to which both the source of restructuring and legal regulations have 
affected union responses is discussed in Chapter 5. These two factors are explored 
in a single chapter because they are all directly involved in the emergence of 
subcontracted workers and the initial conditions offered to them. This enables 
investigation into how the rise of these workers and their pay and terms and 
conditions affected the ways in which leaders and existing members of union 
branches have perceived their interests at the outset of the formation of a new 
employment relationship. Analysing the empirical data of union responses, this 
chapter argues as follows: first, centralised initiatives to restructure the utilisation of 
workforce are likely to provoke more centralised and more practical responses; 
second, legal regulations in favour of narrowing the wage gap and conditions of 
employment between workers on different employment contracts, and empowering 
collective rights for subcontracted workers tend to function as opportunities for 
unions to get more involved in organising and representing these workers. Here 
‘practical’ refers to the branches’ attitude focusing more on potential benefits to 
subcontracted workers than an ideological battle represented often by political 
rhetoric. Furthermore, this chapter addresses the role of leaders and the possibility of 
working with allies in a community in making different responses within a given 
institutional setting by addressing two outliers in Korea. 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the analysis of the level of, and the extent of, collective 
bargaining. This helps explain how differences in bargaining in the health sectors of 
the two countries have contributed to patterns in union responses. It also discusses 
the bargaining agenda, coverage and employer responsibilities in the analysis in 
order to investigate how relevant the bargaining agenda is to subcontracted workers 
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and who is responsible for implementing bargaining outcomes. This chapter found 
that more centralised bargaining structure in England has contributed to inclusive 
strategies used by union branches by accepting subcontracted workers into their 
constituencies, and hence improving their conditions of employment through 
negotiation with subcontractors and at sectoral level. The ‘disorganized 
centralization’ in the Korean health sector (Lee, 2011c: 768) made it difficult for 
union branches to implement more inclusive strategies towards subcontracted 
workers. Nevertheless, by presenting experiences of two outlier branches in Korea, 
this chapter argues that there is scope for unions to make a difference by representing 
subcontracted workers despite unfavourable institutional settings. Based on the 
analysis of empirical data, this chapter argues that the institutionalist approach is not 
sufficient to explain variations in the responses, despite its importance in explaining 
differences in patterns of union responses between countries. 
 
The ways in which union structures have contributed to patterns of union responses 
are examined in Chapter 7. The issue of union structure is closely related to the 
question of how unions represent whose and which interests. This chapter examines 
two aspects of union structure: external structure in relation to the scope of boundary 
of membership; and internal structure related to its governance, i.e. representation 
and administration. It argues that differences in union responses, in part resulted 
from the degree of centralisation in the union’s external structure. In other words, 
more centralised union structures in England help union branches implement more 
inclusive policies and actions towards subcontracted workers in support of strong 
control by the national union. The structure of a union in turn has an influence on the 
process of the reconfiguration of union internal structure, i.e. union governance. 
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Union branches with members who are subcontracted workers are highly likely to 
get them involved in union decision making process and other activities, compared 
to those without such members. Hence, differences in union structure help explain 
variations in union responses to subcontracted workers between countries. However, 
as seen in the two outlying branches in Korea, despite differences in institutional 
settings, there were similarities and differences in union responses both between and 
within countries. 
 
Drawing on the findings presented in the three previous chapters, Chapter 8 returns 
to the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 to discuss how the results of this study add to 
existing debates, arguments and theories. This chapter shows three important 
contributions. First, this study expanded our understanding of union responses to 
triangular employment relationships with the three parties involved. While existing 
literature placed its emphasis on unions’ links to contingent workers in general, this 
study presented the ways in which unions responded, faced with a new challenge of 
subcontracted workers. Second, this study addressed the explanatory power of 
factors addressed in industrial relations literature to explain the complex dynamics of 
union behaviour beyond mapping and evaluating union responses which have been 
addressed in existing literature. It shows the importance of four institutional factors 
in shaping union behaviour: the source of restructuring, legal regulation, collective 
bargaining systems, and union structure and also presents significant aspects of non-
institutional factors such as the role of leaders, attitude and willingness to act of 
subcontracted workers, and effective working with allies in the community. Third, 
drawing on the findings, this study argues that a focus on institutions alone is not 
19 
 
sufficient in explaining variations and commonalities of union responses and 
suggests the importance of an integrated approach in a single analytical framework. 
 
Finally, Chapter 9 returns to the initial aim of this study and draws together the 
issues and findings, which were developed in previous chapters. It also suggests the 
broader implication of the study for further research. 
 
Throughout this thesis, it challenges the existing ways of conducting comparative 
industrial relations studies predicated upon the staple proposition that ‘institutions 
matter’. By investigating union responses to subcontracted workers between the 
English and Korean health sectors, this study provides support for a claim that 
institutional factors alone are not sufficient to examine the complex dynamics of 
union behaviour and then suggests the need to integrate institutional and non-
institutional factors into a single analytical framework. 
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Chapter 2 Locating the research      
 
This chapter is to review key debates and arguments in relation to union response to 
subcontracted workers and then to present an analytical framework for this study. As 
addressed in Chapter 1, contingent workers are not a uniform group and in particular, 
the emergence of subcontracted workers has provided unions with a new challenge 
of triangular employment relationships at a time of declining union density and 
influence. Little emphasis has been placed on specifying heterogeneity amongst 
contingent workers in relation to union responses and identifying underlying causal 
relationships accounting for a particular union response.  
 
This chapter introduces an analytical framework that draws on previous studies 
regarding union strategic choice and comparative industrial relations studies (Blyton 
and Turnbull, 2004; Frege and Kelly, 2003; Poole, 1986; Undy et al., 1996). It also 
challenges analyses that rely solely on an institutionalist approach. It argues that this 
perspective does not allow us to go beneath the surface to examine underlying 
structures and processes through which union strategies are formulated. It considers 
the ways in which non-institutional factors need to be integrated with an 
institutionalist approach and provides a way for this integrated framework to serve as 
a useful analytical tool to explore possible causes for similarities and differences in 
patterns of union responses between England and Korea. 
 
This chapter has two main objectives. First, it reviews existing literature about union 
responses to contingent workers. Studies in this area are about how unions have 
responded to the challenges facing them, in particular to the rise of various forms of 
21 
 
contingent workers with weaker positions in the labour market than those of full-
time and (implicitly) permanent workers. Based on the review of studies of union 
responses, this study adopts Heery’s (2004) typology on union responses to agency 
work. This typology is of great use for analysing union responses to subcontracted 
workers on the grounds that it clearly reflects the distinctive feature of triangular 
employment relationships as also seen in agency work arrangements.  
 
Second, this chapter explores literature which has sought to explain differences and 
similarities in patterns of union responses. By doing so, this study moves beyond 
classifying union responses. This chapter analyses how far the explanatory factors 
underlined in the literature help in explaining union behaviour and accounting for 
differences and similarities. Having reviewed strengths and weaknesses of a range of 
approaches to explain variations in industrial relations systems and actors’ behaviour, 
this study considers the potential for an integrated approach as a way to overcome 
the limitations of each approach with a dual focus, on institutions and actors in turn. 
On this basis, it presents a framework for analysing union responses to subcontracted 
workers, situating such responses within their wider contexts and raises research 
questions on which little emphasis so far has been placed. 
 
2.1 Trade unions and contingent workers 
 
This section begins with a discussion of what the literature shows about the link 
between unions and contingent labour, in three stages. It reviews studies on union 
strategies towards contingent workers and specifically on subcontracting, followed 
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by those on unions’ relations in triangular employment relationships. The way in 
which the term ‘interests representation’ is used is also addressed.  
 
2.1.1 Union strategies towards contingent workers 
 
In a series of recent articles, authors (Cerviňo, 2000; Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011; 
Heery, 2004; Heery, 2009; Heery and Abbott, 2000; Heery et al., 2004a; Heery et al., 
2004b) have elaborated union strategies towards contingent work. A notable 
example is the work of Heery and Abbott (2000) that suggests a five-fold typology 
of union responses to the dual challenges of insecurity to regular and contingent 
workers. It ranges from exclusion from both union constituency and labour market to 
organising and servicing contingent workers whether through partnership with 
employers or dialogue with government. Heery and colleagues (Heery et al., 2004a) 
identify four union responses to non-standard work, depending on the degree of 
acceptance of these workers’ specific needs: from exclusion through subordination, 
to inclusion and engagement. As seen in their works mentioned, existing literature 
identifies a historical sequence of union responses characterised as ‘resist, control 
and include’ by Heery et al. (2004a) or ‘exclusion, partial inclusion and total 
inclusion’ by Cerviño (2000). Similarly, Gumbrell-McCormick (2011: 297) notes 
that unions’ reactions have changed from opposing contingent work by avoiding or 
excluding contingent workers to accepting their precariousness and thereby 
recognising the need to represent their interests.  
 
On one hand these studies help explain variations and changes in union responses, 
but on the other hand they raise a question of in what circumstances unions can 
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adopt a particular response among others. In order to answer the question, there is a 
need to move beyond classification of union strategies towards contingent workers, 
as in the above-mentioned studies. Despite the importance of classification and 
mapping of different union responses, existing literature does not seek to explain 
why and under what circumstances a union chooses a particular strategy toward 
contingent workers and what the factors contributing to patterns of union responses 
are. One of the main contributions of the study presented in this thesis is to identify 
those explanations in two comparative settings. 
 
There are studies showing the importance of the role of trade unions with members 
on mainly permanent contracts in organising and representing contingent workers 
(Cho, 2008a; Cho, 2008b; Jung, 2003; Kang, 2004). Those written mainly by Korean 
scholars are focused on particular events – usually industrial actions – rather than 
unions’ daily activities. This reflects distinct features of the Korean labour 
movement. In Korea contingent workers have tended to take industrial action soon 
after organising themselves with or without support from existing unions. This is 
because the workers may have been given unexpected notice of severance – in many 
if not most cases, unlawful or legally controversial – or under prolonged severe 
working conditions. These studies share a common argument that whether trade 
unions band together with these contingent workers is the key to success in enforcing 
their rights. Despite the importance of solidarity between workers, as Cho (2012a) 
argues, relatively few studies explain why and under what circumstances unions 
whose members are mainly regular workers choose a particular strategy and analyse 
the underlying causal mechanism of that strategy. In studies on the dynamics of trade 
unions’ activities associated with industrial action initiated by contingent workers, 
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Cho (2010; 2012) argues that the attitude and consciousness of regular workers are 
central to solidarity between workers on different employment contracts. He points 
out that the material interests of regular workers have led unions to face a dilemma 
in forging relationships of solidarity. This is because regular workers do not support 
union activities to improve conditions of employment for contingent workers at the 
expense of their invested rights to relatively superior pay, terms, and conditions, and 
employment security (Cho, 2012a: 65). Although these give insight into underlying 
causes of union strategies, they are limited by a focus on union internal politics 
rather than other external institutional factors. 
 
Another feature of existing literature is that studies have tended to deal with 
contingent work in general. As MacKenzie (2008: 6) notes, contingent workers are 
not a uniform group. Contingent employment comprises various contract types such 
as temporary agency workers, fixed-term contractors, part-timers, subcontracted 
workers and the self-employed and there are different levels of labour market power 
within these groupings (Kunda et al., 2002). Accordingly, the challenges facing 
unions in representing contingent workers might differ depending on the type of 
contingent work arrangement (Gallagher and Sverke, 2005: 196; Malo, 2006). The 
variation in contract types also affects union responses because workers’ attitudes to 
unions and the working environment might have various impacts on unions 
depending on the nature of the contingent work. There are a few studies (Heery, 
2004; Heery et al., 2004b) that have explicitly addressed the issue of how unions 
responded to a particular type of contingent workers, agency workers and freelancers. 
However, the link between unions and subcontracted employment has not yet been 
well studied.  
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2.1.2 Studies on subcontracting 
 
This section addresses existing literature on subcontracting. Studies in this area can 
be roughly divided into three categories. First is an analysis of the use of 
subcontracting itself. Studies in this current have mainly focused on management 
perspectives as follows: the effectiveness of the use of subcontracting in terms of 
cost and service quality (Davies, 2008); economic and social effects of using 
subcontracting (Eun, 2011a; Lee, 2011b); and management motivation for using 
outside contractors (Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Eun, 2008; Harrison and Kelly, 
1993; Purcell and Purcell, 1998). There are studies on the distinct features of 
subcontracting in terms of definition and employment contracts (Eun et al., 2011; 
Kang, 2007; Sohn, 2004) and legal aspects with a focus on the ambiguity about who 
is the legitimate employer (Davidov, 2004; Kang, 2007; Park et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, researchers have studied the state of subcontracted workers represented 
by low pay, precarious employment and inferior working conditions (Allen and 
Henry, 1996; Cooke et al., 2004). These studies enable understanding of unique 
characteristics of the new form of employment arrangement of subcontracting, which 
underpins the importance of deepening the understanding of their relation to unions. 
 
Second is the issue of industrial relations with regard to subcontracted workers. 
There are studies on union involvement (or intervention) in the process and 
outcomes of contracting-out with a focus on the function of collective negotiations 
(Doellgast, 2008) or the relationship between union density and contracting-out 
(Hayakawa and Simard, 2001). There are some studies with a particular focus on 
labour movement initiated mainly by subcontracted workers themselves (Cho, 
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2012a; Cho, 2008b; Eun et al., 2007; Shin, 2005). This also reflects a distinct feature 
in Korea where mobilisation amongst subcontracted workers has often taken place. 
Although the level of unionisation among subcontracted workers remains low, this 
form of labour movement has been paid much attention on the grounds that once 
these workers begin to voice their complaints or to demand their rights, their 
collective action often appears to be extreme forms such as sit-in protests and hunger 
strikes. These workers have tended to be forced to adopt these extreme forms of 
protest because it is so hard to negotiate with the real employer and to get legal 
protection due to their employment contract. Hence these studies mainly explore the 
subcontracted workers’ labour movement with a focus on mobilisation, external 
resources such as unions with permanent workers, or repression from the real 
employer.  
 
The third category of study found is an analysis of the social relations between 
subcontracted and regular employees who are working at the same place, through the 
lens of moral exclusion (Lee and Frenkel, 2004). In this research, the term moral 
exclusion is used to characterise subcontracted-regular worker relations consisting of 
discrimination and domination. In a similar vein, some authors argue that the 
emerging segmentation of the labour force has hindered the formation of working 
class consciousness and integration among workers with different employment status 
(Cho, 2012a; Kalleberg, 2000; Malo, 2006; Pernicka, 2005).  
 
To summarise, it was found that existing literature on subcontracting had mainly 
dealt with this issue in terms of the features of employment arrangement, labour 
movement centred on subcontracted workers, or the social relationship between 
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workers with different employment contracts. Union strategies towards 
subcontracted workers had not previously been studied.  
 
2.1.3 Unions and triangular employment relationships 
 
Faced with triangular employment relationships, unions need to consider not only 
the different status and terms and conditions of subcontracted workers but also of the 
third party (subcontractors) in deciding their responses. Heery’s typology (2004) 
clearly shows possible options unions can consider. He identifies four types of union 
responses to agency work, each of which is characterised by a combined policy 
concerning agency workers, whether or not unions seek to represent agency workers 
and whether or not unions accept the legitimacy of agency suppliers, as seen in Table 
2.1 below.  
 
Table 2.1 Union responses to agency work 
 Agency suppliers 
Rejection Acceptance 
Agency workers Exclusion Exclusion Regulation 
Inclusion Replacement Engagement 
Source: Heery (2004)  
 
This study has used Heery’s typology to classify union responses to subcontracted 
labour, although it was originally designed for union responses to agency work. 
There are differences between subcontracted labour and agency work in terms of 
period of service, supervision, and structure of work organisation, as discussed 
further in Chapters 1 and 5. Nevertheless, when compared to the traditional 
employment arrangement with two parties involved, temporary agency and 
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subcontracting share the most important feature, the triangular employment 
relationships. In this regard, it is appropriate to apply the Heery’s typology (2004) to 
the study of subcontracted workers. This typology addresses the distinctiveness of 
the triangular employment relationships. 
 
Following Heery’s typology of four possible responses to agency labour, exclusion 
means that unions reject the legitimacy of both agency suppliers and agency workers, 
while engagement means acceptance of both. In the case of replacement, unions 
combine a rejection of agency suppliers with inclusion of agency workers in order to 
raise both labour standards and labour quality by replacing private agencies with the 
public employment service. Regulation, in contrast, means that unions strive to 
regulate agency workers’ terms and conditions through engagement with agency 
suppliers instead of representing agency workers directly. This is the typology that is 
used in this study to catalogue patterns of union responses to subcontracted workers.  
 
2.1.4 Interest representation 
 
Prior to reviewing factors explaining union strategies, the way in which the term 
‘interest representation’ is used is briefly outlined here. As previously mentioned in 
Chapter 1, trade unions are organisations whose main role is to represent interests 
(Hyman, 1994: 120). This definition of unions gives rise to a question of whose 
interests they seek to represent. Regarding this, Hyman noted that: 
 
Unions (and union movements) act on behalf of specific constituencies, with 
criteria of inclusion which of necessity are at the same time principles of 
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exclusion; and they focus on distinctive aspects of their constituents’ 
individual and collective experiences. (Hyman, 1994: 120) 
 
Here, the meaning of constituencies has a double sense: one is the actual union 
structure with an issue of which group of workers unions recruit; and the other is the 
extent of union representation, whether unions are concerned exclusively with their 
actual members or whether they encompass more diverse interests not only of non-
members within their specific membership demarcation, but also for example of 
retired workers and the unemployed beyond their constituencies. This discussion is 
directly associated with the question of agenda unions seek to pursue. Given that 
interests may vary among the workforce, one union might seek to represent 
traditional core agenda of bread-and-butter, workplace rights, and career 
opportunities, whilst another might endeavour to expand representation to address 
the role of the state such as social wage, labour market policy, and broader issues in 
the community and environment.  
 
Having examined the scope of union representation, there is a need to explore how 
interests are formed. The ways in which unions adopt strategies when faced with the 
emergence of subcontracted workers reflect the expectations of existing and potential 
members about how to get their interests represented within unions. Different groups 
of workers’ interests may be diverse or even conflict because interests ‘may be 
inherent in the work exchange’ (Simms, 2007: 444). Following this stance, existing 
union members may oppose a union’s inclusive strategy towards subcontracted 
workers. Members may consider that their vested interests are likely to be damaged 
by conflicting interests with the subcontracted workers and considering the limited 
organisational capacities available, existing members’ interests may be sidelined 
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when representing subcontracted workers. Although there is no doubt that all the 
workers are in a weaker position against employers, existing members may want to 
maintain a relative superior position compared to subcontracted workers.  
 
However, it would be impossible to say that interests are fixed (Simms, 2007: 444) 
because they are socially constructed (Hyman, 1997a; 1999). Offe and Wiesenthal 
(1985: 184) argue that ‘interests can only be met to the extent they are partly 
redefined’. By the same token, Hyman highlighted that: 
 
It is a sociological truism that the elusive notion of interests has both objective 
and subjective dimensions, and that the relationship between the two is never 
fixed. Through their own internal processes of communication, discussion and 
debate – the ‘mobilization of bias’ – unions can help shape workers’ own 
definitions of their individual and collective interests. (Hyman 1994: 122)  
 
Following this position, there is potential to reconcile likely conflicting interests of 
workers with different employment contracts. Hence the ways in which unions 
redefine interests contribute to complex patterns of union representation: whether 
emphasising and strengthening sectionalism or enhancing solidarity. In this process, 
the role of leaders – although members elect these leaders under democratic 
structures – is important.  
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2.2 Explaining union strategies 
 
The literature seems to have focused more on classifying, mapping and assessing 
union responses and has tended to pay less attention to the factors which have 
contributed to such responses. Revealing external and internal factors affecting 
unions is important as it allows us to understand why unions faced with a similar 
challenge (the rise of subcontracted workers) have responded in similar or different 
ways between countries with different institutional settings. Such investigations 
make it possible to answer questions of whether different institutional or sectoral 
arrangements in which unions operate lead to differences in patterns of union 
responses; whether the challenge facing unions leads to similar responses despite 
institutional differences; if neither, which factors or which combination of factors 
make union responses different or similar. Before uncovering which factors 
contributed to patterns of union responses, there is a need to outline potential factors 
identified as underlying causes of union policies and actions. This section begins by 
reviewing literature concerning which factors have affected union responses and then, 
a framework for analysis is developed on this basis.  
 
This section describes three approaches to explaining cross-national variations in 
process and outcomes of industrial relations in the area of comparative industrial 
relations study: the role of markets, the institutionalist approach and the approach 
focusing on actors (Bamber et al., 2004; Kelly, 2011; Kelly and Frege, 2004; 
Lansbury et al., 2003; Lee, 2009; Romo, 2005; Wailes et al., 2003). Possibilities are 
explored for an integrated approach between the institutionalist and actor-centred 
approaches by analysing the strengths and weaknesses of all three approaches.  
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2.2.1 Simple globalisation approach  
 
One approach named ‘simple globalisation’ by Wailes and colleagues (2004: 57; 
2011) emphasises the market forces associated with globalisation. The term 
‘globalisation’ here refers to ‘changes in the international economy which are 
associated with increases in international trade in goods and services, greater flows 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the growth of international financial 
transactions’ (Bamber et al., 2004: 47). The simple globalisation approach sees 
globalisation as weakening each country’s policy autonomy and paving the way for 
policy convergence. It is supported by three predominant developments in industrial 
relations, in particular throughout Western Europe: decentralisation of collective 
bargaining structures, decline of union membership and density, and declining 
coverage of collective bargaining (Kelly 2011: 59). This approach predicts a ‘race to 
the bottom’ in terms of employees’ wages and other labour standards across most 
economies as firms seek to drive labour costs ever lower and nationally-specific 
labour market regimes erode (Bamber et al., 2004: 57; Kelly, 2011). The spread of 
subcontracting is also understood as a management technique affected by 
globalisation. Wills who names the current situation in labour market ‘subcontracted 
capitalism’ highlights that: 
 
Increasing numbers of the world’s growing workforce, and particularly those 
connected to the global economy, face constant pressure on their wages and 
conditions of work. The nature of short-term contracts and increased 
competition means that contractors are forced to cut back on employees’ pay 
and standards of work. (Wills 2009: 444) 
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As such, the effect of globalisation has been understood as an irreversible trend. 
According to this approach, there is little room for national differences in industrial 
relations policies and practices due to the overwhelming power of globalisation 
(Ohmae, 1990), which is likely to strictly limit the strategic choices of industrial 
relations actors. As some (Campbell, 1996; Tilly, 1995) argue, globalisation also 
threatens the power of organised labour to counter the - mostly negative - effects of 
globalisation. Tilly (1995) points out that established labour rights are undermined 
by globalisation which means the nation state’s capacity to guarantee these rights 
and unions’ ability to develop counter-strategies is not strong enough. This may be 
because, as Campbell (1996) and Silver (2003) contend, the mobility of productive 
capital has been increasing much faster than that of the labour force in the context of 
increased economic interconnectedness, which is likely to weaken organised labour’s 
market power.  
 
Critique of simple globalisation approach 
 
This emphasis is, in terms of comparative method, consistent with the universalist 
approach with its focus on revealing similarities and likelihood of convergence. It 
has been criticised for playing down specific contexts and drawing groundless 
inferences about causality (Hantrais, 1999: 94-96). There is a raft of evidence that 
displays the uneven impact of global market forces in terms of the level of average 
earnings growth and of income inequalities between countries (Ghose, 2003; Glyn, 
2006; Dickens 2007). Applying the simple globalisation approach to a comparative 
study of union strategies, it may be assumed that union responses across the 
countries would be similar. This is because, faced with a challenge, unions may 
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respond in a similar – mostly passive – way, because of a form of organisational 
isomorphism in the context of increasing international economic activity. But several 
studies (Hall and Soskice, 2001b; Locke and Thelen, 1995) show that unions have 
responded in different ways reflecting the institutional context in which they operate 
and the resources available. This simple globalisation approach can easily neglect the 
importance of institutions and actors. It has been widely criticised because of a sense 
that there is no room for national governments and other actors in the labour market 
to manoeuvre. Garrett (1998), in line with arguments of Evans (1997) and Weiss 
(1998), contends that globalisation may encourage the nation state to play a certain 
role in order to maintain international competitiveness, for example in the labour 
market. This becomes increasingly evident in the diversity of industrial relations 
institutions: legal regulations, collective bargaining systems, and union structures. 
This study presents detailed studies pointing towards differences that persist, in some 
extent along with similarities. 
 
2.2.2 Institutionalist approach  
 
An emphasis on the role of markets may explain convergence of patterns in 
industrial relations and effects on actors including unions, and in contrast the 
institutionalist approach is more effective for explaining divergence. This approach 
pays attention to the independent role of institutions, starting with the premise that 
differences in industrial relations institutions are likely to be enduring (Bamber et al., 
2004: 59) and suggests in contradiction to the simple globalisation approach that 
globalisation is unlikely to lead to a general convergence in national patterns of 
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industrial relations (Locke et al., 1995). This section explores the explanatory power 
of the institutionalist approach, and describes the cognate critique. 
 
Studies of changes in industrial relations have focused on the feature of national-
level institutional arrangements in shaping a particular pattern. These explanations 
derive from the new institutionalist ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (hereafter VoC) 
approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001b). Scholars in this group (e.g. Dore, 1986; Hall 
and Soskice, 2001a; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Weiss, 2003) argue that 
national institutions can make a difference, while putting less emphasis on the fact 
that markets and technologies influence the structures and performance of economic 
actors (Kelly and Frege, 2004: 182). The VoC approach is considered as the 
dominant approach in the field of comparative political economy (Kelly, 2011: 64), 
but is also criticised for being focused too heavily on institutions. It remains an open 
question whether actors’ strategies are only influenced by institutions. Further this 
approach has difficulty in accounting for the role that underlying interests play in 
shaping institutional structures and outcomes (Barry and Wilkinson, 2011: 7) and is, 
in particular, criticised for its lack of emphasis on trade unions as independent actors 
(Kelly and Frege, 2004: 183). This point is discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. As Hall and Soskice (2001b: 6) explicitly note, ‘this is a firm-centered 
political economy that regards companies as the crucial actors in a capitalist 
economy’. But this study sees it as legitimate to focus on unions as key actors in 
industrial relations. In what follows this section outlines how institutionalism applies 
to the studies in industrial relations. 
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Institutionalism in IR study 
 
In the area of comparative industrial relation, the institutionalist approach is well 
developed. As Kelly (2011: 66) notes, it is a broadly accepted truism that 
‘institutions matter’ despite the pressures associated with global market forces. This 
mainly focuses on the influence of distinct institutions defined ‘as the rules, norms 
and assumptions that shape economic activity, [and] structure the choices of 
organisational actors’ (Edwards et al., 2007: 203). Many have identified variations in 
the structures, processes and outcomes of industrial relations at national level (e.g., 
Crouch 1993; Hyman and Ferner 1994; Rubery and Grimshaw 2003), which is in 
line with the institutionalist approach (Kelly, 2011: 66). 
 
This approach is rooted in the claim that faced with common economic challenges, 
different national institutions are likely to produce different patterns of industrial 
relations. Locke and Thelen note that:  
 
[W]e demonstrate how various international trends are not in fact translated 
into common pressures in all national economies but rather are mediated by 
national institutional arrangements and refracted into divergent struggles over 
particular national practices (1995: 338, italics in original).  
 
In a comparative study between Germany and the USA, Turner (1991) argues for the 
institutionalist approach by showing that the capacity and the extent of unions’ 
involvement in industrial restructuring were mainly determined by institutional 
arrangements. In a similar vein, Thelen (1993) addresses the question of how far the 
pressures for decentralised bargaining were accommodated within the existing 
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institutional settings, which also shows how institutions matter. Thelen shows that 
differences in the level of collective bargaining and rights for workers between 
Germany and Sweden largely contributed to different patterns of accommodation 
between the new challenge and the existing institutional settings. Locke and Kochan 
(1996: 365) point out that national-level institutional differences hinder industrial 
relations from converging across developed countries. By the same token, Katz and 
Darbishire (2000: 12-14) argue that variations in employment practices can be 
explained by differences in national-level institutions.  
 
According to institutionalist accounts, policy outcomes vary markedly between 
countries faced with common pressures because they are refracted by differences in 
institutional arrangements in different ways (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 5-6). The 
institutionalist approach has not only been influential in explaining policy 
differences of unions but also in investigating changes in industrial relations (Wailes 
et al., 2003: 619-620).  
 
In the context of the institutionalist approach, the ways in which social actors such as 
employers and unions behave is strongly influenced by their national institutional 
arrangements (Allen, 2004; Pontusson, 1995). Clegg’s (1976) emphasis on collective 
bargaining structures in explaining union behaviour is a good example of this 
approach. He argues that ‘power within unions is centred on where collective 
bargaining is conducted and differences in collective bargaining can explain 
variations in union behaviour’ (1976: 8). His argument is powerful, as institutions in 
industrial relations system are crucial in shaping the structures and behaviours of the 
actors (Frege and Kelly, 2003: 11). 
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The institutionalist approach is argued to address the limitations of the ‘simple 
globalisation’ approach (Bamber et al., 2004; Bamber et al., 2011) by emphasising 
the mediating role of institutions. This is because ‘market pressures affect labour 
relations institutions indirectly, in that they are processed and filtered by institutions’ 
(Traxler et al., 2001: 289). The focus on the mediating role of institutions helps to 
explain patterns of persistent national differences and demonstrates that the 
relationship between globalisation and national employment relations is neither 
simple nor deterministic. The focus on institutions also points to key factors that play 
a decisive role in determining distinctive national patterns of industrial relations 
(Bamber et al. 2004: 60). A variety of national differences on industrial relations in 
the context of globalisation can be explained by an institutionalist approach and 
shows the importance of understanding each country’s specific context when 
conducting a comparative study (Bamber et al., 2004; Locke and Thelen, 1995).    
 
Critique of institutionalism  
 
The institutionalist approach is important in comparative industrial relations for 
emphasising the importance of the mediating role of institutions in explaining cross-
national variations as well as pointing out the limitations of the simple globalisation 
approach. However, this approach has also attracted criticism (among others, see 
Frege and Kelly, 2003; Lee, 2009; Wailes et al., 2003) for its lack of explanatory 
power to explain similarities between countries with different institutional 
configurations and of emphasis on social actors’ roles or their relative autonomy 
from institutions, and for the potential to lead to determinism.  
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First, despite its strengths for identifying a source of differences in the ways in which 
international trends have shaped national patterns of industrial relations, the 
institutionalist approach has struggled to explain common developments across 
countries (Pontusson, 1995). Hence Wailes and his colleagues (2003: 620) challenge 
this approach by questioning the possibility that differences between countries may 
be exaggerated and similarities downplayed.  
 
Second, it is widely acknowledged that the institutionalist approach has difficulty 
explaining changes in national-level institutions themselves (Wailes et al., 2003: 
620). Scholars in the institutionalist domain tend to use institutions as an 
independent factor and to explore the ways way in which particular institutions such 
as collective bargaining systems or legal regulations have influence on industrial 
relations outcomes (Gorges, 2001; Remmer, 1997). However, critics argue that it 
would be difficult for the institutionalist approach to explain the degree of change in 
the institutions themselves regulating labour market and industrial relations as well 
as outcomes generated by these institutions (Hassel, 2006; Wailes et al., 2011: 24; 
Wailes et al., 2003: 620). In this regard, institutionalists are criticised for adopting a 
form of structural determinism (Hay and Wincott, 1998; Sokolovsky, 1998), which 
is related to the next point.  
 
Third, the argument of Clegg (1976) has been criticised on the grounds that the 
direction of causality between collective bargaining and union behaviour is not clear 
and the institutional context alone cannot explain actors’ strategies adequately, 
which creates a danger of being simplistic and deterministic in explaining unions’ 
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behaviour (Bamber et al., 2004; Frege and Kelly, 2003; Hyman, 1994; Shalev, 1980). 
Howell (2007: 241) notes that: 
 
The emphasis upon constraint can easily slide into a form of determinism, 
failing to recognize the dialectical relationship between structure and agency, 
the role of political actors in transforming institutions, and that institutions 
provide capacities and resources as well as imposing limits. 
 
In a similar vein, Wailes and colleagues (2011: 24) strongly argue that comparative 
study of industrial relations ‘should be based on a less deterministic view of the role 
of institutions’. Deeg and Jackson (2007: 159-161) argue that emphasis has been 
placed on a complex view of institutions as resources which actors use in achieving 
their goals. Collective bargaining as one of the major institutions in industrial 
relations may not only exert a constraining effect on union behaviour (Willman, 
2004: 73) but also be influenced by union behaviour through the reciprocal 
interconnections between actors and institutions (Frege and Kelly, 2003: 12). 
Although the institutionalist approach provides a useful framework to explain the 
differences between countries faced with similar challenges, focusing on the 
mediating role of institutions, there are questions about whether this approach can 
explain similarities between countries (Bamber et al., 2004: 60; Wailes et al., 2003: 
621).  
 
Fourth, according to this approach, there remains little scope for social actors such as 
employers or trade unions to shape outcomes with their own aims since ‘once an 
institutional order is established, social action is path dependent’ (Wailes et al., 
2011: 24). However, Leisink et al. (1996: 2) argue that: 
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[W]hatever the constraints on trade union action [are], some scope for strategic 
action is always left. Union action may be largely a response to external 
pressures, yet this response may be innovative in terms of, for instance, the 
objectives that are set or the methods which are chosen to pursue them.  
 
In a similar vein, Howell (2005) points out that despite the importance of the role of 
markets and institutions in generating constraints and opportunities for actors and 
shaping, to some extent, their actions, there is always room for actors to make their 
own strategies. The institutionalist approach tends to overlook the role of other (non-
institutional) factors including actors in shaping economic and political outcomes 
due to its particular interests in institutions (Cammack, 1990). Not much attention 
has been paid to the analysis of non-institutional factors including actors’ role, 
although these are potentially powerful (Kelly 2011: 68), as reviewed in the 
following section. 
 
2.2.3 Non-institutional factors 
 
Having argued that institutional factors alone are insufficient to explain similarity 
and variation in union responses to subcontracted workers, it is the case that the 
institutionalist approach provides a useful framework to explain differences in union 
behaviour between countries faced with similar challenges. The institutionalist 
approach focuses on the mediating role of institutions, but it should not be ignored 
that union behaviour may influence the institutions. An example is the 
transformation of collective bargaining structure towards centralisation in Korea in 
particular in the metal, banking, and health sectors where the initiatives of unions 
made it possible, although the new bargaining structure has been relatively 
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disorganised at sectoral level (Lee, 2011c: 779-784). Hence, institutional factors per 
se are not sufficient to examine the deeper dynamics of union responses, although 
they are useful in explaining between country variation (Frege and Kelly, 2003: 12). 
As such, this study also pays attention to non-institutional factors.    
 
In this group of studies, a notable example is the actors’ strategic choices approach 
(Kochan et al., 1984; 1986) whose key premise is that ‘choice and discretion on the 
part of labor, management, and government affect the course and structure of 
industrial relations systems’ (Kochan et al., 1986: 14). Kochan and colleagues 
(1986) introduced the concept of ‘strategic choice’ to the industrial relations 
literature in the mid-1980s. Although Kochan and colleagues are not uninterested in 
environmental pressures as one of sources of changes in industrial relations systems, 
they insist that these pressures are not strict determinants of industrial relations 
outcomes. These researchers emphasise the importance of particular configurations 
of power relations among the actors involved. In a similar vein, Romo argues that 
institutional change is caused by the ways in which actors interact and ‘new 
institutional equilibria reflect changes in their balance of power, strategies and forms 
of interaction’ (2005: 8).  
 
Kochan et al. (1986) argue that central to analysing changes in industrial relations 
systems is an understanding of which choices actors involved make within two 
major constraints of the structures and history. But their argument focuses more on 
the management side, as confirmed by the expression ‘one of the strongest factors 
impinging on choice is management values toward unions’ (Kochan et al., 1986: 14). 
Despite the fact that it focuses itself heavily on firms, this section also pays attention 
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to actors’ strategic choices in that differences in actor policies or industrial relations 
in studies of similar national cases reflect different patterns of actors’ strategic 
choices (Kelly, 2011: 68). In other words, actors’ policies and strategies are not just 
conditioned by external forces but there are some choices for actors themselves 
(Kelly, 2011: 69). 
 
Regarding the issue of how actors generate their interests, Blazejewski (2009: 244) 
points to the importance of the integrated approach between actors’ interests and 
situations. That study pays attention to the fact that whilst collective institutions are 
expected to be relatively stable, actors’ interpretation of their institutional 
opportunities and constraints vary, depending on their positions – such as shop 
stewards, workers and works council members. Blazejewski then argues that 
differences in the ways actors make use of institutions can be explained with an 
analysis of micro-level differences in institutional meanings and practices (ibid.).  
 
It may be that institutional factors are insufficient to examine the deeper dynamics of 
union strategic choices. For this reason, this study also considers union interests as 
one of the main factors in that underlying interests play an important role in shaping 
institutional structures and outcomes (Barry and Wilkinson, 2011: 7). Interest-based 
theorists pay attention to material interests shaping policy preferences, as policy 
interests might differ between skilled blue-collar and white-collar workers or 
between workers in trade-affected industries and those in the public sector 
(Rogowski, 1989; Swenson, 1991). Wailes and colleagues summarise the feature of 
comparison based on interest-based approach as follows: 
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Interest-based comparisons, therefore, proceed by disaggregating societal 
interests and identifying similarities and differences in the coalitions of interest 
that underpin policy patterns across countries. (Wailes et al., 2003: 622) 
 
This approach, however, has not been well developed in the main body of 
comparative industrial relations literature compared to the areas of national trade 
policy, economic policy, public-sector restructuring or changes in welfare provision 
across countries (Wailes et al., 2003: 622). The reason may be the distinct feature of 
this approach where institutions and policies in industrial relations are regarded as 
what have resulted from compromises through political contestation between interest 
groups in a society (Gourevitch, 1986; Korpi, 1978). But there have been useful 
attempts to apply the interest-based approach to the study of industrial relations. A 
notable example is the work of Pontusson and Swenson (1996) on the 
decentralisation of Swedish collective bargaining during the 1980s. They argue that 
this phenomenon was in part caused by changes in preferences of the employers and 
workers between sectors in the context of the international economy, which might 
have undermined the fundamental principle behind the long lasting centralised 
bargaining system, the cross-class coalition of interests since the 1950s. Drawing on 
empirical evidence, they argue that a number of non-institutional factors may play 
roles in shaping the interests of actors in industrial relations (Pontusson and Swenson 
1996: 247).    
 
The interest-based approach is useful to ‘explain the non-institutional sources of 
policy preferences and the role that international economic changes may play in 
shaping these preferences – a major weakness in the new institutionalism’ (Wailes et 
al. 2003: 622), but this approach has also weaknesses. This approach has been 
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criticised by its tendency to pay relatively little attention to the impact that ideology 
and ideas may have on policy outcomes (Schonhardt-Bailey 1998: 302) and its 
tendency to ignore the link between preference change and policy outcomes and the 
role of institutions (Garrett and Lange, 1996: 49). 
 
2.3 Potential for an integrated approach  
 
This chapter so far has considered strengths and weaknesses of a range of 
approaches to explain variations in industrial relations systems and actors’ behaviour. 
Market forces, institutions and actors’ strategic choices all influence changes in 
industrial relations systems and actors’ behaviour. But it is hard to say which factors 
or which combination of factors might have the most power to explain a particular 
event. In this regard, Kelly (2011:71) notes that:  
 
Nobody disputes that market forces are powerful, that institutions can both 
attenuate and amplify such forces and that actors usually have some strategic 
choices, however limited. Perhaps one of the major challenges facing 
comparative researchers is to think through how we can specify more precisely 
the conditions under which each of these sets of ‘factors’ is more or less 
effective.  
 
There are researchers who use the integrated approach as a way to overcome the 
weaknesses and limitations of each approach with a dual focus on both institutions 
and actors. The deterministic features of the new institutionalism tend to make it 
difficult for researchers to understand active roles of actors in industrial relations. 
Unions are not merely passive agents and can make a difference by formulating 
relevant strategies (Malo, 2006: 508), reflecting institutional opportunities and 
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constraints prevailing in each country (Kelly and Frege 2004: 183-185). The 
integrated approach places emphasis on the interconnection between actors and 
institutions in the context of international economic change (Bamber et al., 2004: 60).  
  
There are a number of versions of this approach. Romo (2005) argues the importance 
of union strategies and interactions in the policy-making arena based on Scharpf’s 
(1997) ‘actor-centred institutional accounts’. Wailes et al. (2003) highlight the 
potential to improve explanatory power by synthesising institutionalist and interest-
based approaches. The other strand suggested by Frege and Kelly (2003), drawing on 
social movement theory argues that four independent factors (social and economic 
change, institutional context, state and employer strategies, and union structures) 
play a decisive role in union strategic choices as ‘framing processes’ as the ways in 
which unions perceive changes in their external environments as threats or 
opportunities. Besides, Marino and Roosblad (2008: 627) point out that union 
responses are influenced not only by external circumstances, but also by factors 
more related to the unions themselves such as available resources. In a similar vein, 
Cerviňo (2000) argues that factors internal and external to unions should be 
considered together. 
 
The integrated approach stresses the importance of the interaction between interests 
and institutions in the context of international economic change (Bamber et al., 
2004; Frege and Kelly, 2003; Wailes et al., 2003). Romo (2005) and Wailes et al. 
(2003) are representative of the studies which analyse changes in industrial relations 
and bargaining systems based on the integrated approach. Romo (2005) argues that 
changes in wage bargaining structures in Italy and Spain are better explained through 
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factors endogenous to national systems, in particular union strategies and 
interactions in the policy-making arena. Wailes et al. (2003) highlight the integrated 
approach of institutionalist and interest-based approaches on the grounds that it 
could be a way to overcome the limitations of each approach: the structural 
determinism of institutionalism, and the reductionism and instrumentalism of 
interest-based approaches. As a consequence, they argue that the integrated approach 
is useful to explain both differences and similarities between and within countries. 
 
Frege and Kelly (2003) develop an analytical model for explaining union strategic 
choices based on the social movement literature (McAdam et al., 2001: 17). 
Although they highlight the explanatory power of institutions in how unions respond 
to the current challenges, they emphasise the importance of ‘framing’ processes 
through unions translate and act on changes and the role of leaders in the process of 
framing unions’ opportunities and threats and their choices of action (Frege and 
Kelly 2003: 14). Framing processes means the ways in which unions recognise and 
interpret social and economic changes and adopt particular strategies (ibid.). Given 
the fact that unions as key actors retain a degree of independence in their choices, 
even if subject to external influences (Frege and Kelly, 2003), they devise strategies 
on the basis of available power and resources and existing constraints (Marino, 2012; 
Regini, 1981; Turner, 2005). The model suggested by Frege and Kelly (2003) 
intends to explain unions’ strategies through framing processes based on interaction 
of the factors mentioned above.  
 
Cerviňo (2000) argues that union representation of contingent workers depends on 
how unions perceive the incentives and the costs and whether there exist appropriate 
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contexts to develop such a strategy. She points out that if the ideological and 
organisational incentives are greater than the costs, unions are more likely to 
represent these workers (Cerviňo, 2000: 10-11). Although Cerviňo highlights that 
factors internal and external to unions should be considered such as the 
organisational structure and employer strategies, coupled with incentives, her 
emphasis is worth noting because it puts weight on actors’ interests in interaction 
with institutions. According to that researcher, union leaders, based largely on the 
principles of class oriented unionism, may have interests in representing contingent 
workers beyond protecting existing members. This ideological objective boosts 
incentives for unions to represent contingent workers, which is directly related to the 
extent to which contingent workers can exert influence on unions. Given that unions 
seek to their organisational growth by increasing the number of memberships and 
gaining more bargaining power, unions are likely to represent contingent workers if 
this strategy would serve to increase their power, or at least, prevent further decline 
(Cerviňo, 2000: 11).  
 
2.4 Analytical framework        
 
Building on the literature reviewed, this section provides an analytical framework of 
union responses to subcontracted labour, as seen in Figure 2.1, in order to answer the 
research questions addressed in the next section. As Kelly (2011) argues, asserting 
that a range of factors is likely to influence industrial relations and actors’ behaviour 
is not to say very much. It is because ‘nobody disputes that market forces are 
powerful, that institutions cannot attenuate and amplify such forces and that actors 
usually have some strategic choices, however limited’ (Kelly, 2011: 71). The 
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analytical framework presented here is a set of factors identified in literature and 
explained in subsequent sections as driving forces that shape variations in union 
responses to subcontracted labour.  
 
Figure 2.1 An analytical framework of union responses 
 
 
 
This study, with a comparative research design, considers the positions of 
institutions surrounding unions when investigating the explanatory power of those 
institutions. General trends, such as the rise of subcontracting in this study, are not 
translated into a common pressure in all national economies but rather are mediated 
by national institutional arrangements and refracted into divergent struggles over 
particular national practices (Locke and Thelen, 1995: 338). But evidence of 
similarities and differences between most comparators would show that institutional 
factors alone are insufficient to examine the deeper dynamics of union strategic 
choices. If Wailes et al. (2003) show the potential of an integrated approach between 
the institutionalist and interest-based approaches by studying the national variations 
in industrial relations reform with comparing most similar cases, this study 
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accentuates the legitimacy of that approach with comparison of the most different 
cases at union branch level.  
 
This section explains how this framework was derived and why factors in each box 
in Figure 2.1 were selected. This framework is to explain how union responses are 
formulated. Drawing on the literature review above, this study assumes that union 
responses are formulated through interaction between institutional and non-
institutional factors. This is expected to help identify logical possibilities and explore 
which combination of factors necessary and sufficient to cause a given outcome 
(Edwards, 2005: 274). The next section explains part of the framework in turn. 
 
2.4.1 Institutional factors 
 
This framework consists of four institutional factors: the source of restructuring, 
legal regulations, collective bargaining systems, and union structure. It is important 
to mention here that institutional factors both independently and complementarily do 
influence union behaviour (Hamann and Kelly, 2008: 136). Independence and 
complementarity of factors are explained with the examples of union density and 
bargaining coverage. Unions with bargaining coverage which is almost equal or 
slightly above the union density are likely to have strong incentives to engage in 
organising in comparison to those with low density but high bargaining coverage. In 
a similar vein, this study expects that each factor or a combination of factors in each 
box may contribute to union responses.   
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Source of restructuring 
 
Given the fact that trade unions are ‘secondary organisations’, their existence and the 
ways they operate are primarily influenced by the organisations who employ the 
workers unions represent (Hyman, 1997a: 309). Exploring union responses is, to a 
large extent, an analysis of employers and other environmental factors such as the 
labour market, government policies, and legislative changes which might exert a 
significant influence on unions (ibid.). The source of restructuring here denotes who 
has driven the restructuring towards subcontracting. It also refers to employers’ 
strategies on labour utilisation. It is important to explore who had the initiative 
towards restructuring. The issue of whether central government as an employer in 
the public sector or whether an individual employer has driven restructuring to 
explore the scope of restructuring influence. In particular, the case of restructuring 
initiated by government is definitely associated with political leverage.  
 
Poole (1986) emphasises that the power and strategies of employers, managements 
and the state are crucial and decisive in shaping union strategies. Based on the 
classic understanding of the union as a less powerful actor than other actors in the 
labour market, he focuses on a reactive role of the union in the industrial relations 
system. According to Poole’s analysis (1986: 73), militant employer strategies 
unwilling to secure trade union recognition often promote labour radicalism, and a 
powerful role of the state in the industrial relations system is highly likely to fashion 
a politically active labour movements. In a similar vein, Cerviňo (2000: 13) asserts 
the importance of considering the willingness of employers to negotiate with unions 
about terms and conditions of contingent workers. She argues that if employers are 
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more disposed to negotiate with unions, it would be easier for unions to represent 
these workers. 
 
Legal regulation  
 
Given that law and industrial relations are not separable (Davidov, 2004), it is worth 
investigating the extent to which legal regulations have functioned as either 
opportunities or constraints for unions’ responses. Legal regulations here encompass 
those in the process of contracting-out, terms and conditions of subcontracted 
workers and their collective rights.  
 
Legal provisions, as Booth and Francesconi (2003) point out, might weaken unions’ 
efforts to recruit subcontracted workers as it is likely that such initiatives may 
discourage them from becoming union members. To take a familiar example, the 
minimum wage legislation might replace collectively bargained wages and EU 
directive provisions may play a role as a substitute for the employment protection 
that unions used to negotiate (Booth and Francesconi, 2003: 387). As discussed in 
Chapter 1, subcontracted workers in this study are those likely to fall into low-paid 
and low-skilled jobs whereby workers are likely to get paid at minimum wage or 
only slightly above it. Hence, whether or not the minimum wage legislation 
encourages unions’ activities in representing these workers is important and relevant. 
In a similar vein, Baccaro et al. (2003) maintain that a strong institutional position 
may discourage unions to organise workers in low-paid jobs.  
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By contrast, a hypothesis could also be formulated that a union is more likely to 
represent subcontracted workers with less diverse interests from existing union 
members (Booth and Francesconi, 2003: 387). This is because a union can enhance 
its recruiting activity by monitoring compliance with the initiatives and thereby 
attract subcontracted workers without too much extra effort to forge common 
interests between employees on different employment contracts. The analysis of 
legal regulations allows us to understand as to whether they may act as a substitute 
for union activity.  
 
Collective bargaining  
 
Collective bargaining plays a pivotal role in employment relations where used. It 
determines the terms and conditions of employment that regulate levels of pay, 
working time and other relevant working conditions (Marchington et al., 2011: 49). 
Regarding the issue of contingent workers with far weaker labour market positions, 
however, there are pessimistic views on the role of collective bargaining and hence 
some authors argue that there is a need for unions to develop a new method other 
than collective bargaining (Heery, 2009; Kretsos, 2011; Wills, 2009; Wills and 
Simms, 2004). Despite the importance of this argument, it is still the case that the 
primary mechanism which unions have used to represent their members’ interests in 
the two countries being studied is collective bargaining (Simms and Charlwood, 
2010: 126), so it is worth exploring collective bargaining systems as the primary 
route to represent the interests of workers in order to investigate unions’ strategies 
and behaviour in the context of emerging subcontracted labour. An analysis of 
collective bargaining systems serves to clarify competing arguments as to whether 
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different institutional arrangements lead to different union strategies or whether they 
reduce the extent of variation in union behaviour by the growth of flexibility in the 
labour market.  
 
Clegg points out the role of collective bargaining in shaping union behaviour by 
arguing that ‘variations in union behaviour can be explained by differences in 
collective bargaining’ (1976: 8). Despite the critique of his argument for being 
deterministic and ambiguous about causality (Frege and Kelly, 2003; Shalev, 1980), 
the two dimensions of bargaining he suggests – the level and extent of bargaining – 
are of great use in analysing the effect of collective bargaining on union behaviour. 
As discussed in detail with evidence from case studies in Chapter 6, this study does 
not intend to argue that bargaining is the most decisive factor in shaping union 
behaviour as Clegg did. Nevertheless, this study adopts these two dimensions of 
bargaining in order to characterise different bargaining systems between the two 
countries.  
 
Borrowing from Clegg (1976), collective bargaining has two dimensions: the level 
of and the extent of bargaining. The level of bargaining refers to where collective 
bargaining takes place and with whom – at the workplace with managers, or at the 
industry with employers’ representatives, or at the country with the government. The 
extent of bargaining refers to coverage of the bargaining – how many employees in a 
plant or an industry or a country are covered by it. The two dimensions are used in 
the study of Bosch et al. (2010) who use the term centralisation in order to 
differentiate the level of bargaining and the degree of inclusiveness in order to 
explain the extent of coverage of bargaining outcomes. This is an important part of 
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the study in this thesis because it helps clarify in what ways differences in bargaining 
in the health sector of the two countries have contributed to patterns in union 
responses. This study adds two issues to the analysis in order to investigate how 
relevant the bargaining agenda is to subcontracted workers and who ends up 
responsible for implementing bargaining outcomes: bargaining agenda and employer 
responsibilities.  
 
Union structure and governance 
 
Given the rise of subcontracted workers amid declining union density and increasing 
representation gap, as briefly mentioned in Chapter 1 and as explained in Chapter 4 
in more detail, this changing workforce composition presents unions with significant 
challenges. Unions have to decide whether to represent interests of these workers by 
including them into unions’ representational domains (Cerviňo, 2000; Gumbrell-
McCormick, 2011; Heery, 2004). Contrary to other contingent workers employed 
directly by a user company, the issue of subcontracted workers provides unions with 
an additional challenge, the need to expand representation beyond the workplace. For 
this reason, this study considers union structure as one of factors influencing union 
behaviour. Given the fact that union branches in UNISON and KHMU are mainly 
based on the workplace, this organisational structure may not be appropriate for 
representing subcontracted workers whose contractual employers differ from that of 
existing members. It is important to explore whether existing union structures 
function effectively or not for representing subcontracted workers.  
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As Gumbrell-McCormick (2011: 297) points out, union structure is one of the 
factors that condition how unions respond to the need to represent the interests of 
precarious workers including subcontracted workers. This helps us understand whose 
interests branches seek to represent. Union structure can be divided into two 
dimensions: external structure which refers to the scope of membership, the 
boundary of membership and patterns distinguishing one union from another; and 
internal structure which involves both governance and administration (Fiorito and 
Jarley, 2008: 189). The issue of union structure is closely related to the question of 
how unions represent whose and which interests. This is because, as Hyman (1999: 
97) argues, unions are agencies whose main role is to represent members’ or, in a 
broad term, workers’ interests and need to decide whose and which interests and how 
to represent those. 
 
Contradicting Clegg (1976: 8-11) who emphasises the role of bargaining in 
determining the level of membership and the degree of (de-)centralisation of union 
governance, this study categorises union structure as part of the institutional settings 
within which union strategies are formulated (Frege and Kelly 2004). It does not 
seem that a bargaining system plays a deterministic role in explaining changes in 
union behaviour. This is because a transformation of union structure may lead to 
changes in collective bargaining structure.  
 
In terms of the vertical dimension, there is an argument that decentralisation of union 
organisation could have a positive impact on grassroots involvement by rank-and-file 
members, which could in turn increase membership density (Frege and Kelly, 2004: 
35). This may result in either boosting union activities for subcontracted workers 
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based on increased organisational power and resources or discouraging them because 
unions may be more likely to focus on representing interests of existing members. In 
contrast, as Penninx and Roosblad (2000: 14) point out, unions centralised at 
national level might have a weak organisational power at the shop floor level, which 
can negatively affect their ability to protect interests of subcontracted workers within 
the immediate working environment. In this regard the importance of having an 
effective articulation between national and branch levels based on a strong 
organisation at both levels is highlighted (Kjellberg 1983; 2000).  
 
2.4.2 Non-institutional factors 
 
In the analysis of how each institutional factor mentioned above can affect union 
branch strategies, this study pays attention to the role of workers’ representatives in 
terms of their ideological position and general approach to industrial relations, the 
attitude of existing members and subcontracted workers. Borrowing the idea of 
Frege and Kelly (2003), this process can be called a ‘framing process’. This is 
because institutional arrangements indirectly affect each branch’s behaviour through 
this form of internal process (Cerviňo, 2000; Frege and Kelly, 2003; Marino, 2012). 
Faced with the opportunities and constraints of institutions, union leaders weigh the 
advantages and disadvantages of a particular strategy in terms of ideological 
objective and organisational growth (Cerviňo, 2000). Cerviňo adds that: 
 
[I]ncentives, per se, do not explain trade union strategies toward atypical 
workers. The representation of these workers is possible when the incentives 
(ideological and organisational) are greater than the costs, and when 
appropriate contexts exist to develop such as strategy. (2000: 11-12) 
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As such, when analysing union responses we need to consider several non-
institutional factors coupled with institutional factors: leaders’ ideological orientation, 
organisational incentives expected, attitude of existing union members and 
subcontracted workers, and organisational resources other than a union such as 
through building coalitions with other groups in a community. Although these 
factors operate in a given institutional context, there is scope for a branch to respond 
in an innovative way rather than to accommodate to the constraints of existing 
institutions conservatively. This study considers potential non-institutional factors in 
shaping union responses: the role of leaders, willingness to act of the represented and 
locations where branches operate.   
 
The role of leaders 
 
This study explores non-institutional factors in explaining union responses. The first 
factor is the role of leaders. Although leadership is one part of a process of 
organisation and representation, it is of great importance (Fairbrother et al., 2007: 
34). Formulating union policies, moulding union objectives and articulating and 
reconciling members’ interests and concerns rely largely on leadership, though we 
need to have a care not to overemphasise their roles as semi-autonomous actors 
(Fairbrother et al., 2007: 48-49).  
 
With respect to leadership this study uses the work of Undy et al. (1996) rooted in 
the work of Child et al. (1973). Undy et al. suggest three dimensional rationalities in 
explaining union behaviour faced with legislative reform: leaders’ political, 
democratic and administrative rationalities. Here, political rationality means the 
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ultimate purpose and primary means of unions, in other words, ‘unions ideological 
positions and their general approach to industrial relations’ (Undy et al., 1996: 8). 
This is in line with the work of Bacon and Blyton (2004: 750) who argue that it is 
essential to understand the ideological orientations combined with the actions of 
unions. Democratic and administrative rationality refers to the notions of union 
democracy and related governmental systems, and the ways in which unions achieve 
efficient management (Undy et al., 1996: 8).  
 
This study also considers the two terms ‘agency’ and ‘articulation’ models of union 
behaviour laid out by Heery (2006). In the agency account, union officers’ different 
characteristics and preferences are crucial in driving their activities and action. He 
argues that ‘officers make choices in performing their role and ... these are shaped by 
their own values’ (2006: 464). This account heavily focuses on personal 
characteristics of union officers, as contrasted to the articulation account that 
emphasises the importance of linking officials at branch level to the wider union. In 
Heery’s analysis (2006) of paid union officials in the UK, he argues that both agency 
and articulation accounts need to be considered as factors facilitating union renewal. 
The importance of articulation is emphasised by Kelly and Heery (1989) who argue 
that ‘successful recruitment campaigns will depend not only on national leadership, 
but also on local organisation and its impact on worker perceptions of union 
effectiveness’ (1989: 210).  
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Willingness to act of the represented 
 
This study takes the willingness to act of existing and potential members into 
account. As Fairbrother et al. (2007: 43) argue, union leadership, together with a 
willing membership can take the initiative in facing a challenge. A willing 
membership, coupled with the attitude of potential members, can be interpreted as a 
main source of organisational growth and consolidation. With respect to the 
incentives, unions are likely to have greater interests in representing subcontracted 
workers if this is considered ‘to serve to boost unions’ power, or at least, prevent it 
from declining’ (Cerviňo, 2000: 11). Central to this judgement is the consideration 
of possible scenarios including whether or not the number of subcontracted workers 
is large enough to help unions get more power; whether such workers support 
unions; whether these workers will challenge the role of existing unions by 
organising their own union separately; and whether the exclusion of these workers 
weaken the unions in both ideological and organisational aspects (ibid.).  
 
Representing subcontracted workers is one way to reconcile potential conflicting 
interests with existing members. Central to this issue is the question of how union 
members perceive the rise of subcontracted workers and the issue of organising them 
into the same union branch. This is also related to the attitude of subcontracted 
workers with the question of why contingent workers join a union (MacKenzie, 
2008). Furthermore, there is a need to consider that shared experiences between 
workers with different employment contracts as members in a union branch may 
enhance the ability of union branches’ ability to represent subcontracted workers. 
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Locations 
 
This study also considers the features of locations where the union branches studied 
were operating with attention to their possibility of influencing actors’ behaviour and 
to build coalitions with other groups in a local community. Apart from some 
hospitals highly specialised in certain areas, main targets of hospitals would be the 
locals (Lee, 2007). This is one of the features of the health sector. Consumption 
activities of goods (health service) are mainly operated within a (broader) 
community, which is in a stark difference from other industries, for instance the car 
industry where geographical separation exists between production and consumption. 
Most hospitals are operated in an accessible geographical location for people who 
live nearby and thereby hospitals are sensitive about their reputation and image so as 
to attract potential patients (Lee, 2004). Despite the importance of local community 
in studying unions and labour movements, as Kim (2011) argues, literature mainly 
focus on workplace factors when considering ‘the politics of production’ (Burawoy, 
1985). But there are some studies of labour process that emphasise that the local 
community should be considered as the unit of analysis, coupled with the workplace 
(Gough, 2003; Warde, 1992). As highlighted in Milkman’s examination (2006) of 
union campaigns for organising low paid migrant workers in southern California, 
one of main factors of successful organising is how to build supportive community 
and political alliances. In a similar vein, Marchington et al. (2004) underline the 
importance to establish new communities of interest as an alternative sources of 
voice for union renewal. This emphasis on local community can also apply into 
studies of unions. In the study of factors contributing to organising subcontracted 
workers, Kim (2011) points out that local community is one of the places where 
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‘politics of scale’ (Swyngedouw, 2004: 26) are engaged. Taking the location where 
each branch is operating into account helps this study explore whether differences in 
locations have an effect in shaping union responses.  
 
2.4.3 A note on the list of factors  
 
As mentioned above, this study mainly considers four institutional factors and three 
non-institutional factors. As institutional factors, the source of restructuring, legal 
regulations, collective bargaining systems, and union structure are primarily 
analysed. For non-institutional factors, this study pays much attention to the role of 
leaders, attitude and willingness to act of the represented, and features of locations 
where unions operate. Before moving forward on substantive discussion about how 
these factors contributed to a particular response of unions, it should be noted that it 
is hard to say that this list of factors addressed in this study is exhaustive. Rather, 
these factors were selected so as to develop plausible causal accounts of similarities 
and differences in patterns of union responses to subcontracted workers. As 
explained in further detail in Chapter 3, this is related to the fact that this study 
employed a most different case comparison (Lansbury et al., 2003: 65) for method of 
comparison.  
 
Given the research questions of this study about which factors contributed to similar 
and different union responses between and within countries, it is essential to identify 
key causal factors and mechanisms where these factors operate. Despite possibility 
of determinism, this study mainly considers four different institutional factors 
because it helps identify what have contributed to similar and different patterns in 
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union responses. Furthermore, this study adds non-institutional factors to enhance 
the accountability for a given outcome.  
 
2.5 Research questions 
 
This chapter so far reviewed literature in three key areas: union responses to 
contingent workers, three ways to explain patterns of union behaviour, and the 
potential benefits of integration between institutional and non-institutional factors. 
This review raises a number of questions that demand further consideration. 
 
Firstly, previous studies have mainly emphasised the classification of union 
strategies towards contingent workers but there are few that analyse why and under 
what circumstances trade unions choose a particular strategy. Some questions are 
identified: when and why have unions with members employed mostly on permanent 
contracts developed an intention to represent contingent workers? Are union 
responses similar under similar national or sectoral institutional arrangements? If so, 
does unions’ behaviour between countries or industries with different institutions 
vary? If we find similar responses by unions with different institutional contexts, 
how can we explain this? 
 
Secondly, the literature has tended to deal with union responses to contingent work 
in general. Given the fact that there is a variety of contract types with different levels 
of labour market power and different effects on trade unions, little emphasis has been 
placed on analysing how trade unions have responded to a particular group of 
contingent workers, in particular subcontracted workers. Previous studies on 
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subcontracting have largely focused on managements’ interests, the state of 
subcontracted workers, unions’ involvement in the process of contracting-out, 
industrial relations surrounding subcontracted workers and inter-organisational 
dynamics among workers with different employment contracts. Two main questions 
remain unclear: how have unions dealt with subcontracted workers who have 
different employers and mainly carry out distinct functions compared to temporary 
agency workers who are more likely to work side-by-side with workers on 
permanent contracts? And how have unions responded to the third party 
(subcontractor) which was not found in some other contingent employment 
arrangements subject to two parties involved such as fixed-term and part-time 
contracts? 
 
The third set of question that remains to be addressed are related to the first. There 
are three broad theoretical approaches explaining changes in industrial relations 
systems and actors’ behaviour. With the proposition that ‘institutions matter’ 
acknowledged as being the one of the most powerful approaches at present, a 
number of questions are raised: to what extent can institutions explain variations in 
union responses between countries? If we find differences between countries, can we 
attribute causal relationship to institutional differences? If we find similarities 
between countries with a difference in institutional settings, how can we explain it? 
Given the fact that each approach has strengths and weaknesses, is there any 
possibility to integrate different approaches into a single analytical framework? The 
ways in which this study addresses these questions are described in the following 
chapters. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology and research methods 
 
This chapter outlines and justifies the methodology and research methods. It starts 
with presenting the philosophical position employed in this study. That is followed 
by the research design, the rationale for selecting research sites, and the research 
methods used to gather the evidence to address the research questions posed. The 
method of data analysis and strengths and limitations of this analysis are illustrated. 
 
3.1 Critical realist approach 
 
This section reviews key concepts and principles of critical realism and discusses the 
extent to which they can serve as a useful methodological position for the proposed 
research. By presenting the epistemological and methodological position of critical 
realism, the section also provides explanations about how this operated as an 
overarching analytical framework not only for the case analysis of each country, but 
also for comparative discussions of the similarities and differences between the two 
countries. 
 
As illustrated in Chapter 2, the main purpose of this study is to analyse 1) how union 
branches have responded to subcontracted workers providing unions with a 
challenge of triangular employment relationships, 2) which factors have contributed 
to a particular type of responses, and 3) how to explain similarities and differences in 
patterns of responses in the English and Korean health sectors. 
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Given the complexity of scientific investigations it is important to show how to study 
social processes in a systematic way (Archer, 1995). This section presents critical 
realism as a philosophical underpinning to this study by examining how well it fits 
with the nature of and the objectives of this study. The research questions are closely 
related to the process of understanding the main concepts of critical realism: the 
importance of understanding structures and processes, of the generative mechanism 
between factors, of context-sensitive research and of the relation between agency and 
structure (Edwards, 2005). This study answers questions about how unions have 
responded to subcontracted labour in England and Korea, why and in what 
circumstances differences and similarities in patterns of union responses are found in 
the two countries and which factors in what ways have contributed to them. With 
respect to other philosophical currents, positivism with a focus on empirical 
regularities prevents from raising a question why things occur as they do, while 
relativism based on the fact that the world wholly socially constructed seems to 
ignore the causal influences of structures (Edwards, 2005: 268). This is the starting 
point for the philosophical understanding employed in this study. This section first 
explains the ontology of critical realism and then investigates its main features by 
comparing it to other philosophies of social science such as positivistic and 
relativistic approaches. 
 
It is essential to reveal the ontological distinction between scientific laws and 
patterns of events (Bhaskar, 1975: 12). While the ontology in positivism and 
relativism is restricted to the fused domains of the empirical/experiences and the 
actual/events, critical realism adds another domain, the ‘real/mechanisms’ (Ackroyd 
and Fleetwood, 2000: 13; Bhaskar, 1975: 62). These three concepts constitute 
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overlapping domains of reality called ‘stratified ontology’ (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 
2000: 13). The reason why it is vital to stratify domains is that it is hard to explain 
natural/social phenomena by using empirical resources obtained in surface reality. 
Different mechanisms might interact with each other in stratified ways and one 
mechanism might restrict or distort other emerging mechanisms. It is important to 
investigate ‘which mechanism’ is needed to understand events occurring at the level 
of the empirical or actual, and the structures operating behind surface reality. 
 
As Bhaskar (1975: 56) notes, ‘events must occur independently of the experiences. 
Structures and mechanisms then are real and distinct from the patterns of events that 
they generate’. In other words, this ontological position recognises that an external 
world exists independently of our knowledge and beliefs but is knowable and 
changeable (Benton and Craib, 2001: 120). As Edwards (2005: 268) highlights, 
critical realism argues that even if we cannot observe, there are real forces with 
‘causal power’ and understanding the relevant mechanisms is the task of science. 
Unlike laboratory experiments, social systems are necessarily open and complex 
with human intervention (Sayer, 1992). Nonetheless, this does not mean that society 
is wholly produced by human design or discourse as ‘rules, norms and institutions 
develop with logics independent of the choices of individual actors’ (Edwards, 2005: 
268). In this regard, Edwards (2005: 268) argues that: 
 
[Critical realism] aims to move beyond the discovery of empirical regularities 
to understand the mechanisms that not only produce these regularities but also 
determine when they will occur and when they do not. 
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From the critical realistic point of view, all social practices rely on human agency 
and social structure. As Bhaskar (1989: 34) argues, all activities presuppose the prior 
existence of social forms and activity would not possess the means to agency without 
social structure. He outlines this central theme of critical realism as to the nature of 
social structure and the connection between society and people as ‘Transformational 
Model of Social Activity’, in which structures are discontinuous because agencies 
act over time. Archer (1995: 154), who underlines ‘analytical dualism’ which means 
a methodological division between agency and structure, argues that once the 
structure is changed, subsequent activities are conditioned and shaped differently. 
This helps show that agency and structure exist independently, though one interacts 
with one another. 
 
The importance of the critical realist approach has become increasingly evident in 
the field of industrial relations studies. Turner et al. (1967) showed that key features 
of industrial relations such as strike levels varied both within a particular industry - 
the car industry in their study and between industries in the UK and those in other 
countries. This can be explained by differences in the embedded characteristics of 
particular industrial relations arrangements. The study of Edwards (1987) on the link 
between strikes and payment-by-results (PBR) systems demonstrates that despite 
theory that underlines that PBR is likely to promote strikes, this association is not 
found in some circumstances, which means that the ‘causal power’ of PBR systems 
may or may not be actualised depending on the conditions such as the size of 
workplaces and their industrial sector. 
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The critical realistic view gives a fundamental insight into this study which seeks to 
figure out the ways in which union responses were shaped and which factors under 
what circumstances have contributed to differences and similarities in patterns of 
responses. The purpose of this study is consistent with the assertion of Edwards that 
‘the feature operates only in the context of other factors’ (2006: 13). In other words, 
union responses are shaped in the context of an interaction of factors such as legal 
regulation and collective bargaining, as shown in the analytical framework in 
Chapter 2. This is in line with Pawson and Tilley’s formulation (1997: 60) that 
empirical regularity is a function of mechanism and context. As such this study 
understands regularities or configuration outcomes in a social world.  
 
It is important to understand union responses as an outcome of interacting factors in 
a certain context. As Edwards (2005: 265) argues, ‘IR institutions and processes are 
grasped in context’. Unionisation level, to take an example, has different meanings 
in context. In contrast to Korea where, for instance, 20 percent union density at the 
workplace might be described as a low level, the same density in England can be 
said to be a moderate or even high one. This is because whilst, in general, there is 
only one enterprise union (or an industrial union branch) at workplace or company 
level in Korea, the existence of multiple unions at a single workplace is more 
common in England. 
 
As such, it is useful to employ the concept of critical realism for this study. Critical 
realism is a philosophy for understanding causes of events and it is pivotal to 
investigate behind surface reality to identify the generative mechanisms. These real 
causes are presented in the form of hypotheses and they are evaluated according to 
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their general plausibility in explaining the observable surface events (Charlwood, 
2003: 41-42). As presented in Chapter 1, one of the main purposes of this study is to 
figure out why similarities and differences in patterns of union responses in England 
and Korea were found with different institutional settings and which factors 
contributed to these. The logic and practice of this research is in accordance with the 
critical realist approach identifying the underlying generative mechanism that 
produces manifest phenomena as observable contingent tendencies or patterns (Reed, 
2000: 53). Also, contrary to relativistic approaches, critical realists view the 
simultaneous and dialectical existence of structures and agency mediated by social 
practices. Furthermore, critical realism recognises that causal powers are not 
exclusively the properties of either structure or agencies: they both as the ‘real’ can 
have causal powers, through being interdependent and interacting with one another, 
which affect the ‘actual’(Fairclough, 2005). Critical realist reflections on the linkage 
between structure and agency give insight into methodology of this research. As laid 
out in Chapter 2, union responses are shaped through interacting with factors 
external and internal to unions.  
 
3.2 Qualitative research 
 
Following this philosophical stance, this study employed a qualitative research 
strategy rooted in understanding the social processes which took place within 
organisations, particularly unions. Quantitative research methods such as surveys can 
be adopted to explore process issues, but the necessary crudeness of the survey 
method hinders researchers from obtaining more satisfactory results (Kelly, 1998: 
16-17). 
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To explore how factors internal and external to unions have contributed to patterns 
of union behaviour in the two countries, this study took consideration of a number of 
factors of different levels and the relationships between them. The relationships 
between factors were not uni-directional but likely to be interactive and dynamic 
over time. This ambiguity of boundaries between factors may reflect more 
interactive and mutually interlocking relationships between them (Yin, 2003). These 
interactive, changing and multiple levels of processes and interrelations between 
factors cannot be easily quantified. Relationships between individual factors were 
understood only through analytical inference based on more informed and in-depth 
research method. 
 
3.3 Research design 
 
This section outlines the research design employed in conducting this study. It used 
case study design and comparative study. In relation to the research questions posed, 
this section argues that case study design helped explore features of real-life events, 
and union responses to subcontracted workers. A ‘most different case’ comparison 
(Lansbury et al., 2003: 65) was useful to compare union behaviour in the two 
different institutional settings. 
 
3.3.1 Case study 
 
Given the research questions with a focus on ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions, the study 
developed a case study design, as it allows us to explore characteristics of real-life 
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events, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident and when there is little control over events (Yin, 2003). Case study 
methods concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case in question 
(Stake 1995) is an appropriate approach for this study in that it would be useful to 
‘understand or explain the phenomena by placing them in their wider context’ (Kitay 
and Callus, 1998: 103). 
 
One of main criticisms of case study research centres on concerns external validity 
or generalisability. As Bryman (2004) argues, case study hinges on what might be 
called the exemplifying case. Cases are often chosen not because they are extreme or 
unusual in some way but because they are expected to provide a suitable context for 
certain research questions to be answered (Bryman, 2004: 51). The crucial question 
is not whether the findings can be generalised to a wider universe, but how well the 
researcher generates theory out of the findings (Yin, 2003). In particular, by using 
comparative design this study explored the distinguishing characteristics of two 
cases to act as a springboard for theoretical reflections about findings (Bryman, 
2004: 55).  
 
3.3.2 Comparative study 
 
The ways in which unions act is conditioned by the industrial relations institutions in 
which they operate, and by economic situations, coupled with their own structures 
and ideologies and other relevant factors (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011: 297). Social 
systems are necessarily open and complex and, unlike some of the natural sciences, 
we cannot isolate these components and examine them under controlled conditions 
73 
 
(Sayer, 1992: 3, 19) so comparative study is useful to overcome these problems 
(Strauss, 1998) by investigating same issues in different contexts. In order to 
understand which factors or combination of factors play a role in shaping union 
behaviour, this study adopted a comparative study which helped investigate 
similarities and differences and in turn help us understand the dynamics of union 
behaviour. Comparative study as a method offers important potential for theoretical 
development by developing causal explanations of relevant phenomena and by 
formulating bold conceptions and drawing out synthetic and general frameworks 
from exploration conducted in a variety of national contexts (Shalev 1980; Bean 
1987:3, 1994; Strauss 1998, Wailes et al. 2011: 5).  
 
Among methods of comparison, this study employs a most different case comparison  
(Lansbury et al., 2003: 65), which juxtaposes the national and sectoral settings of the 
countries studied that vary across a range of institutional factors and allows us 
identify key causal factors. As explained below, this study compares union 
behaviour in the health sector in two countries, England and Korea, with different 
institutional arrangements. This comparative research design enables us explain the 
questions posed in this study: (1) union responses to subcontracted labour; (2) the 
impact of different national context and the complexity of internal process in shaping 
and applying those responses; and (3) underlying causal relationships that help 
explain similarities and differences in patterns of responses. Given the research 
interests of this study, it would be challenging for a study based on one particular 
institutional setting for instance to clarify the explanatory power of institutions, 
hence the comparative study helps increase analytical leverage. 
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Many of the problems associated with comparative analysis relate to the difficulties 
of establishing conceptual equivalence when operationalising comparative research 
(Wailes et al., 2011). Linden (1998) distinguishes between phenomenal equivalence 
- where identical measures are used for the same concept regardless of context - and 
conceptual equivalence - where different measures are used for the same concept to 
reflect differences in contexts. He argues that comparative analysis can only proceed 
effectively on the basis of conceptual equivalence (Linden, 1998: 5-6), which needs 
to be applied to this study as well. 
 
In a similar vein, Locke and Thelen (1995) develop the method of ‘contextualised 
comparisons’. This, in contrast to the method of ‘matched comparisons’ which 
assumes that external forces have a similar influence on different economies, argues 
that external shocks can be experienced differently and also that the same issue has 
different meanings depending on context. In this regard they assert that under a 
certain circumstance, comparing oranges with apples will be more reasonable rather 
than apples with apples. Edwards (2005), using the term ‘contextualised comparison’, 
asserts the importance of context-sensitive research which makes two assertions: IR 
institutions and processes can only be understood in context; and systematic 
explanations hinge on specific features of industrial relations arrangements in a 
workplace, an industry or a country studied. 
 
3.4 Research sites 
 
Before embarking on case study research, a researcher must decide the unit of 
analysis on which the case will be based and how many cases will be involved 
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(Kitay and Callus, 1998: 105). Specifying the boundaries of the unit of analysis does 
not artificially restrict the study, in that one of the purposes of case study research is 
to explore the relationship between a unit and its wider environment (ibid.). To 
investigate the research questions posed, this study took the union branch as the unit 
of analysis and studied eight union branches in the two largest unions in the English 
and Korean health sectors. 
 
3.4.1 Unit of analysis 
 
Before moving on to the explanation of the analysis unit, it is worth noting that the 
two industrial unions were considered as possible units of analysis at an early stage 
of designing the research. Having identified general or industrial unions as an 
appropriate setting, exploratory interviews with National Officers of the largest 
unions in each country’s health sector were conducted and different national and 
industrial contexts were reviewed, which helped to illuminate a need to change the 
unit of analysis to union branches for two reasons. 
 
The first is because it would be almost impossible to analyse union behaviour 
towards subcontracted workers without exploring what has happened at workplace 
level through the activities of union branches. There might be considerable variation 
in outcomes within each country, as Doellgast (2008) argues in work on the analysis 
of six telecommunication companies in the USA and Germany. If general or 
industrial unions are selected as the unit of analysis, there might be a risk of 
overlooking variations at workplace level.  
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The second reason for changing the unit of analysis is that the approach applied to 
macro questions is often ‘highly deterministic, with prior conditions always being 
required to produce one outcome or another’ (Goldthorpe, 2000: 51, cited in 
Edwards 2003: 274). Hence the union branch has been taken as unit of analysis 
rather than a wider union in order that a less deterministic approach be possible and 
this is also supported by Edwards (2005: 275) who points out that ‘linking workplace 
experience to other levels of change is a key route forward’. 
 
The distinctiveness of national employment regimes has been undermined by 
globalisation of markets and the diffusion of practices, as MacDuffie (1995) argues 
from plant-level studies. In a similar vein, Doellgast (2008: 284) underlines that ‘the 
distinctive features of national industrial relations institutions are becoming less 
useful as static factors that explain company-level variation in restructuring 
outcomes’. Further the trend towards company-specific industrial relations regimes 
reinforces the particularism of union practice (Hyman, 2001) 
 
Katz and Darbishire (2000) argue that the proliferation of company-level bargaining 
has undermined the concept of a coherent national industrial relations system. In the 
study on collective negotiations over the outsourcing in the USA and Germany, 
Doellgast (2008) asserts that, despite differences in national employment relations 
institutions, the success of unions in limiting the scale and scope of outsourcing 
differs ‘within rather than between’ the two countries. Considering these arguments, 
two questions can be presented: whether we can argue that the causal relationship 
between national institutions and union branch strategies is less transparent in the 
wake of the decline of union density and bargaining coverage; and whether we can 
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claim that national institutions are less likely to matter in unions’ strategic choices to 
respond to subcontracted labour? This study contributes to the debate on whether 
unions’ strategic choices are still heavily rely on national institutions or are 
influenced more by the prevalence of heterogeneity at the regional or workplace 
level. 
 
Given the fact that the extent of workforce diversity in a company is strongly 
influenced by an employer’s strategy and management style, the study of union 
branches allows us to evaluate to what extent industrial relations and workforce 
arrangements at workplace level have an influence on union behaviour. In terms of 
reconciling common interests between workers on different contracts, the analysis of 
union branches enables us to explore the relationship between full time (implicitly) 
permanent workers, who are the majority of members, and subcontracted workers. 
The latter are likely to be excluded from the possibility of union representation since 
they are usually isolated from the mainstream workforce and confined to a discrete 
and separate set of tasks (Druker and Stanworth, 2004: 233-234). Union members as 
well as their leaders may not be willing to act in solidarity with subcontracted 
workers who can be considered as ‘outsider’ because of their employment contracts, 
especially if supporting the latter brings a loss of their own members. Growth of the 
indirectly employed including subcontracted workers has presented trade unions 
with a twofold challenge, as Heery (2004) point out, as to whether or not they 
include these workers as part of their constituencies, and whether unions accept 
subcontractors as their counterparts for collective bargaining. Since such decisions 
are taken a branch level, it became increasingly evident that union branch is the 
logical unit of study. 
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3.4.2 Selecting research sites 
 
In identifying potential research sites this study identified two contexts with different 
national and sectoral settings but where unions faced the same challenge of the 
increase of subcontracting. The health sectors in England and Korea, chosen for the 
study were selected on following criteria. 
 
At the national level, this study paid attention to three criteria: political systems, 
economic context, and industrial relations institutions. The English political system 
has been characterised by the abstentionist role of the state (even if it is argued that 
this characteristic has been changing), whilst the strong Korean state has orchestrated 
industrialisation processes. In contrast to England where a neo-liberal economic 
strategy has been implemented and has developed since 1979, Korea has been drawn 
into the neoliberal fold after the Asian crisis of 1997-98 (Harvey, 2005). Whilst there 
have been moves towards enterprise unionism which has led to a decentralised 
industrial relations system in England (Benson and Gospel, 2008; Willman and 
Bryson, 2007), the union movement in Korea, having had a long tradition of 
enterprise unionism, has begun to establish more centralised structures with 
restructuring along industry lines as part of revitalisation (Bae et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, the identification of the health care sector allowed for comparison in 
terms of the characteristics of the health sector (sheltered in England vs. exposed in 
Korea), the features of health care provision (public vs. private), the primary agent of 
restructuring which has initiated the increase of subcontracted labour (government-
led vs. management-driven), legal regulations affecting unions and subcontracted 
labour, collective bargaining systems (centralisation vs. disorganised centralisation), 
79 
 
union structure (both at industrial level but a relatively short history in Korea) and 
other relevant factors. Hence, the health sector in England and Korea provides a 
useful focus for examining union responses to subcontracted workers. 
 
Branches of the two largest unions in the English and Korean health sectors were 
studied. The general public section union, UNISON and the Korean Health and 
Medical workers Union (hereafter KHMU). These two unions being studied had a 
similar organisational structure: national union, regions, and branches, as explained 
in Chapter 4 in greater detail. UNISON had 12 regions and 1,200 branches across the 
UK with seven service groups to represent groups of members working in the same 
sector (UNISON, 2013). For KHMU, across the country there were 11 regions and 
165 branches (KHMU, 2012). Union densities and locations, with details of 
subcontracted services at those sites, are summarised in Table 3.1.  
 
From amongst the branches, this study selected three in UNISON and five in 
KHMU. It is worth noting why the number of branches differed and why these eight 
branches were chosen. In the process of selecting research sites, this study made an 
effort to find branches representing typical responses of each country with Heery’s 
typology (2004). As explained in Chapter 2, Heery suggests four types of union 
responses to agency work, another form of triangular employment relationships, each 
features a combined policy on agency workers and agency suppliers in a distinctive 
way. Applying this typology, union responses were characterised by the issue of 
whether union branches include subcontracted workers into their representational 
domains and whether they accept subcontractors as counterparts in their collective 
bargaining unit.  
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Table 3.1 An overview of the case study sites 
 No. of 
Workers 
Union 
density 
Subcontracted services Location Heery’s 
typology 
E1 2,400 25% Cleaning, catering London Engagement 
E2 6,700 20% Cleaning Birmingham Engagement 
E3 3,400 30% Catering, domestic, laundry Birmingham Engagement 
K1 1,300 88% Catering, cleaning, 
 maintenance, security, 
 reservations by phone, 
 parking, etc. 
Seoul Regulation 
K2 1,100 56% Catering, cleaning, 
 electricity, reception, 
 parking, security 
Seoul Regulation 
K3 1,000 80% Catering, cleaning, 
 electricity, maintenance, 
 parking, reception 
Seoul Regulation 
K4 600 13% Catering, cleaning Ulsan Engagement 
K5 1,400 60% Catering, cleaning, 
electricity, nursing assistant,  
reception, parking, security 
Gwangju Engagement 
Note: The number of workers and union density are counted only among full time 
permanent workers for two following reasons. First is to strike a balance between union 
branches either with or without memberships among subcontracted workers. Second is to 
focus on union branch faced with a challenge of emerging subcontracted workers. 
Source: The annual report of each hospital and interviews 
 
This study found that typical responses between the two countries differed in that 
branches of UNISON included subcontracted workers and subcontractors, while 
those of KHMU did not include these workers but tried to regulate their terms and 
conditions through bargaining with a user company. The former is classified as 
engagement and the latter as regulation, according to Heery’s typology (2004). 
Interestingly, there were two outlying cases in KHMU illustrating engagement type, 
whilst no exceptional case was found in UNISON. 
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Taking the case of Korea first, in order to select research sites, this study interviewed 
five National Officers as key informants who were able to help direct this study to 
likely sites. They reported that there were two exceptional branches whose responses 
were different from other typical branches. On this basis, desk research analysing 
almost all branch rulebooks in KHMU (140 out of 165 branches) was conducted 
with a particular focus on provisions concerning membership. As a result, it found 
out that no branch other than the two outliers, Branches K4 and K5, included 
subcontracted workers explicitly in its rulebook. It was evident that workers 
employed by subcontractors could not join the branch which was operating in their 
workplace. As explained in Chapter 7, some rulebooks of branches had scope for 
interpretation because the membership provisions were stated that workers who 
belonged to or provided their labour power to a hospital could join a branch. This 
resulted from the amendment of rulebooks traditionally based on employment 
contracts following formation of the industry union, KHMU, whose membership 
encompassed any person working for, seeking a job in, or who had worked for health 
service (The KHMU rulebook, Rule 3.7.1). Nevertheless, there was little change in 
essence in the membership provision. As such, subcontracted workers did not fall 
into a branch’s demarcation except in the two outlier branches. By contrast, the K4 
branch allowed subcontracted workers to join the branch by stating in its rulebook 
that ‘regardless of employment contract and status, all workers including full-time 
permanent, temporary, part-time, outsourced and other forms of precarious workers 
are allowed to be members of the branch if they are working for the hospital K4’ 
(The branch K4 rulebook, Rule 2.6). In the case of the K5 branch, although it did not 
explicitly state eligibility for membership of subcontracted workers, it had an open 
membership provision and actively supported a separate union branch for 
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subcontracted workers (see in Chapter 7 for two types of inclusion presented by two 
outliers in Korea). As such, all branches of KHMU were categorised into one type of 
responses, except the only two outlier branches which were classified as 
engagement.  
 
Interestingly, this study found no exceptional case in UNISON. Although this study 
did not undertake desk research as in Korea due to lack of data available, four 
National Officers in UNISON reported that the national rulebook did not allow each 
branch to exclude workers of private companies from its membership. An 
interviewee explicitly pointed out that despite differences in actual membership 
among subcontracted workers in each branch, writing the exclusion of these workers 
into its rules was an obvious breach of the national rulebook. An interviewee 
responsible for subcontracting issues at national union level said that ‘no 
subcontracted workers were organised outside the branch structure’. Hence, this 
study did not find exceptional case and classified the typical response of UNISON 
branches as engagement. 
 
Three union branches representing typical response in each country were deliberately 
chosen in order to discriminate country effects from hospital ownership, size and 
location effects. As is widely recognised, there exists considerable heterogeneity or 
variation within a country. Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990) argue that in a cross-
cultural study, where only one organisation in each country was studied, there is a 
danger that ‘any and all differences between companies - hence between countries - 
become fair game for explanations couched in cultural or societal terms’ (1990: 34). 
In this regard, they argue that differences between countries could much more 
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reliably be sorted out when a large number of diverse organisations in each country 
were selected. This choice can allow us to differentiate factors between hospital 
ownership, size, and location as well as country and thereby avoid the danger of 
misrepresenting effects, as is inherent in a comparative research design where only 
one organisation is studied in each country. If between-country variation is detected 
along with within-country uniformity in the pattern of union responses, for instance, 
it is possible to state that this is strongly influenced by national institutions. 
 
After considering the size of hospital, number of workers, union density and 
accessibility, this study selected three branches (K1, K2 and K3) in Korea and three 
(E1, E2 and E3) in England as typical responses. Broadly speaking, the research sites 
finally selected are indicative of the sites within which most union branches operate. 
Furthermore Branches K4 and K5 were selected as outlying cases. Following the 
note of Bryman (2004: 51), these cases were selected because they are expected to 
provide a suitable context for particular research questions to be answered rather 
than because they are extreme or usual, but this study seeks to consider both of them 
so as to explore why variations in branch level within a single institutional setting 
were found. 
 
3.5 Research methods 
 
In examining trade union responses to subcontracted labour, this study used four 
methods of data collection on the grounds that applying a multi-method approach is 
expected to minimise the weaknesses of each. As Edwards (2005: 275) points out, 
although interview-based case studies have been considered as a tried and tested 
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method, there are limitations: interview-based studies tend to depend on reports of 
the outcomes of interest rather than direct observation of behaviour. Hence, ‘in-depth 
qualitative research’ is needed to uncover ‘hidden’ processes and practices within 
organisational settings (Greene, 2003: 312).  
 
The four main sources of evidence used in this research are discussed by Yin (2003: 
86) who provides the following Table 3.2 summarising their strengths and 
weaknesses. 
 
Table 3.2 Source of evidence: strengths and weaknesses 
 
Source  
of evidence 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Interviews ∙ Targeted - focuses directly on 
case study topic 
∙ Insightful - provides perceived 
causal inferences 
∙ Bias due to poorly constructed  
questions 
∙ Response bias 
∙ Inaccuracies due to poor recall 
∙ Reflexivity - the interviewee 
 gives what interviewer wants to hear 
Direct 
observation 
∙ Reality - covers events in real 
time 
∙ Contextual - covers context of 
event 
∙ Time consuming 
∙ Selectivity - unless broad coverage 
Documen- 
tation 
∙ Stable - can be reviewed 
repeatedly 
∙ Unobtrusive - not created as a 
result of the case study 
∙ Broad coverage - long span of 
time, many events and settings 
∙ Retrievability - can be low 
∙ Biased selectively,  
if collection is incomplete 
∙ Reporting bias-reflects  
(unknown) bias of author 
∙ Access may be deliberately blocked 
Archival 
Records 
∙ [no editing for documentation 
above] 
∙ Precise and quantitative 
∙ [no editing for documentation above] 
∙ Accessibility due to privacy reasons 
Source: Yin (2003: 86) 
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The main method of data collection was fifty-three semi-structured interviews with 
union officials and this study has also made use of direct observation supplemented 
by archival records and documentation. This section focuses on how data was 
collected for this study, followed by how it was transcribed, translated, and analysed, 
in the next section. 
 
3.5.1 Semi-structured interviews 
 
The first method was qualitative research interviews, in particular semi-structured 
interviews. These allow researchers to ask new questions that follow up 
interviewees’ replies and vary the order and the wording of questions (Bryman, 
2004: 320). Considering the research concerns have a clear focus rather than a 
general notion, semi-structured interviews were used so that the more specific issues 
could be addressed (Bryman, 2004: 320). As seen in Table 3.3, interviews were 
conducted at three levels: national, regional, and branch. A total of fifty-three 
interviews were carried out, comprising thirteen officials at the union headquarters of 
UNISON and KHMU, seven officials of the corresponding regions at the two 
national unions, and thirty-three officials of eight branches selected. With the 
consent of the interviewees, all interviews were recorded on a digital recorder. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis and each interview 
lasted for one to four hours, and some for two to three occurring. Prior to the full-
scale studies, preliminary interviews were undertaken with five National Officers of 
KHMU, and four national and regional officials of UNISON. Interviews with 
National Officers were followed by case studies of the branches.  
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Table 3.3 The composition of interviewees 
 
 UNISON KHMU 
National 8 5 
Regional 4 3 
Branch E1  3 K1  4 
 E2  3 K2  6 
 E3  4 K3  3 
  K4  4 
  K5  6 
Total 22 31 
 
It is important to explain the need for interviews with regional officers in both 
unions. This study intended to clarify the role of regional offices in between the 
national union and its branches in dealing with the issue of subcontracted workers. 
However this study found that each regional office studied played a less decisive role 
in shaping union branch responses than the national unions in the two. Hence these 
interviews with regional officers were used as sources to better understand what has 
happened in the national unions and branches instead of using them as separate data 
to examine the role of regional offices. 
 
All interviews of the Korean cases were carried out between December 2010 and 
March 2011, and between February and March 2012. Distance constraints meant 
interviews were conducted intensively during a relatively short period. The second 
phase of interviews was conducted in order to clarify comparable points between the 
two countries following the English case studies during 2011, and to justify the case 
selection in Korea. Interviews for the English cases were conducted for a longer 
period from April 2011 to May 2012 because time was required to understand the 
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English contexts in which industrial relations systems, public sector unionism, the 
history of subcontracting, have operated and to get access to the interviewees. 
 
3.5.2 Observation and documentations 
 
This study also used direct non-participatory observation as one of data collection 
methods. The key aims of the observations were to cast light on the decision-making 
processes, membership participation, communication with current and potential 
members and other relevant issues at both national and local levels which were not 
easy to obtain solely from interviews. This study observed events as follows: the 
branches’ annual general meetings of Branch E1 (Mar 2012) and Branch E2 (Mar 
2012), UNISON Annual Conference for the Health Sector (Apr 2012), UNISON 
National Delegate Conference (Jun 2013), KHMU National Annual Conferences 
(Feb 2011 and Feb 2012), and a KHMU general executive meeting with an issue on 
indirect employment (Dec 2011). In addition, an organising campaign (Sep 2011) 
and an industrial action (Nov 2011) were observed at Branch E3. These observations 
provided opportunities to document union activities and behaviour without relying 
on peoples’ willingness and ability to respond to questions. The events were 
recorded and analysed with Nvivo, as described in the next section. This study also 
used archival records to seek information about these kinds of meetings and 
conferences held in the past or which this study was not able to observe. 
 
These data were supplemented with extensive documentary data. Sources of 
documentary data that were particularly relevant included annual reports on 
management performance, collective agreements, internal documents of hospitals 
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such as the number and wage of subcontracted workers by year, union annual reports, 
union newspapers, training materials for union members. In addition, interview 
research and documentary analysis was supplemented with general sources such as 
workforce statistics, newspaper articles, and reports, with respect to each hospital 
and union branch. 
 
3.6 Data analysis 
 
This section reports how data collected were transcribed and analysed. Transcripts of 
interviews and observations was loaded into Nvivo and then coded. Nvivo is a 
qualitative data analysis software package. By coding text and breaking it down into 
categories, the use of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (hereafter 
CAQDAS) can facilitate the process of data analysis and provide a quick and simple 
way of finding the frequency with which interviewees use certain words in what 
contexts (Bryman, 2004). Proponents of CAQDAS also argue that it provides 
reliable and rigorous qualitative data (Morison and Moir, 1998; Richards and 
Richards, 1994). For qualitative researchers who use case study methods, concepts 
and theories are usually inductively derived from the data that are collected 
(Bryman, 2004: 52, 284). 
 
Prior to analysing data with Nvivo, all interviews were transcribed. There is a need 
to mention the Korean cases with methodological issues of language. With respect to 
data collected from Korea, all interviews and observations were transcribed in 
Korean and parts of the transcription considered most useful were translated into 
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English. This was because it was time consuming and inefficient to translate all the 
data into English. The transcriptions were loaded into Nvivo. 
 
3.7 Practicalities and limitations of the research 
 
This section outlines some practical issues encountered in the process of researching, 
and the limitations of this research. Establishing conceptual equivalence in operating 
comparative research, and language issues when translating interviews conducted in 
Korean into English has a difficulty. It should also be noted that there is a lack of 
evidence from managers and subcontracted workers themselves, and in addition 
practical issues caused by unbalanced background understanding of research sites. 
These difficulties are explained below.  
 
3.7.1 Conceptual equivalence and translation 
 
While analysing data, there is potential to misinterpret data collected from different 
countries. This is because, as Lanai (2010) points out, ‘identical words in different 
languages may have different meanings, while corresponding terms may embrace 
wholly different realities’. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, the main concepts of 
this study are subcontracting and subcontracted workers. This study found that these 
were equivalent between the two countries in that the former referred to the business 
activity of using workers employed by a third party and the latter referred to workers 
who were allocated to a client’s company with whom subcontractors had contracted 
to supply labour. Although there were differences in these workers’ expected service 
period, and the degree of legal protection in wage and conditions of employment and 
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collective rights, these are issues to be discussed in substantial chapters not a 
problem of conceptual equivalence. 
 
There were also an issue of translating data from Korean into English. This study 
found the term union branch was equivalent to the Korean word jibu, but the word 
which denoted union official varied in Korean including nojo (or jibu) imwon, ganbu, 
and jidoja, but these terms were translated as the equivalent term ‘union official’ in 
the UK. In fact, Section 119 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992 (hereafter TULRCA 1992) defined an official as follows: 
 
“[O]fficial” means— 
(a) an official of the union or of a branch or section of the union, or 
(b) a person elected or appointed in accordance with the rules of the union to 
be a representative of its members or of some of them, and includes a 
person so elected or appointed who is an employee of the same employers 
as the members or one or more of the members whom he is to represent 
 
Comparing the definition with that in Korean law, the conceptual equivalence 
becomes evident. Article 29 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act 
(hereafter TULRAA) in Korea defined the representative of a trade union as follows: 
 
[Someone with] the authority to bargain with employers or employers 
association, and to make collective agreements for the trade union and union 
members 
 
In Article 24 of TULRAA, the term ‘full-time official’ described a worker who ‘may 
perform duties only for a trade union, without providing work specified in his/her 
employment contract, if stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement or consented 
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by employers’. Although this article aimed to prohibit the payment of full-time union 
officials, this study was able to confirm that the meaning of union officials is used as 
an equivalent term between the two countries. 
 
3.7.2 A note on the omission of evidence from other parties 
 
Data collected for this study is mainly based on interviews with union officials, 
observations of union activities and documentation published by unions. It is the 
case that employers, existing (mostly regular workers) and potential (subcontracted 
workers) members and other related actors such as governments or political parties 
are also influential in shaping union behaviour but this analysis put more emphasis 
on unions by asking how unions have adopted a particular strategy through 
interpreting other actors’ behaviour and external and internal circumstances rather 
than on analysing each actor’s behaviour separately. In this regard, a key area of 
potential weakness of this study is the omission of evidence directly from managers 
and subcontracted workers. This came about for a number of reasons. 
 
Firstly, given that the starting point of this study was union representation in the 
context of declining union membership and the emerging challenge of triangular 
employment relationships, negotiating access to the union was a primary objective. 
Access to the union allowed this study to develop research questions relating to how 
unions have responded to subcontracted workers, why they have chosen a particular 
strategy, and which factors have contributed to shaping those responses. Accessing 
the union branches, on the other hand, meant that getting access to management and 
subcontracted workers was a secondary objective of the study. Efforts were made to 
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contact managers in all workplaces where union branches studied were operating but 
no access for interviews with managers was possible in England although managers 
were interviewed in research sites in Korea. With respect to the accessibility of 
managers, there was an asymmetry of data collected between the two countries so 
that this study did not include data collected from interviews with managers in Korea. 
In addition, while data on the Korean case was collected with little difficulty due to 
the researcher’s working experiences as a labour journalist for fourteen years, and 
personal links with unions, much more time and effort was required to get access to 
interviewees in England. Although this study gradually curtailed the time required by 
expanding the network for the research, this process took longer than expected. 
Furthermore, time was spent attending activities organised by English trade unions 
in order to get more familiar with the English context. 
 
Secondly, this study did not include subcontracted workers as interviewees. At the 
initial stage of research design, this study had considered collecting data from these 
workers as a whole. This was expected to clarify how their employment contracts, 
the ways of working, and the relationship with regular workers at workplace have 
affected their attitudes towards unions, which had in turn contributed to union 
responses. However, subcontracted workers were not a homogeneous group, 
consisting of diverse features of workers in relation to aspects such as age, gender, 
ethnicity, nationality, contractual status and occupational positions. Lethbridge’s 
study (2009: 115) for example showed that the majority of contracted-out workers in 
East London were women from black and minority ethnic groups. Their attitudes 
towards trade unions were expected to vary depending on their own status and 
interests, which required an independent study separated from this one. Some may 
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criticise the approach this study employed as being exclusively focused on formal 
representatives (e.g. Blazejewski, 2009: 244) with little focus on the perspectives of 
newly emerging and more likely precarious workforce. 
 
As mentioned above, however, the aim of this study is to present the responses of 
unions with declining influence largely caused by membership decline when faced 
with emerging subcontracted workers providing unions with new challenges about 
how to deal with the third party and its employees. Instead of looking at each actor 
involved in the triangular employment relationships separately, this study focused on 
how union branches understood and interpreted these workers’ interests and 
behaviour. This has also expected to help uncover underlying relationships such as 
conflicting interests between workers with different employment contracts and 
internal politics at workplace level. From the outset, this study concedes that it has 
better information concerning formal representatives and their behaviour than rank-
and-file members or potential members among subcontracted workers, and the latter 
area requires further research. 
 
3.7.3 Practicalities 
 
Additional efforts were made in order to better understand the English context. 
Given the researcher’s long working experience in Korea, as mentioned earlier, it is 
the case that this study had a better understanding of the Korean industrial relations 
and labour movement in general which plays an important role as background 
knowledge in exploring Korean unions’ policies and actions. This means that it 
relatively lacks an understanding of the English context. In order to fill in the 
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understanding gap between the two countries, seminars, rallies, and marches 
organised by English unions were attended, and informal interviews were conducted 
with union officials and participants of the events including officials of other 
UNISON branches and members of the Socialist Medical Association. Included are a 
TUC seminar entitled ‘Is the tide turning on public services outsourcing?’ (Nov 
2012), a jointly hosted conference ‘Outsourcing and Austerity: Civil Society and the 
Coalition (Oct 2012), TUC march and rally for ‘A Future that Works’ (Oct 2012), 
‘Reclaiming the NHS’ conference (June 2012), ‘Save our NHS’ rally (Mar 2012), 
Public sector workers march and rally as part of strike against pension reforms (Nov 
2011), TUC march for the Alternative (Mar 2011), and other relevant events. While 
attending these events, a field journal was written which helped to keep a record of 
interesting speeches, relevant discussions, and informal interviews. The field journal 
has contributed to a rich understanding of what had happened in the NHS as a whole, 
what union officials thought about the changes, and how union branches have 
operated in this context. It was not possible to use all the information but some was 
useful to enhance its understanding. 
 
3.8 Concluding summary 
 
This chapter presented the methodology and research methods for obtaining the data 
to address the research questions. Given that this study is interested in questions 
about ‘why’ and ‘how’ and ‘actors’ (unions’) behaviour’ in particular contexts where 
they operate, the critical realist approach helped answer them.  Compared to the 
constructivist traditions which describe reality as being socially constructed (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994), this approach helped understand social practices resulting from 
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actors and social structure. Union responses to subcontracted workers were seen as 
conditioned by industrial relations institutions in each country as well as by union 
internal politics based on leadership, willingness of the represented, and other 
relevant factors. In this regard, the critical realist approach allowed consideration of 
actors and structures at the same time so as to explore underlying causal explanations. 
This study employed a comparative study with eight union branches of the two 
largest unions in the English and Korean health sectors, UNISON and KHMU. This 
approach was useful to understand the dynamics of union behaviour by allowing the 
study to investigate same issues facing unions in different contexts. Data was 
collected through fifty-three semi-structured interviews, observations, documentation, 
and archival data, and analysed with the support of Nvivo. Before moving on to 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7, Chapter 4 outlines the features of the English and Korean health 
sectors in considerable detail to show why these two are an appropriate setting for 
this study. 
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Chapter 4 Institutional context 
 
The characteristic features of both national and sectoral institutions in England and 
Korea were briefly outlined in the previous chapter in order to illustrate why the 
health sectors of both countries are an appropriate focus for this study. This chapter 
presents background information on the health sectors in more detail before moving 
on to a comparative analysis of the union response to subcontracted labour in 
subsequent chapters. It focuses on explaining the features of health sector institutions 
in England and Korea, which in turn helps illustrate the similarities and differences 
in institutional arrangements. National and sectoral institutions shape management 
strategy in relation to subcontracting by moulding the governance regime of each 
hospital, either constraining or facilitating changes in workplace and industrial 
relations.  
 
This chapter begins with an explanation of key features of the health sectors in the 
two countries in Section 4.1, followed by a description of the characteristics and 
recent changes within the labour market with a particular focus on the emergence of 
subcontracting in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 then provides an outline of industrial 
relations in this sector and a brief explanation of the main actors: trade unions, and 
employers and their associations. 
 
4.1 The Health Care Sector 
 
This study found that the key features of the health care systems in England and 
Korea differed in terms of the source of finance and the main body for health care 
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delivery. The NHS, which dominated in the English health care provision, receives 
public funds from general taxation and is a publicly provided health service (Buchan, 
2000: 319; Grimshaw and Carroll, 2008: 169). In contrast, Korea has witnessed a 
relatively high proportion of private health funding and the majority of hospitals, 
approximately 90 percent, are owned and run by private organisations such as 
companies or universities (Lee, 2007: 56). These differences are closely linked with 
the driving forces behind the restructuring of ownership, operational structure and 
workforce composition of hospitals for the purpose of reducing costs, improving 
labour flexibility, and increasing profitability, as discussed in Chapter 5. This section 
presents the key features of the health care systems of the two countries by means of 
the typology introduced by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (hereafter OECD), highlighting recent pressure on hospitals to save 
costs by enhancing labour flexibility which has caused growth in the number of 
subcontracted workers. 
 
4.1.1 Key features of health sector 
 
The distinctive features of the health care systems in the two countries were well 
represented by the typology developed by OECD. Among various typologies, the 
three-model typology, based on a dichotomy between patient sovereignty and social 
equity (OECD, 1987: 24), is the most well-known and has been widely used since 
the late 1970s (Lee et al., 2008: 108). This typology proposes three models: the 
National Health Service (NHS), Social Health Insurance (SHI), and Private Health 
Insurance (PHI). This also corresponds with the latest OECD typology focusing on 
the relationship between insurance/financing and delivery systems, and resulting in 
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three models: the public integrated (equivalent to NHS); public contract (SHI); and 
the private insurance-provider (PHI) models (Docteur and Oxley, 2003; Lee et al., 
2008: 108). This section explains the features of each health care system within the 
latest typology, illustrating how each system studied falls into its respective category. 
 
According to the latest version (Docteur and Oxley, 2003: 9-11), the first type is the 
public integrated model which refers to a combination of public financing and public 
provision. Under this system, health care services are organised and operated in the 
same way as a government department, and are highly likely to cover the total 
population. The UK system before the reforms of the early 1990s is an example of 
this. Interestingly, it is likely to be subsequently reclassified as an example of the 
second model (ibid.). As explained in detail in Chapter 5, the UK has seen a number 
of reforms of its universal public health service from the mid-1980s with the 
introduction of ‘new public management’ techniques, represented by 
managerialisation and marketisation (Galetto et al., 2012: 7; Kessler and Purcell, 
1996). The second model is that of the public-contract, whereby private providers 
are directly involved in the delivery of health care by contracting with the public 
insurer (public payer), either a state agency or social security funds. In countries 
adopting this model, private hospitals and clinics are run on a non-profit basis: Korea 
is an example of this second model (Lee et al., 2008: 108). Lastly, there is the private 
insurance-provider model which means that private (often for-profit) providers are 
combined with private insurance whose operators can selectively enter into contracts 
with competing providers. 
 
As mentioned above, the UK health care provision, the NHS, is publicly funded 
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from taxation. According to OECD Health data (2012), 83.2 percent of health 
expenditure in the UK was funded by public sources in 2010, well above the average 
of 72.2 percent in OECD countries, although slightly down from 84.1 percent in 
2009. In terms of ownership, the vast majority of hospitals in the UK were located in 
the public sector (Méhaut et al., 2010: 321-322). In contrast, Korea witnessed a 
relatively high proportion of private health funding: 32 percent of total health 
expenditure in 2010 was accounted for by substantial out-of-pocket payments. 
Despite a steady increase in the share of public spending on health, from 36.2 
percent of total health expenditure in 1996 to 58.2 percent in 2010, it remained well 
below the OECD average. In Korea, the majority of hospitals, approximately 90 
percent, were owned and run by private organisations such as universities or 
companies (Lee, 2007: 56). 
 
These differences are closely linked with the driving forces behind restructuring. As 
discussed in Chapter 5 in relation to union response, governments in England found 
it necessary to increase key market values such as efficiency and competitiveness in 
the health sector and thereby initiated health sector reform. In contrast, restructuring 
in Korea has tended to be driven by those market forces which are fuelled by 
globalisation ideology. It may also be that government policies for public hospitals, 
which accounted for around 10 percent of all hospitals in Korea, might have 
compelled other private hospitals to follow. Compared to England, however, private 
hospitals in Korea seem to be more likely to enjoy autonomy in their business, 
especially with regard to the workforce. 
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The different features between the two countries in terms of health care provision 
and financing seem to indicate that the different types of health care systems have 
led to different ways of restructuring. Hospitals in the USA epitomise this 
relationship since the reason they tend to take low-road strategies, represented by 
low pay, poor working conditions, and low mobility prospects, is rooted in their 
greater dependence on fragmented and competing sources of finance and a lack of 
funding for people not covered by the health insurance sector (Méhaut et al., 2010: 
360-362). It is the case, as Galetto et al. (2012: 4) argue, that differences in health 
service provision between organisations, coupled with differences in collective 
bargaining institutions have contributed to the distinctive features of the institutional 
arrangements governing employment regulation in the hospitals of the two countries. 
 
4.1.2 Pressures on the health sector 
 
The NHS is the world’s largest publicly funded health service, following the 
principle of universal health services that were free at the point of use regardless of 
wealth and were funded through taxation (NHS, 2012a). In other words, spending on 
hospitals is highly politicised and needed to take competing demands into 
consideration, ranging from patient expectation to the politics of public sector 
expenditure. The policies adopted by English hospitals operating within the NHS 
‘must be sensitive to national health policy options and the health service budget in 
terms of their consequences for pay policy, outsourcing, and even concerns about the 
quality of care and the fight against hospital-acquired infections’ (Méhaut et al., 
2010: 362). In this regard, Grimshaw and Carroll (2008: 169) note that: 
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[P]olitics, bureaucracy, transparency, and the United Kingdom-specific welfare 
state model all play important roles in shaping the context for patterns of work 
and employment. 
 
The public sector has witnessed changes in spending and governance with 
implications for hospital workers depending on the political agenda. Successive 
Conservative governments during the late 1980s and the 1990s put pressure on the 
hospital sector not only via tight restrictions on spending but also through certain 
market reforms, represented by compulsory competitive tendering and the 
introduction of self-governing NHS trusts (Grimshaw and Carroll, 2008: 169). The 
election of the Labour government in 1997 also made a significant impact on the 
hospital sector, one which was associated with service quality and their political 
ambition, for instance, to reduce waiting lists (Grimshaw and Carroll, 2008: 170). 
These changes radically challenged how hospitals manage health care. While 
governments still operated health spending centrally, local hospital management took 
on responsibility for its execution and thereby, accountability for balancing the 
budget. 
 
In terms of changes in financing, it is important to look at the Private Finance 
Initiative (hereafter PFI), a form of public-private partnership. Under PFI, introduced 
in the late 1990s across the public sector, private contractors have recouped money 
in return for investment in building new hospitals or refurbishing existing buildings 
(Grimshaw et al., 2002). Compulsory competitive tendering (hereafter CCT) of 
ancillary services to private companies was a requirement of all PFI hospital 
contracts up until 2004. From 2005 onwards, ‘private health care providers secured a 
role within the NHS (in England only) with the establishment of a growing number 
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of independent treatment centres’ (Galetto et al., 2012: 8). This partnership has led to 
vulnerability of employment, especially for those working in ancillary services such 
as cleaning, catering, portering, estates, and maintenance, as a result of transferring 
these workers to private sector companies offering less generous pensions and lower 
rates of pay compared to other employees. 
 
Another change was to introduce a more autonomous status for NHS hospitals, that 
of Foundation Trust, in 2004  (Galetto et al., 2012: 8). Foundation Trusts are still 
publicly owned but have greater autonomy in decision-making in terms of managing 
their workforce and organising health provision, and represented one form of 
decentralisation of public services (Newell, 2009). In Britain, 137 hospitals out of 
290 had acquired Foundation Trust status by 2010 (Galetto et al., 2012: 8). The 
hospitals where the three UNISON branches studied were based are all Foundation 
Trusts. 
 
By contrast, privately owned hospitals represent the majority in the provision of 
health care in Korea, although the health industry is characterised as being for the 
public good (Lee, 2007: 56). Whilst around 90 percent of hospitals in the UK were 
public organisations, only 10 percent were classed as such in Korea and even in the 
case of public hospitals, they were operated via a self-financing business system and 
hence it is argued that they differed little from private hospitals with a focus on 
making a profit (Lee, 2007: 56). As a consequence, private hospitals have been 
established in urban areas where the demand for health care was higher than in rural 
areas, and focusing more on curing disease than the prevention of disease or 
improvement in health (Lee, 2007: 57). The fact that the functions of the different 
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hospitals were not clear was criticised for creating intense competition in the health 
sector (KIHASA, 2003: 67-71). There are three types of hospital: clinics as primary 
health care; hospitals as secondary care; and the general hospital as a tertiary 
hospital. The degree of care at each level differed theoretically but in practice there 
was little division in the market and therefore all hospitals have competed to attract 
patients (KIHASA, 2003: 68). As a result, the number of hospitals including general 
hospitals, dental hospitals, oriental medicine hospitals, mental hospitals, tuberculosis 
hospitals, and leprosy hospitals has increased rapidly from 21,000 in 1990 to 56,000 
in 2010 (MoHW, 2011), and has led to intense competition. 
 
4.2 The Labour Market in the Health Sector 
 
The health sector in England and Korea has witnessed a rise in subcontracting (Kim 
et al., 2009; Wills, 2009). Contracting-out of some ancillary and support services 
occurred as management in the NHS explored various methods of saving on the 
payroll, among other reasons (Buchan, 2000: 320). The experience of the Korean 
health sector was broadly similar. One of the striking features of the labour market in 
the Korean health sector was that among contingent workers, indirect employment 
including subcontracting has increased more rapidly than direct employment and 
within indirect employment, a majority of staff were employed by outsourcing 
companies (Kim et al., 2009: 15). This section explores the features of the labour 
market of the two countries, focusing on the rise in the number of subcontracted 
workers which in turn has posed a challenge to union representation. 
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4.2.1 Employment 
 
As life expectancy has risen and infant mortality has fallen in most developed 
countries, the role of the health service has become increasingly important and as a 
result, the number of workers in this sector has also increased (Lee, 2007: 49). The 
first part of this section looks at how the health sector of the two countries has 
witnessed an increase in the number of clinical and supporting staff. 
 
According to a report of the NHS entitled NHS Workforce: Summary of staff in the 
NHS: Results from September 2011 Census (NHS, 2012b), 1.3 million staff were 
employed by the NHS in England in 2011. Taking into consideration the fact that 
this number did not count workers working for the NHS but employed by private 
companies, the total number of workers in the NHS is greater still. Looking at the 
total workforce in the health sector from 2001 to 2011, although a slight decrease in 
numbers has seen during 2006, 2007, and 2011, over the whole period an increase 
has seen (NHS, 2012b). Since 2001, the workforce employed in the NHS has been 
growing at an annual average of 2.0 percent and the total number increased by 
241,000 during a ten-year period. Among the 1.3 million workforce, over half 
(685,000) were professionally qualified clinical staff including 144,000 doctors, 
370,000 qualified nursing staff and some 170,000 qualified technical staff, supported 
by 448,000 staff in hospitals and general practitioner (GP) practices. The rest of the 
workforce was directly involved in day-to-day running of the organisation and its 
infrastructure, categorised as NHS infrastructure support, with 109,000 in a central 
function and 38,000 in a management role. This also included 72 000 hotel, property, 
105 
 
and estates staff working in clerical and administrative jobs and in areas such as 
laundry, catering, domestic services and gardens. 
 
In 2010, the Korean health sector employed 444,000 workers which included doctors, 
dentists, oriental medical doctors, pharmacists, nurses, nursing aides, medical 
technicians, and other workers according to the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
(MoHW, 2011). The health sector in Korea, in common with England, has 
demonstrated an increase in the number of workers, having risen by 100,000 since 
2005. However, this figure released by the government only represented the number 
of workers directly employed by hospitals as did in England. In terms of the 
composition of the workforce, the Korean health sector showed a dual and 
fragmented labour market following the economic crisis of 1997 which came as a 
shock to the labour market. During this period, many companies, including hospitals, 
created spin-offs or alternatively outsourced part of their business. The decrease in 
the number of good jobs at large firms was largely due to management’s 
determination to carry out a programme of downsizing and outsourcing and, post 
economic recovery in 1999, companies tended to recruit contingent workers to fill 
what had previously been regular jobs (Eun, 2007; Lee, 2011a: 297). 
 
4.2.2 Subcontracting 
 
Subcontracting, as Eun (2008) and Wills (2009) argue, is commonplace and more 
widespread than other forms of contingent employment in most developed countries, 
and the labour market in the English and Korean health sectors have experienced 
similar situations.  
106 
 
Taking the English case first, it is noticeable that the number of professional 
qualified clinical staff has been increasing since 2001, while the number of staff 
employed by hotel, property and estates has not kept pace. In comparison with the 
average annual change of 2.0 percent between 2001 and 2011 (NHS, 2012b: 29), the 
change in the number of professional staff is 2.3 percent, while that of hotels, 
property and estates stood at only 0.2 percent. This trend was also evident in earlier 
data. The NHS report (2006) entitled Staff in the NHS 2005 showed that, since 1997, 
the number of support staff directly employed by the NHS decreased by an average 
of 296 per year to 75,000 in 2005 as a result of more services being contracted-out. 
Despite the fluctuation in numbers, it has continued to decrease and stood at 72,000 
in 2011, evidence that contracting-out was still an on-going process. The 2004 
workplace employment relations survey also confirmed this trend. The majority of 
workplaces (86 percent) contracted-out at least one of 11 services including building 
maintenance, cleaning, training, security, payroll and so on, with little difference 
between the private (86 percent) and public (87 percent) sectors (Kersley et al., 
2006). As such, since the Conservative government pushed contracting-out in earnest 
in 1983, there has been a steady decline in the number of staff in the infrastructure 
support category including cleaners, laundry, catering and maintenance staff (Revill, 
2005). In a study of the link between contract cleaning and infection control, Davies 
(2009: 20) argues that although the perceived shortcomings in the quality of service 
provided by the third party, private cleaning companies have caused widespread 
public disquiet, many hospitals, particularly those in England have continued to 
outsource cleaning service.  
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Data from the Korean health sector confirmed that contracting-out, which was 
considered as a practice most often used in the manufacturing sector, has become 
widespread in the hospital sector (Eun, 2011a). The latest survey of companies with 
300 or more employees conducted by the Ministry of Employment and Labor 
(MoEL, 2010) showed that 82 percent of the hospitals surveyed (81 out of 99) had 
contracted-out at least one service as of 2010, such as cleaning, catering, laundry, 
linen, and caring services. Given that the proportion of companies using 
subcontracted workers in shipbuilding, steel, and car industries recorded 100 percent, 
92.6 percent and 86.4 percent respectively, the incidence of using subcontractors in 
the health sector represented a similar level to that of the manufacturing sector 
(MoEL, 2010). Some hospitals have even contracted-out nursing assistant jobs 
classified as a part of clinical service and thereby the Korean health sector has 
witnessed a decrease in bottom level clinical service, which has led to a dual labour 
market (Eun, 2011b). 
 
One of the striking features of the labour market in the Korean health sector was the 
fact that among contingent workers, indirect employment increased more rapidly 
than did direct employment. Between 2005 and 2009 there was little difference in the 
proportion of contingent workers across the whole workforce: whilst the proportion 
of those in direct employment decreased from 14.1 to 7.6 percent, that in indirect 
employment increased from 10.9 to 13.9 percent (Kim et al., 2009: 15). Of those in 
indirect employment, the majority of workers (86.8 percent) were employed by 
outsourcing companies with the rest being employed by temporary agency 
companies. The difference between outsourced and temporary agency work in the 
Korean health sector is explained in more detail in Chapter 5 in relation to legal 
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regulations and practices. Official figures released by government only considered 
temporary agency work as part of contingent work, excepting outsourced staff, 
because they considered that subcontracted workers were directly employed on 
permanent contracts by subcontractors. In this regard, Kim and his colleagues argue 
that an overwhelming majority of indirect employment could be classified as a 
‘hidden workforce’ (Kim et al., 2009: 15). Kim and colleagues also suggest that 
staffing in the health sector can be divided into three categories: qualified permanent 
workers in clinical services; contingent workers directly employed in some area of 
clinical services; and those indirectly employed in non-clinical services. This 
argument is supported by the findings of their study of 50 branches of KHMU in 
2009. This study shows that of the contingent workers directly employed in all jobs, 
the proportion relating to nursing staff (39.9 percent) is the greatest. In contrast, of 
those indirectly employed, the first, second, and third greatest percentages relate to 
cleaning (38.6 percent), catering (16.2 percent) and maintenance (10.5 percent) 
respectively.  
 
4.2.3 Working conditions of subcontracted workers 
 
Subcontracted workers whom this study deals with are mostly classified as the low 
paid. According to the study by Messing (1998: 180) which identifies a hierarchy of 
status in hospitals, those who cure (e.g. doctors and their assistants who may be 
nurses or technicians) are at the top, followed by those who care and heal (e.g. nurses, 
therapists, and attendants), and then those at the bottom hold responsibility for 
hygiene (e.g. cleaners, sterilisers, and launderers) and for health maintenance (e.g. 
food services). She points out that the ‘invisibility’ and low status of these workers at 
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the bottom level helps shape the perception of these services as peripheral to medical 
services (1998: 180). Davies (2009: 23) argues that ‘the low status of cleaners within 
hospitals is related to the low status of cleaning itself, and both have undoubtedly 
eased the path to the contracting-out of cleaning services’. Grimshaw and Rubery 
(2007: 58) also comment that for private contractors for these services: 
 
Reliance on a primarily female workforce may be related to undervaluation of 
the whole activity. In some cases, the opportunity to link pay to a 
disadvantaged group and thereby keep wage costs at a low average level may 
be associated with the formation of a separate sector. 
 
Not only were these workers classified as being in the bottom three of nine pay 
bands (UNISON, 2006: 8), but they were also excluded from the NHS pension. In 
the past, the NHS offered its employees generous pensions and competitive wages, 
even for relatively unskilled workers (Givan and Bach, 2007: 136) but those 
transferred have suffered from deteriorating pay and working conditions. Even for 
those covered by a two-tier workforce code, their pension schemes were designed 
differently from the NHS pension. The Treasury has recently announced a move 
which would come into effect late 2013 whereby ‘NHS staff transferred to the 
private sector in future can continue to pay into their government pension schemes’, 
but this policy is aimed at making it cheaper for private contractors to bid for 
government service contracts (CIPD 2013). 
 
This low status of those employed in ancillary jobs is also evident in the Korean 
health sector. The hierarchical structure in Korean hospitals comprises three groups: 
the first group includes doctors, dentists and oriental medical doctors with a high 
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level of education of 18 years or more; the second refers to nurses, chemists, medical 
technicians with at least 14 years education; and the third includes nursing assistants, 
cleaners, caterers, electricians, telephone operators, those with less than 12 years 
education (Han et al., 2006). Due to the diverse and disparate nature of the various 
qualifications, it is almost impossible to achieve any degree of social mobility, in 
other words, movement between groups (Lee, 2007: 85). Workers in the third group, 
the lowest level of the hierarchy, were mainly targeted for subcontracting by 
employers looking to cut costs and to improve labour flexibility. It was relatively 
easy for employers to replace those workers employed within the third group 
because the level of qualifications and experience required for these jobs was not 
high. Hence most subcontracting took place in the third group. A strong likelihood of 
their being replaced led to a deterioration in pay and working conditions for both 
those who were transferred and new comers. 
 
According to an analysis using data from the Economically Active Population 
Survey (hereafter EAPS) 2013 published by Statistics Korea (KOSTAT), the average 
hourly wage of subcontracted workers in all industries – it was almost impossible to 
find data at national level which covered the health care sector exclusively – was less 
than half (44.7 percent) of that of regular workers as of March 2013 (Kim, 2013: 17). 
Subcontracted workers did not enjoy the same rights and entitlements as regular 
workers who shared the workplace with them, such as access to seniority pay 
increments and wage premiums. A large number of subcontracted workers were 
excluded from standard provision covering statutory welfare and labour. Such 
exclusion serves to cause their marginalization (Kim, 2010: 242). Only about 50-60 
percent of them were covered by statutory welfare programmes including national 
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pensions, national health insurance and employment insurance, compared with 85-99 
percent of regular workers. The proportion of subcontracted workers protected by 
legal labour standards, such as extra work premiums and severance pay was 30-60 
percent, which was much lower than that of regular workers reaching 72-97 percent 
(Kim, 2013: 26).  
 
As such, there seems to be little difference between the trend in terms of workforce 
composition towards outsourcing ancillary jobs in the English and Korean health 
sectors. There is very little doubt that this trend has fragmented existing workforce 
arrangements and resulted in a multi-tier workforce (Perrons, 2004). As Méhaut and 
his colleagues (2010: 339) point out, the employers’ response to outsourcing is 
interpreted as a ‘low-road’ strategy, relating to deterioration in pay, career 
opportunities, and job security. In a similar vein, Eun (2008: 127-129) argues in her 
study of industrial relations strategy in Korean companies that the increase in 
subcontracting is a result of ‘the Korean way to achieve low-road strategy’ in that 
companies tend to pursue a low-road strategy characterised by low wages, low skill 
levels and low productivity (Clair and Reich, 1997; Kalleberg, 2001) by choosing to 
subcontract rather than employ directly.  
 
This study found that, as Méhaut et al. (2010: 339) argue, hospitals in both countries, 
under enormous pressure to reduce labour costs, have tended to outsource workers, 
particularly those in ancillary jobs, to subcontractors usually offering less generous 
pay and working conditions. 
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4.3 Industrial Relations Actors 
 
Drawing on the earlier explanation of the sectoral characteristics and features of the 
labour market in the English and Korean health sectors, this section explores the 
main actors in industrial relations. Reflecting upon the two different contexts in 
which actors operate, it focuses on their representational function, structural features 
and their role in collective bargaining. 
 
4.3.1 Trade unions 
 
As shown earlier, the NHS has a larger and more heterogeneous workforce than that 
of any other organisation in the public sector in England, which is reflected by a 
complex pattern of union representation (Newell, 2009). The number of trade unions 
representing workers in the health sector in the UK stood at sixteen as of 2013 
(Interview, National Officer of UNISON). These unions were all involved in 
collective bargaining and most of them represented both public and private sector 
workers (Weber and Nevala, 2011: 17-19). The major unions in the health sector 
were divided into two main categories: general unions and professional bodies 
(Givan and Bach, 2007: 136). 
 
The largest general union in this sector is UNISON, formed in 1993 and representing 
over 400,000 members working both in the NHS and private contractors delivering 
NHS services (UNISON, 2012c). Its members included nurses, midwives, health 
care assistants, paramedics, cleaners, porters, catering staff, medical secretaries, 
clerical and administrative staff, and scientific and technical staff. UNITE and GMB 
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were two other general unions with fewer health care workers than UNISON (Givan 
and Bach, 2007: 136). In contrast with the relatively heterogeneous membership of 
general unions, members represented by professional ‘special register bodies’ 
(Grimshaw et al., 2007: 598) were more homogeneous since they were based on 
specific occupational groups with their own particular interests. The British Medical 
Association (BMA) and the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) representing 141,000 
doctors and 410,000 nursing staff respectively were two representative professional 
unions, followed by smaller recognised professional unions of groups such as 
physiotherapists, radiographers and midwives (Certification Officer, 2011: 56; Givan 
and Bach, 2007: 136).  
 
In England, workers are able to join more than one specific union. Nurses, for 
example, were able to join both UNISON as a general union and the RCN as their 
professional body. In practice, there were not many workers with dual membership 
because they had to bear the cost of the union dues of all unions they joined 
(Interview, Branches E1 and E3). Union density was well above average in the 
public sector in the UK and that in the health and social care sector in 2006 was 43 
percent (Grimshaw et al., 2007: 599-600). The NHS workforce was far from 
homogeneous and heavily unionised (Buchan, 2000: 319). 
 
In contrast with the situation in England, the Korean health sector enjoyed a 
relatively simple structure. The number of unions was only two and the professional 
groups were not considered to be trade unions with the right of collective bargaining. 
Unions were split into two categories depending on their affiliated unions at national 
level. As of 2011, KHMU, an industry union, with 40,800 members belonged to the 
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Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (hereafter KCTU), while the National 
Medical Industry Workers’ Federation of Korea, an association of enterprise unions, 
with 6,937 members was affiliated with the Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
(hereafter FKTU) (MoEL, 2012). Membership of these unions covered all those 
working in hospitals and medical clinics such as nurses, medical engineers, nursing 
aides, pharmacists, dieticians, administrative and technical staff. Unions did not 
exclude doctors, with the exception of those who were responsible for the 
management of a business, but few were members. Apart from unions, there were 
professional associations for doctors, nurses and some other technicians, but they 
were not granted trade union status and thereby unable to bargain collectively over 
pay and working conditions or go on strike, and were not protected by labour law. 
 
The two unions being studied, UNISON and KHMU had similar organisational 
structures, comprising a three-tier structure of a national union, regions and finally 
branches usually based in the workplace. UNISON had 12 regions and 1,200 
branches across the UK plus seven service groups representing groups of members 
working in the same sector, for example, health, local government and higher 
education (UNISON, 2013). For KHMU, with members mostly working for the 
health care sector, there were 11 regions and 165 branches across the country 
(KHMU, 2012).  
 
As explained in Chapter 3, this study selected three branches (E1, E2 and E3) of 
UNISON’s health sector and three branches (K1, K2 and K3) of KHMU in order to 
represent typical branch responses to subcontracted workers in the two unions 
respectively. It also looked two other branches (K4 and K5) of KHMU which 
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presented similar responses to those of the UNISON branches. The selected research 
sites enable us to understand not only the differences but also the similarities in 
patterns of union responses to subcontracted workers, as discussed in the following 
chapters. 
 
4.3.2 Employer associations 
 
Turning to organisations which represented employers, this study found the English 
health sector to be relatively more stable than that of Korea. NHS Employers was the 
voice of employers in the NHS in England, representing employers on workforce 
issues in relation to pay and negotiations, recruitment and workforce planning, 
healthy and productive workplaces, and employment policy and practices (NHS 
Employers, 2013). It was part of the NHS Confederation which was the only body 
covering the full range of organisations who commissioned and provided NHS 
services, with over 92 percent membership across all types of NHS organisation 
(NHS Confederation, 2012). 
 
In contrast, the term ‘employer organisations’ at sectoral level in Korea was not 
popular until enterprise unions were reorganised into the industrial union, KHMU, in 
1998. Unions mainly negotiated with each hospital employer rather than an employer 
association. In the context of lack of occupational labour markets, the enterprise 
unionism enforced by the state was the predominant form of union structure (Park, 
1992: 112). Long before the establishment of KHMU, there was one organisation, 
the Korean Hospital Association (hereafter KHA) which represented hospital 
employers, but it mainly focused on the improvement of hospital systems and 
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management through research, education, training and the lobbying of governments 
(KHA, 2012) rather than being involved in industrial relations issues. Rather, the 
KHA tended to refute its role as the employer association on the grounds that only 
10 percent of member hospitals had union members who joined KHMU (Jun and 
Suh, 2008: 155). In addition, members of the KHA did not want to play a leading 
role in industrial relations. Especially members with no union involvement refused 
to accept the role of KHA as an employer association due to concerns over the 
possibility of the establishment of unions in their hospitals (Lee, 2007: 94). But, after 
lengthy discussion with KHMU in 2001, the KHA began to consult and negotiate 
with KHMU formally and informally and provided members with training in 
personnel management and some key issues on industrial relations such as sectoral 
collective bargaining, labour law and changes in statutory working hours (Jin and 
Suh, 2008: 155). 
 
As a result, the employer organisation for the health sector, the Korean Health and 
Medical Employers Association (hereafter KHMEA) was launched in 2007 with 96 
member hospitals (Lee, 2011c: 784), which was the second employer association in 
Korean industrial relations, after that established in the metal industry in 2006 (Eun 
2007: 4-5). The recent launch of employer organisations as the sectoral unions’ 
counterpart reflected the lack of a tradition of sectoral unionism. However, the 
KHMEA resolved to disband itself just two years after its establishment, arguing that 
it would be impossible to negotiate with KHMU which they considered unreasonable 
in its demands and unilateral in its attitude (Cho, 2009). However, it could be 
interpreted that there were complicated circumstances in terms of its representational 
quality and the process of reconciling each member’s interests behind this matter, 
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caused by the size (big versus small and medium-size) and the ownership of 
hospitals (universities or companies) (Eun et al., 2012b: 128-129). Therefore, there 
has been no employer association whose role is closely involved in industrial 
relations in the Korean health sector since 2009, whilst KHMU has tried to negotiate 
individually with each hospital where a branch is based. 
 
4.4 Concluding summary 
 
This chapter described the distinctive features of the health care sectors of England 
and Korea, explored the effect on these sectors of recent changes in the labour 
markets which witnessed an increase in the number of subcontracted workers, 
subsequently and summarised the main actors in industrial relations in both contexts. 
Both the source of financing and the health care delivery body differentiated the 
English system from that of Korea. While the NHS in England was originally 
publicly funded from taxation, providing health care to the public, recent years have 
witnessed a continuous move toward marketisation and privatisation. By contrast, 
the health sector in Korea demonstrates a higher degree of private health funding and 
the dominance of private organisations delivering health care. Despite differences in 
the system, both have undergone similar changes in the labour market. In both cases, 
in order to save costs and enhance flexibility, management has contracted-out some 
ancillary and support services, leading to deterioration in pay and working conditions 
for those undertaking the services transferred. The emergence of workers with 
inferior conditions and different employers from the regular workers poses a 
challenge to unions, particularly in terms of their representational function and 
abilities. In England, industrial relations in the health sector are the responsibility of  
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trade unions including professional bodies, NHS Employers, and the government. In 
the Korean case, despite reorganising enterprise unions into industrial unions, 
industrial relations are not well developed at sectoral level, therefore the industrial 
union, KHMU and the management teams of the hospitals where the KHMU’s 
branches are organised are the key actors. 
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Chapter 5 Emergence of subcontracted labour 
 
This chapter explores union responses to subcontracted workers in relation to the 
ways in which the restructuring of organisations for saving costs and improving 
flexibility was generated. It also covers how legal regulations which apply to unions 
and subcontracted workers were enacted. Union responses in the English and Korean 
health sectors varied considerably. Faced with the rise of subcontracted workers, the 
three UNISON branches (E1, E2 and E3) studied in England adopted an inclusive 
approach by accepting these workers as branch members and representing them 
through negotiating with private contractors and/or hospitals. By contrast, the three 
KHMU branches (K1, K2 and K3) studied in Korea excluded these workers from 
their representational domain but to some extent, regulated their pay and terms and 
conditions of employment, through negotiating with and consulting hospitals. 
Heery’s typology (2004) of union responses to agency labour was applied to the 
findings of this study, as described in Chapter 2. The responses of the UNISON 
branches were classified as engagement, while those of KHMU branches as 
regulation, as explained below. 
 
This study presents a typical response of UNISON as engagement and that of 
KHMU as regulation respectively for the following reasons. As explained in Chapter 
3, empirical evidence showed that there was no branch of UNISON which excluded 
these workers or rejected a negotiation with subcontractors. In a similar vein, data 
collected from desk research of branches’ rulebooks and interviews with National 
Officers of KHMU highlighted that no branch included subcontracted workers into 
its constituency except the two outlying branches, K4 and K5. These two responded 
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in a different way from the typical approach in Korea, presenting a similar response 
to those of UNISON where engagement type of responses was typical.  
 
This chapter addresses the questions of why typical unions’ responses differed and of 
the underlying causes which help explain differences between the two countries. 
Furthermore, with attention to differences within a given institutional setting in 
Korea and similarities between countries, it assesses which factors contributed to 
these variations in union responses. The extent to which the trajectory of 
restructuring of organisations, and legal regulations applying to trade unions and 
subcontracted workers, influenced patterns of union responses is also explored. 
 
To this end, the chapter explores how restructuring initiatives have affected unions’ 
responses in the two countries: how subcontracted labour has emerged; how 
subcontracted workers have been managed at their workplaces; and how this has 
affected union branches’ responses. Legal regulations applying to unions and 
subcontracted workers were also analysed because these are closely involved in how 
subcontracted workers emerged and were managed. This approach helps explain 
how union representation was formulated and implemented in the context of 
restructuring of organisations and legal regulations in a distinctive way in each 
institutional setting.  
 
It is necessary to explain why this study puts the source of restructuring and legal 
regulation in a single chapter. These two factors are directly and closely associated 
with the process of using subcontracted labour at the workplace, changes in terms 
and conditions of subcontracted workers, and conditions of unions’ activities such as 
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organising, bargaining, and industrial action. Such factors allow analysis of patterns 
of union responses affected by different features of employers in the health sector 
and of legal regulations applying to unions and subcontracted workers in each 
country. 
 
The findings are as follows. First, restructuring led by government encouraged more 
centralised and more practical – focusing on potential benefits rather than ideological 
battles – union responses in England. In contrast, restructuring driven by employers 
in Korea caused fragmented responses depending on the size and the speed of 
restructuring at workplace level. Second, legal regulations that help reduce the gap in 
pay and working conditions between regular and subcontracted workers, and those 
regulations giving subcontracted workers collective rights, helped branches organise 
and represent these workers, as shown in the English case. In other words, it seems 
that the higher the level of legal protection for pay and working conditions of 
subcontracted workers was, the more actively unions have been involved in 
organising and representing them. Third, and most significantly, despite 
commonalities in institutional settings, union branches could make a different type 
of representation outside the mainstream of union responses, as addressed in 
Branches K4 and K5. 
 
According to these findings, it seems that despite the importance of the source of 
restructuring and legal regulations in shaping union responses, those alone are not 
sufficient to explain both similarities and differences in union branches’ responses to 
subcontracted workers. Whilst these two institutional factors are able to explain why 
typical responses in the two countries varied, they lack explanatory power to 
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describe differences within countries. Rather, these differences may be explained by 
three non-institutional factors: leadership, involvement of subcontracted workers, 
and effective work with allies in the community. This chapter hereby highlights the 
importance of considering both institutional and non-institutional factors in a single 
analytical framework.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.1, unions’ policies and actions are 
examined in the light of which source the restructuring leading to emergence and rise 
of subcontracting initiated from. This chapter then explores union branches’ 
understanding of why employers prefer using subcontracted labour in order to reveal 
the effect of the rise of subcontracted workers on union branches and their members, 
followed by an analysis of the extent to which legal regulations contributed to branch 
responses in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. Non-institutional factors are then explored in order 
to examine differences within a country, or similarities between countries in Section 
5.4 with a focus on the two outlying cases in Korea. The last section summarises the 
conclusions drawn from these analyses. 
 
5.1 The source of restructuring 
 
This section examines the question of whether the source of and the ways of 
restructuring of organisations which encouraged the use of subcontracting have 
served to differentiate unions’ responses between the two countries. This issue is 
directly related to differences in the health care sectors in England and Korea, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. The distinctive characteristics of the main financing source 
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and the provision of health care service help explore how union branches’ responses 
have been formulated in the difference institutional settings. 
 
The NHS is a publicly funded health service with its budget in large part coming 
from general taxation, while Korean hospitals are financed by a mix of taxation and 
social insurance contributions. In England, although recent years have witnessed that 
some services became provided by the private companies, health services are still 
almost entirely delivered by public organisation within the NHS. In contrast the main 
body of health service provisions in Korea is private hospitals. Due to these different 
characteristics, the role of the state in the health care systems is characterised as 
‘provider’ in England and as ‘conductor’ in Korea (Lee et al., 2008: 110). The 
identification of these differences allows for comparison in terms of the main agent 
of restructuring of the health sector, the ways in which unions perceived the 
restructuring, and then how unions’ policies and actions were developed in response 
to it. 
 
Drawing on empirical evidence, this section argues that compared to those in Korea, 
the English union branches studied implemented strategies which were more 
centralised at national level and more pragmatic against the backdrop of radical 
changes toward externalisation of the workforce. To this end, this section explores 
how the different trajectory of restructuring of the health sector in England and in 
Korea contributed to union responses in the two, followed by an analysis of how 
unions shaped their responses based on their understanding of management 
initiatives and their implications. 
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5.1.1 Government-led versus management-driven 
 
In the reform of health sector employment arrangements, the issue of who initiated 
the reform is one which seems to have caused striking differences in the two 
countries. Here the process of restructuring and its impact on workers and unions, in 
English and Korean health sectors is contrasted. 
 
England 
 
After the 1979 election, the Conservative government introduced various types of 
market-style reforms. This marketisation strategy was, as Givan and Bach (2007: 
135) describe, implemented through a range of practices that introduced competition 
and private sector service provision into the NHS. Among them, three changes were 
crucial for the spread of subcontracting as part of marketisation: the introduction of 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT); the establishment of self-governing 
hospital trusts; and the emergence of Private Finance Initiative (PFI). 
 
It was not the first time the private sector had become involved with the health care 
services. Prior to the 1980s hospitals used private firms to supply support services 
but this was relatively small-scale and mostly in response to labour shortages in the 
1960s, which was in a stark contrast to the mandatory regime from 1983 onwards 
(Givan and Bach, 2007: 137-138). Health authorities as the administrative 
organisations were instructed ‘to test the cost-effectiveness of their support services 
and to accept the lowest tender unless ‘compelling reasons’ dictated otherwise’ 
(Givan and Bach, 2007: 138). The Conservative government argued that contracting-
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out ancillary services was a more efficient way of using limited resources (Davies, 
2009: 20). In accordance with their 1983 election manifesto (Conservative Party, 
1983), the Conservative government pushed health authorities to make the maximum 
savings possible by putting services such as laundry, catering, and cleaning to 
competitive tender, whilst also tightening up on management costs and exerting 
firmer control of staff numbers on the other. 
 
Another challenge to the way hospitals managed health care was the establishment of 
hospital trusts. Some NHS hospitals were converted to trusts and from then on had 
the status of public corporations, with the ability to borrow independently for capital 
expenditure and to retain operating surpluses (Clayton and Pontusson, 1998: 93). An 
NHS trust, as a service provider, typically comprised a single large hospital or 
hospitals that competed against each other for government revenue (Givan and Bach, 
2007: 140). The change meant that while decisions on spending were still highly 
centralised, responsibility for execution of spending plans and accountability for 
balancing the budget were placed on branch hospital management (Grimshaw and 
Carroll, 2008: 172). 
 
The final element of the reforms carried out by the Conservative government was the 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) which was a form of public-private partnership. 
Under the PFI system, a consortium of private sector firms provided the capital 
investment for a new hospital or the refurbishment of existing buildings and 
recouped the money through a charge on the services provided by the hospital 
(Grimshaw et al., 2002: 485-489). What is most relevant to this analysis is that each 
PFI agreement involved ‘the outsourcing of support staff as part of the contract 
126 
 
tendering’ (Givan and Bach, 2007: 141). The PFI scheme transferred large groups of 
workers employed in the NHS hospitals such as cleaning, catering, portering, estates, 
and maintenance to the private companies. Such workers thereby received less 
generous pensions and were paid at lower rates than the NHS employees they 
worked alongside (Grimshaw and Carroll, 2008: 172). These ancillary services were 
then sold by the private sector consortium back to the client NHS hospital 
(Grimshaw and Carroll, 2008: 172). To summarise, under the PFI system, a private 
consortium was contracted to finance, design, build, and operate public service 
facilities by outsourcing support staff, whereby the policy of competitive tendering 
was effectively superseded (Givan and Bach, 2007: 141). 
 
This radical organisational reshaping of the health service was maintained under the 
New Labour governments following 1997 without significant changes (Bach, 2004; 
Colling, 2001; Geddes, 2001; Givan and Bach, 2007). As Bach (2004: 184-185) 
argues, the state has intervened to a great extent in restructuring the health service by 
implementing general management, establishing the internal market, and developing 
the audit culture. Public hospital employers were pressurised to accept the changes 
resulting from central government’s demands for greater efficiency and the 
modernisation of service provision (Bach and Winchester, 2003) and hence hospital 
trusts were encouraged to adopt new managerial techniques focusing on value for 
money rather than public ethos (Bach, 2004). 
 
This change was supported by the Conservative legacy that was the establishment of 
a cadre of managers that ‘were able to convert government aspirations for a more 
‘business-like’ NHS into concrete managerial initiatives’ (Givan and Bach, 2007: 
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142). Despite the injection of marketised managerial initiatives and the 
transformation of the traditional role of the government as a ‘model employer’, the 
government still had a pivotal role in controlling the health service in that health care 
in England remained publicly-financed, even if some of the service were no longer 
publicly provided (Galetto et al., 2012). 
 
Although policymakers in the New Labour government focused more on pragmatic 
justifications for marketisation than ideological drive (Givan and Bach, 2007: 134), 
research conducted by the Office for Public Management (hereafter OPM) provides 
evidence that implementing outsourcing policy was primarily driven by political will 
rather than evidence-based practice (UNISON, 2008a: 6). Research by the OPM also 
showed that each hospital Trust was forced to increase tendering and use of the 
private sector, which was the only option offered to trusts that wished to make 
service changes (UNISON, 2008a: 6) 
 
As such, the use of subcontracting was initiated by government in England through 
implementation of CCT and PFI as part of health care reforms. Although the final 
decisions about whether to contract-out, and which and how many services to 
outsource were left to each hospital’s management, such decisions seemed to have 
been forced by the governments’ initiatives. 
 
Korea 
 
The spread of subcontracting in the Korean health sector tended to be driven more 
directly by the market than in England, although it was the case that the historical 
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features of government industrial policies and their effects on businesses have been 
related to this trend. According to Eun (2011b; 2012), one of the main reasons for 
management use of outsourcing in Korea was governments’ developmental industry 
policies. The Korean government in the 1960-70s encouraged large companies with 
300 or more employees not only to pave a way for a subcontracting system as a way 
of concentration of capital but to use subcontracted workers as a means of effective 
labour control (Eun, 2012: 89-90). At that time industry policies driven by the 
government focused on fostering large companies at the expense of economic 
subjugation of small- and medium-sized companies to large ones, and creating a 
vertical labour control system with multi-layered subcontracting. Eun (2012: 90) 
argues that since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the combination model of 
direct employment with outsourcing has changed into a new model whereby 
subcontracted workers are substituted for a part of the existing regular workforce 
through the use of outsourcing, after massive dismissal of regular workers. 
 
Such government initiatives, combined with the discourse of competition and 
efficiency, set up the standardised Korean model which aimed to utilise both regular 
workers as insiders and subcontracted workers as outsiders. Although only around 
10 percent of hospitals were run by government agencies, the government intended 
to influence the market by drawing up guidelines on utilisation of workforce in 
publicly-owned hospitals. The government issued a guideline in 2001 which limited 
the proportion of regular workers which could be hired by public hospitals (Yoon, 
2008a: 67-68). The proportion of contingent workers in the hospitals owned and run 
by public organisations stood at 13.6 percent in 1999 surged to 17.9 percent in 2001 
and 26.8 percent in 2004 in the wake of this guideline.  
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The government announced a new policy on subcontracting in the public sector in 
2006, stating that ‘all public institutions are allowed to outsource services classified 
as peripheral ones’ (The Korean Government, 2006: 24). This policy also allowed 
them to outsource core services if there were ‘rational reasons’ such as the 
possibility of making a huge cost reduction to compete with the private sector (ibid.). 
This policy has been criticised not only by unionists but also by academics, arguing 
that the government’s outsourcing-friendly approach meant that many services were 
likely to be classified as peripheral, due to ambiguity over how core or peripheral 
services were defined (Yoon, 2008a: 68). 
 
The government’s drive towards outsourcing encouraged businesses to contract-out 
more services across all sectors and this caused a stark division between internal and 
external labour markets in Korea. The health sector was no exception. As presented 
in Chapter 4, more than eight in ten hospitals (82 percent) have contracted-out at 
least one service as of 2010, far higher than the national average across sectors 
which stood at 54.6 percent (MoEL, 2010). Considering that subcontracting had 
been concentrated in the manufacturing sector up to that point, such figures 
confirmed that this practice had been extensively spreading into service sectors such 
as health care. 
 
This form of labour market polarisation through the proliferation of subcontracting 
has been widespread throughout whole industries in Korea, and was encouraged by 
the trend of organisational isomorphism (Kim et al., 2011). It was accelerated by the 
external shocks of the economic crisis, combined with actors’ strategic choices in 
labour market (Lee, 2011a: 299). After the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the 
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Korean governments began to transform its approach from a developmental to a 
neoliberal state (Lim and Jang, 2006) and large firms with 300 or more employees 
started pursuing exploitative profit maximisation resulting in more inferior 
conditions in small subcontracting firms, which also led to an increase of contingent 
labour (Lee, 2011a: 299). 
 
It is also noteworthy that this segmentation of the labour market was triggered by the 
weakness of trade unions’ power. Union density and collective bargaining coverage 
had both decreased, as explained in Chapter 6. In addition, unions’ activities had 
focused on representing the interest of existing regular workers based on enterprise 
consciousness. 
 
5.1.2 Union branch responses 
 
Unions in general have opposed the introduction of precarious work arrangements 
such as subcontracting (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011; Hayakawa and Simard, 2001; 
Olsen and Kalleberg, 2004; Perry, 1997). This is because they tend to consider that 
subcontracting implies a transfer from regular jobs with employment security and 
relatively high wages to precarious ones with insecurity of employment and lower 
wages (Hayakawa and Simard, 2001: 81). Furthermore, unions outline concerns 
about diffusion or loss of union membership and a negative impact on unions’ 
influence (Perry, 1997: 532). Such changes undermine the material base for 
bargaining and organising whereby unions operate (Colling, 1995: 135). 
 
131 
 
Data collected from the branches of UNISON and KHMU studied support these. 
There were neither interviewees nor documents arguing that contracting-out was 
inevitable or necessary. Despite this common idea, union branches’ responses to 
subcontracting in practice differed. The UNISON branches implemented more 
practical strategies against the backdrop of radical changes towards externalisation of 
workforce than those of KHMU. Here ‘practical’ refers to the branches’ attitude of 
focusing more on potential benefits to subcontracted workers than on the ideological 
battle represented in political rhetoric. 
 
Drawing on data from interviews and documents, this section presents findings about 
the extent of unions’ responses, arguing that government-led restructuring in 
England towards externalisation of the workforce has triggered more pragmatic and 
centralised responses nationally, while the market-driven restructuring in Korea has 
contributed to more fragmented responses at branch level. The branches in England 
have adopted a two track approach to protect pay and employment conditions of 
contracted-out workers and even new recruits of private companies after losing the 
ideological battle. By contrast, those in Korea have neither contributed to the 
reversal of the tide of externalisation of employment nor to the protection of 
subcontracted workers, except in two cases which paid off in representing 
outsourced workers’ interests and improving their pay and terms and conditions.  
 
The remainder of this section presents each union branch’s responses, and analyses 
the ways in which the restructuring drives have impinged on those experiences, in 
more detail. 
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Branches of UNISON 
 
Despite the central role played by the state in restructuring public health system 
driven by market value, the branches of UNISON adopted a twin-track approach: 
fighting against the governments’ initiatives towards marketisation; and protecting 
subcontracted workers employed by private contractors. Branch E1 committed itself 
to support subcontracted workers by harmonising their terms and conditions with 
those of the NHS staff, as did Branch E2. In addition, Branch E1 sought to prevent 
the lowering of pay and working conditions for those transferred, through a living 
wage campaign with other social movements, and allies in the community. Branch 
E3 took protracted strike against contracting-out lasting ten months (Interview, 
Branch E3), and also succeeded in providing decent pay and working conditions for 
those transferred, through negotiating with private companies after a failure to turn 
the tide. 
 
All branches of UNISON studied adopted more realistic policies than those of 
KHMU, in large part because they thought that there was less possibility of 
stemming the tide of the government’s policy, although they opposed contracting-out 
practices. They involved themselves in representing subcontracted workers’ interests 
with the support of UNISON’s national level activities in politics such as anti-
privatisation publicity and lobbying of government. 
 
All interviewees stated that, despite their opposition to contracting-out as part of 
privatisation in the NHS, they thought that they had to do something to represent 
privatised members. Whilst union responses at branch level have focused on 
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representing pay and working conditions of contracted-out workers, UNISON at 
national level has formulated and implemented strategies for opposing privatisation 
as well as for protecting the contracted-out workers. An interviewee summarised its 
tactic as ‘twin-track’ saying that: 
 
UNISON opposes privatisation. The core belief is that public services [should 
be] publicly owned and publicly delivered. But there is also a pragmatic issue 
because privatisation will proceed in spite of union opposition. So UNISON 
attempts to ensure employment issues are fully considered and seeks a joint 
relationship with a new employer prior to transfer. (National Officer, 
UNISON) 
 
This comment supports the findings of Givan and Bach (2007: 134) that unions have 
been forced to adopt a more pragmatic position in spite of ideologically opposing 
marketisation. According to the interviews, UNISON opposed privatisation on the 
basis of its core belief that public services should be publicly owned and publicly 
delivered on the one hand, and was pragmatic because privatisation would proceed 
in spite of union opposition on the other. UNISON sought to oppose contracting-out 
through national campaigns directed at political parties, media, and the public, whilst 
it also worked for protection of contracted-out workers, including new recruits, 
through several agreements with the government and organisations representing 
subcontractors, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Regarding union responses 
at branch level, UNISON focused on intervention and involvement in the 
procurement process as early as possible, in order to minimise negative effects on 
health service quality, workforce arrangement and public ethos. Branches’ activities 
were aimed at representing the interests of subcontracted workers. 
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UNISON published a large number of reports and materials (e.g. UNISON, 2008a; 
UNISON, 2008b; UNISON, 2009; UNISON, 2010a; UNISON, 2012d) to support its 
branches to respond effectively to moves to outsource, and to support members 
transferred to private contractors. It also paid attention to protecting members in 
partially-privatised workplaces despite its principle of opposing privatisation. This 
may be one reason why exclusion or replacement type responses in Heery’s typology 
(2004) were hardly found within UNISON. Exclusion refers union’s strategy of 
eliminating both agency suppliers and agency workers in order to seek the abolition 
of ‘fee-charging employment agencies’ and replacement means that a union aims to 
replace private employment agencies with public agencies (Heery, 2004: 437). 
However, in accordance with a stark change of TUC’s emphasis, a switch towards 
protecting and regulating agency workers (Heery, 2004: 437-438), UNISON did not 
adopt a policy of driving contractors and contracted-out workers from the labour 
market. Instead, it engaged in setting up improved regulation of the process of 
contracting-out, of contracted-out workers, and of new recruits. 
 
At branch level, this study found similar approaches to those at national level. All 
interviewees in branches stated that they opposed contracting-out because it meant 
privatisation of the health service and thereby fragmentation of the workforce. 
 
I am very proud of our health care system. The NHS is for us not for market 
[and] for money. Everyone should be covered by the public health service 
regardless of their income, their residence, their employment status, and so on. 
The health service is not for profit. (Branch E1) 
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Although the interviewees showed their policy preference as above, they also had a 
practical view towards cases that were already contracted-out: ‘If some of our 
members are transferred to private companies despite our opposition to privatisation, 
the branch has to protect their pay and terms and conditions’  (Branch E2); ‘After 
transfer took place on 1st June 2001 we negotiated the same pay and terms and 
conditions with the exception of the pension and the NHS injury benefit scheme for 
new starters including bank staff
1’ (Branch E3). 
 
It is, however, worth noting that one of the branches studied had a critical point of 
view towards the national union’s approach. This is related to the argument of Givan 
and Bach (2007: 136) that the relationship between unions and the Labour 
government is a reason why the union stance has been reactive rather than proactive. 
 
Branch E3 started industrial action in August 2000 against the Trust’s drive to 
contract-out services using the PFI scheme. Despite the longest strike action in the 
history of the NHS, which lasted ten months, this branch did not win its fight and as 
a consequence, the Trust started the process of contracting-out. One interviewee of 
this branch said: 
 
We insisted that our strike should have been political and ideological. We 
wanted our national union to support us and to make this issue a country-wide 
agenda because it was not only our branch issue but the problem to devastate 
[sic] much of our NHS. But the national union did not call for industrial action. 
Do you know why they didn’t? In my knowledge, it is because of its political 
stance. UNISON is affiliated with the Labour Party so they could not call for 
                                                 
1
 ‘Bank’ denotes an in-house temporary staffing bank whereby a company employs temporary 
workers directly, which is used as a source of internal flexibility (BIS 2011: 5, 10). 
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industrial action against the Labour government. But as you see, we did a 
strike action against the coalition government’s pension reform last November 
[in 2011]. It is a sort of limitation of the affiliated union. We felt they 
[UNISON headquarters] live in the pocket of Labour governments and also felt 
they could’ve done more. (Branch E3) 
 
This interviewee’s criticism of UNISON can be interpreted as a view that faced with 
Labour’s transformation towards a more market-oriented regime, UNISON should 
have responded more ideologically and more actively. The fact that UNISON is a 
Labour-affiliated union and one of Labour’s biggest financial backers lends weight 
to this view, which means that the special relationship between the two made it 
difficult for UNISON to resist at national level. In this regard, the interview with a 
National Officer at UNISON is pertinent:  
 
As government drives towards marketisation and privatisation have developed, 
the focus of UNISON approach shifted from political to pragmatic. (National 
Officer, UNISON) 
 
Although the National Officer interviewed did not agree that the link to the Labour 
Party precluded UNISON’s political and ideological battle, this interviewee admitted 
that the union became more focused on pragmatic and realistic policies for 
subcontracted workers. This evidence supports the assessment of Givan and Bach 
(2007: 134) that ‘union opposition has ... become more pragmatic and less 
ideological’. Their argument is predicated upon the following explanation: whilst the 
Conservative government of 1979 was elected in the context of an anti-union 
sentiment and had intensive distrust of public provision, New Labour after 1997 
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attempted to depoliticise its reform agenda, stating explicitly that ‘the key test is 
what works’ (Milburn 1999, cited in Givan and Bach 2007: 142). 
 
Despite the change in UNISON focus, the national organisation continued to speak 
against contracting-out by publishing guidance, training materials, and leaflets for its 
branches and for the public. The intent was to spread awareness of the negative 
impact of contracting-out by showing the sharp drop in the number of domestic staff, 
the deterioration of service quality, intensification of work, increasing numbers of 
cases of infection, and other relevant side effects (UNISON, 2004; 2005b; 2008b; 
2009; 2010a). Whilst UNISON informed the public and its members of the fact that 
it stood against contracting-out, saying that there should have been an end to a 
tendering regime which put cost ahead of quality, at the expense of jobs, pay, and 
conditions (UNISON, 2005b), it encouraged  branches to improve pay and terms and 
conditions of transferred members and to organise them including new recruits. 
 
Branches of KHMU 
 
In contrast to the branches of UNISON implementing two-track policies, KHMU 
seemed to have done little to protect subcontracted workers or to stem the tide of 
outsourcing, although they asserted that indirect employment should be abolished in 
the labour market. Branches K1 and K2 were not engaged with the process of 
contracting-out due to lack of a formal mechanism for negotiating over contracting-
out. Branch K3 even agreed with the management decision to contract out services 
such as cleaning and catering on the grounds of protecting the employment security 
of existing branch members in the context of a massive restructuring of hospital K3. 
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These three branches of KHMU being trapped in political rhetoric neither prevented 
each hospital’s outsourcing services nor represented outsourced workers’ interests. 
 
In contrast to England where governments have implemented massive contracting-
out drives since the early 1980s which urged hospital trusts to outsource services in 
the name of cost savings and efficiency improvement, hospitals in Korea seemed to 
have been affected by fierce competition in the market rather than by the direct 
pressure from governments. It is the case that governments’ policies applied to 
public hospitals had an impact on privately-owned hospitals but the latter did not 
have a strict obligation to follow those policies. Intensified competition in the health 
sector, however, encouraged private hospitals to adopt more flexible work 
organisation faced with the pressure to cut costs and improve flexibility. 
 
There were at least three ways in which subcontracting affected all five branches 
observed in this study. The first was that contracting-out was phased in over a long 
period. This practice was found in the experience of all five branches. In the case of 
Branch K4, for instance, the cleaning service in Hospital K4 was contracted-out not 
long after the hospital was established and the catering service ten years later. This 
form of practices made it hard for union branches to be involved in the contracting-
out process. This was confirmed by the following comment: 
 
The hospital has been outsourcing services over a long period of time, not on a 
large scale in a short time. Sometimes we haven’t noticed whether services 
were contracted-out because they were small in size at the time. (Branch K1) 
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During this phased approach, a second way in which subcontracting had affected all 
five branches was that hospitals tended to outsource services without properly 
informing a union branch despite a collective agreement at the workplace level 
regarding employer’s obligation to consult its counterpart about contracting-out 
plans. Although this was an obvious breach of agreements, in most cases, employers 
claimed ignorance of their obligations. Furthermore union branches felt they had 
little power or little interest in fighting against contracting-out. Although three 
branches studied (K1, K2 and K3) with above fifty percent of union density at each 
workplace cannot be said to have little power, they did not (or were not able to) take 
action to preclude contracting-out as the management initiative towards contracting-
out took place step-by-step over time at a small scale. By doing so, hospitals gave 
little room for union branches to be involved in the process or to develop a timely 
strategy against subcontracting. The following comment helps illuminate the 
situations: 
 
The hospital contracted-out some services without giving us [the branch] any 
information in advance. When we closely questioned managers about it, they 
just said that they were still thinking, or that the plan was not finalised. Hence, 
we often didn’t know when we needed to (or could) be involved and missed 
the chance to oppose the plan. (Branch K2) 
 
The third way in which all five branches studied has been affected by subcontracting 
was a new work organisation including contracting-out services set up in the process 
of the establishment of a new hospital through a merger of two or more existing 
hospitals or via closure of existing hospitals. Examples included the case of K1 and 
K3 branches. For instance, Branch K3 previously based on Hospital K3-A and 
Hospital K3-B had to negotiate for the transfer of the existing workforce to the new 
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Hospital K3 with no less favourable employment and working conditions. Although 
Branch K3 succeeded in making an agreement to transfer all existing workers with 
the same conditions, this agreement was put in place after the new hospital had 
already arranged to contract-out some services such as cleaning, security, call centre, 
and parking. This meant that Branch K3 was not able to intervene in the process of 
reorganising the workforce in the new hospital. The branch had no choice but to 
accept a two-tier workforce in the new hospital at the expense of securing existing 
members’ employment continuity. As a result, transferred cleaners and newly 
deployed cleaners employed by a private company were working at the same 
hospital with different pay rates and terms and conditions. The following comment 
demonstrates why Branch K3 responded in that way: 
 
I cannot say with confidence that this is the best result. However, we had no 
choice, in order to protect our members. It is an unprecedented victory in the 
history of KHMU to make an agreement to transfer all existing members to a 
new hospital. I think it is a problem that there are two types of cleaners with 
different working conditions in the same hospital. Nonetheless we [Branch K3] 
did our best to secure members’ employment. (Branch K3, italics added for 
emphasis) 
 
This comment shows that existing members benefited from this negotiation in 
exchange for a two-tier workforce in the new hospital. Although there were 
differences in the ways in which hospitals have driven restructuring, this study 
argues that intensified competition in the health sector in Korea has made branches 
adopt conservative decisions focusing on existing members’ interests. The three 
branches which represented a typical type of responses in KHMU opposed 
contracting-out rhetorically but did almost nothing practically. In the process, the 
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role of KHMU, as the sectoral union at national level was also limited in its reach. 
KHMU supported each branch where the conflicts over outsourcing become an issue, 
but failed to pre-empt employers’ moves towards outsourcing. Neither did KHMU 
achieve even minimal legal regulations to prevent possible abuses of employers’ 
power or to protect working conditions of workers either at risk of being contracted-
out or already contracted-out. Officials in each branch felt that lack of support from 
the national union, poorly established legal regulations, and the existing members’ 
fear of being negatively affected by such practices had hindered the ability of 
branches to resist contracting-out practices. In this regard, this study underlines that, 
contrary to the argument of some authors (Anderson and Holmes, 1995; Murray, 
1983; Pulignano, 2005), the deregulated and weak institutional framework made 
unions receptive and defensive rather than antagonistic against restructuring and its 
outcomes. 
 
Interestingly this study found two outliers, branches K4 and K5, which presented a 
different type of responses from the three discussed above. As examined later in this 
chapter, these two branches tried to pre-empt employers’ moves for contracting 
services out by organising strike actions and rallies. In relation to those in the 
services contracted-out, these two branches actively organised or supported 
organisation to protect their interests. 
 
5.1.3 Summary 
 
To summarise, restructuring led by government encouraged more centralised and 
more practical responses in England, while that driven by employers in Korea caused 
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fragmented responses depending on the size and the speed of restructuring at the 
workplace level. This finding indicates that the policies and actions of unions as 
‘secondary organisations’ are in large part shaped by the power and strategies of 
employers, management and the state (Hyman, 1997a: 309; Poole, 1986). Contrary 
to Poole’s analysis (1986: 73), however, militant employer strategies and a powerful 
role of the state did not promote labour radicalism or a politically active labour 
movement in union responses to subcontracted labour. Nevertheless, evidence 
explained so far seems to support the explanatory power of institutions, the role of 
the state and employer in this context, since the source of restructuring and its 
coverage do explain differences in typical responses of union branches in England 
and Korea.  
 
5.2 Flexible use of the workforce 
 
Before examining the issue of legal regulation, there is a need to explore the features 
of subcontracted labour in the English and Korean health sector because union 
branches’ interpretations of subcontracting and subcontracted workers are a starting 
point to formulate its policies. Existing studies (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011) note 
that most unions would oppose outsourcing due to their concerns over the possibility 
of membership loss, deteriorating pay and employment conditions of workers, and 
other negative effects on unions and workplaces. It is likely, however, that individual 
union members’ views may differ from their unions’ opinion. Members often have 
ambiguous opinions because they might think that subcontracting may help them 
preserve their decent wages and privileges as the in-house workforce (Doellgast, 
2008: 265). As a result, union members might take a divisive belief such as a ‘them 
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and us’ attitude. Because one of main reasons for outsourcing is to reduce costs, 
subcontracted workers are likely have inferior working conditions, (Pulignano, 2005: 
157) and they have little opportunity to bargain over these terms with their ‘real 
employer’ (Wills, 2009: 444). To this end, the ways union branch members perceive 
the rise of subcontracted labour would be the rationale behind each branch’s policies 
and actions, even if they are not solely decisive. 
 
This section examines whether branches’ interpretations are similar or different 
between the two institutional settings by showing how union branches understand 
the following issues: why subcontracted labour is preferred, how the use of this 
employment differs from that of other forms of precarious labour, and under which 
circumstances how subcontracted workers are managed at work and by whom. 
Answering these questions helps explain the effect of the rise of subcontracted 
workers on unions and their members. 
 
5.2.1 Staffing preferences 
 
In England where the government has driven contracting-out, there were few legal 
constraints on the processes involved when hospital employers decided to contract 
out their services. Under the pressure of government in the name of, for example, 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) and Private Finance Initiatives (PFI), 
NHS hospitals were forced to contract out services. The question here is why 
governments preferred to use contracting-out among various forms of flexible 
employment arrangement. Givan and Bach (2007: 137) argue that governments 
wanted to privatise nationalised industries and public utilities and to promote 
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liberalisation to foster competitive markets. The governments’ intention was also 
associated with the outsourcing of employer responsibilities towards employees to 
private companies (Davidov, 2004: 727). 
 
While the practices of contracting-out were initiated by governments in England, the 
experience of the Korean health sector painted a different and more complex picture. 
Although there was a government drive behind contracting-out in Korea, this was 
limited in scope to government-owned organisations or public corporations which 
are few compared to the case of England. Given that only ten percent of hospitals 
were owned and run publicly, this raises a challenging question of why so many 
hospitals, eight in ten as of 2010 (MoEL, 2010), have been adopting this strategy, so-
called externalisation of employment. As discussed earlier in this section, it was 
caused in part by the trend of organisational isomorphism (Eun, 2008). In the context 
of intensified competition in the health sector hospitals began to adopt outsourcing 
strategies competitively. 
 
Regarding employer’ preference on subcontracting, some (Lee, 2011a; Lee, 2011c) 
argue that laws passed in Korea aiming to protect workers in flexible employment 
arrangements rather encouraged employers to use other forms of flexible workers, 
such as subcontracted labour. The laws in question were the Act on the Protection, 
etc., of Dispatched Workers in 1998 and the Act on the Protection, etc. of Fixed-
Term and Part-Time Employees Act in 2007. According to the former, employers 
were required to use temporary agency workers only for jobs which required 
professional knowledge, skills or experiences (Article 5 (1)) or if there was a 
vacancy due to maternity leave, illness, injury, etc., or there was a need to 
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temporarily or intermittently secure a workforce (Article 5 (2)). It is noteworthy that 
employers were not permitted to use these workers in certain jobs including the work 
of assistant nurses in the medical service according to the Enforcement Decree of the 
Act on the Protection, etc., of Dispatched Workers (Article 2 (2) 3).  
 
The purpose of the subsequent Act in 2007 was to redress undue discrimination 
against fixed-term and part-time employees (Article 1). Both of these Acts legislated 
employers’ obligation to turn a flexible workforce, fixed-term and part-time workers 
and temporary agency workers who has worked for more than two years, into regular 
workers of the user company. The revised Act for dispatched workers in 2012, in 
particular, regulated that employers who illegally used temporary agency workers 
had an obligation to directly employ those workers regardless of the period of 
working, compared to the previous Act which only constrained to employers this 
obligation if such workers had been used for more than two years. 
 
Despite the aim of these laws to protect employment security and working 
conditions of contingent workers, they have tended to act as a platform to proliferate 
outsourcing (Lee and Eun, 2011). This is because, after the enactment of these laws, 
many companies refused to turn contingent workers into regular positions by 
terminating their employment contracts just before meeting their legal requirement 
of two-year service and then replacing many of them with subcontracted workers 
(Lee, 2011a: 300; Lee, 2011c: 774). Furthermore, some companies have continued to 
use illegal agency workers since the governments were reluctant to impose strict 
punishment on companies that had violated the rules (Kim, 2010: 247). This 
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phenomenon has accelerated the proliferation of subcontracted workers. One 
interviewee commented that: 
 
Hospital managers used to complain about the introduction of stricter 
regulations on contingent workers. They said that the legal obligation to turn 
contingent workers into regular ones after two years of service was an onerous 
responsibility. So they preferred using subcontracted labour with a clear job 
description in order to avoid being accused of illegal use of temporary agency 
workers. (Branch K2) 
 
While employers have tended to blame the strictness of the use of contingent 
workers, the labour movement criticised loopholes in the current laws and practices 
of employers that bypassed the laws by terminating employment contracts for 
contingent workers just before the end of their second year. To this end, unions 
argued for introducing fundamental measures to set a limit on reasons for hiring or 
using contingent workers. 
 
The intent of these laws was defeated by employers who resorted to an 
expedient. In order to avoid legal obligations, employers illegally use 
temporary agency workers or utilise subcontracting after terminating existing 
employment contracts, or invent a new type of employment contract in 
between regular and contingent work arrangements. (National Officer, 
KHMU) 
 
This Korean case added further evidence to support the work of Olsen and Kalleberg 
(2004: 340) who argue that the introduction of stricter regulations on one form of 
flexible employment arrangement may increase the use of other arrangements. This 
study argues that the two Acts regulating the use and management of contingent 
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workers are not only insufficient to protect these workers but also play an important 
role in the spread of subcontracting. 
 
Seniority-based pay system has also been identified as one of reasons for the 
proliferation of subcontracting from the employers’ points of view. This system 
means that the size of a pay increase depends on workers’ age and length of service, 
especially in Korea where seniority is considered as a factor in determining pay 
(Jung, 2011: 246-247). A branch official recounted: 
 
Cleaners, for example, tend to be dominated by older women workers with 
long service and hence their pay increased automatically every year before 
contracting-out. A long-term employed cleaner could earn more than a newly 
recruited nurse. The hospital made use of the difference in the pay level 
between low-skilled cleaners and core medical staff to make a rationale for 
contracting-out. (Branch K3) 
 
Once cleaning services were contracted-out, in many cases, their pay was cut 
significantly, down to the national minimum wage line or slightly above it. 
Employers could receive benefits not just by reducing payroll costs and enhancing 
flexibility but also by cutting fringe benefits such as tuition fees for workers’ 
children, special bonuses for holidays, medical support, and so on which generally 
applied only to full time permanent workers of the company. This reflects the 
employment practices of firm internal labour markets in Korea (Jung, 2011: 248). 
 
It is increasingly evident that employers’ preferences for cost saving, flexibility, 
efficiency and outsourcing their responsibilities toward workers to a third party is 
closely linked to contracting-out practices in both countries. This study proceeds to 
148 
 
explore how unions understood this move, which helps explain why they decided to 
make particular types of responses. 
 
5.2.2 Union branches’ interpretations 
 
This study now addresses questions about how unions have perceived the changing 
nature of work and why they have (or have not) attempted to represent interests of 
subcontracted workers. Interestingly, this study found that despite differences in 
typical branch responses to subcontracted workers in the two institutional settings, 
all interviewees for this study had similar ideas about subcontracting, all saying that 
they opposed the externalisation of employment through contracting-out, and that all 
services should be kept in house. They pointed out deteriorating service quality and 
working conditions especially for transferees caused by contracting-out services as 
follows: 
 
[The growth of subcontracting is] ... dreadful. It has been done for profit. It is 
for cutting costs to make money. It made service less accountable ... working 
conditions [both of transferees and new comers] worse. I don’t agree. (Branch 
E2) 
 
If a service is contracted-out, everything is done by [the] contract [which] 
specified exactly what should be done, without flexibility. To give just one 
example ... physiotherapy services [in this hospital] have been contracted-out. 
The contract says that we [the hospital] give five outpatient appointments [per 
patient]. But it is not good because some patients only need three, while some 
people need ten. Patients with the same condition with different socio-
economic backgrounds might have different demands. But when the service 
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has contracted-out, it is harder to be flexible. It [contracting-out] is the worst 
not just for workers but for service users. (Branch E1) 
 
After a company took over the cleaning service, the wage for cleaners was cut 
by almost half. It is slightly above the national minimum wage. But, ironically 
they kept doing same jobs at the same workplace. (Branch K4) 
 
Despite this common idea on contracting-out, there were slightly different points that 
have been emphasised by the interviewees between countries. While those in 
England put more accents on the political drive for contracting-out, those in Korea 
attributed this practice to fierce competition among hospitals. This point is closely 
related to the source of restructuring, presented in Section 5.1. Taking for example 
the UNISON branches first: 
 
This [contracting-out] is the default position of governments. Considering the 
amount of money put into it [contracting-out practices], it is not value for 
money ... [and] not a rational business choice. (Branch E2) 
 
The Tories keep saying ... contracting-out is the best way to make the NHS 
more efficient. The more we contract-out and more privatise the NHS, the less 
efficient it is becoming. And it has impacted negatively on the quality of care 
in many areas. The NHS is... should be the best, most efficient health system in 
the world. ... Sorry, I am not a nationalist though. We need to defend it [the 
NHS]. (Branch E3) 
 
These interviewees also criticised the practice of contracting-out as being a step 
towards privatising the NHS. With the public ethos they asserted that all the services 
within the NHS should be run by public organisations. When an interviewee was 
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asked if she thinks the practice of contracting-out should be abolished, she said 
without hesitation that: 
 
Absolutely... 100% for sure... Everything being contracted-out should be 
brought back in house. Nothing more should happen. (Branch E2) 
 
By contrast, those in Korea pointed out each management’s decision as the key 
driver of contracting-out and then explained the spread of this practice has been 
precipitated by organisational isomorphism in the context of globalisation. This is 
illustrated by the following comment: 
 
I have no idea why most hospitals prefer contracting-out. I can see that there 
must be an obvious cost saving effect but don’t know if it is beneficial in the 
long term. Hospitals try to follow what big-sized hospitals with a lot of profit 
have done. (Branch K4) 
 
Another interviewee commented in a similar vein: 
 
Hospital management knows that the way to save costs is to exploit workers, 
particularly in ancillary services. It is hard to find hospitals that directly 
employ cleaners. It became a norm then. More and more hospitals are trying to 
operate with only directly employed highly qualified medical staff. In Korea 
where the medical market is dominated by private hospitals, there is no 
mechanism to control a segmented service and fragmented workforce. (Branch 
K2) 
 
As such, union branches’ interpretations of contracting-out practices had a lot in 
common. They all thought it was carried out to make more profit (irrespective of real 
outcomes) by reducing labour costs, to harm service quality and working conditions, 
and to weaken the influence of trade unions. But there was a slight difference in that 
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those in England considered it as a politically-driven practice, while those in Korea 
as a more market-driven one. 
 
5.3 Legal regulation 
 
This chapter has so far examined how union branches’ responses were generated 
differently depending on the source of workplace restructuring and the ways in 
which subcontracted workers were managed at work. These questions led to a need 
to explore legal provisions since the extent to which legal regulations are involved in 
the advent and management of subcontracted workers might affect branches’ 
responses. This is associated with the question of the extent to which legal 
regulations have functioned as either opportunities or constraints for unions’ 
responses in relation to subcontracted labour. The term legal regulation here refers to 
those affecting the process of contracting-out and concerning the individual and 
collective rights of workers involved in contracting-out, coupled with the national (or 
sectoral) minimum wage legislation which is primarily designed for workers in low-
paid jobs including subcontracted workers in question in this study. The issue of 
employer responsibilities under the triangular employment relationships with the 
third party involved is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Exploring legal regulations allows us to understand whether or not they act as a 
substitute for union activity. Developing the point made by Booth and Francesconi 
(2003), legal provisions such as the minimum wage legislation or EU directives 
might weaken unions’ efforts to recruit subcontracted workers as it is possible that 
such initiatives may discourage them from joining a union. So, legal regulations 
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which help subcontracted workers to improve their pay and terms and conditions 
may substitute for the function of unions. In a similar vein, Baccaro and his 
colleagues (2003) maintain that a strong institutional position may discourage unions 
to organise low-paid workers. Alternatively, legal provisions may act as 
opportunities for union representation by allowing unions to monitor compliance 
with the law in order to protect the rights of low-paid workers and thereby attract 
them (Booth and Francesconi, 2003). 
 
In this regard, the issue of legal regulations on contracting-out has made the health 
sector in England and Korea particularly appropriate for studying. Contrary to Korea 
with its lack of regulations on the process of contracting-out and the conditions of 
workers involved in it, there are regulations in England, represented by the Transfer 
of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations usually referred to as ‘the 
TUPE Regulations’. 
 
Although there are criticisms of the effectiveness of TUPE on the grounds that it 
ensures only minimum standards, it is limited in coverage, and its effect declines 
(Colling, 1999; Cooke et al., 2004; Domberger, 1998; Marchington et al., 2011), this 
study found that the TUPE regulations provided a basis for protection of employees’ 
rights on pay, and terms and conditions, and of employees from dismissal before or 
after a transfer. The TUPE regulations are a good example to support the argument 
that national institutional regulation may mitigate, to some extent, disadvantages 
such as lower pay and inferior benefits experienced by contingent workers 
(Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011; Lind and Rasmussen, 2008). 
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Turning to the case of KHMU this point is much clearer. There is a lack of legal 
mechanisms regulating employment relations and the rights of transferred workers 
(Kim et al., 2012) so that subcontracted workers could hardly get any legal 
protection in relation to the continuity of both employment and pay and terms, and 
conditions after transfer. As found in all five branches studied, once a transfer takes 
effect, they are urged to sign a completely new employment contract with worse pay, 
terms, and conditions than they would have had if they were still employed by the 
original employer. Under market competition with little legal regulation to minimise 
the gap between workers with different labour market positions, the union’s role in 
interest representation is likely to favour the relatively secured at the expense of the 
less advantaged. 
 
This finding supports an argument that legal regulations are likely to function as 
opportunities for union activity. In other words, a union is more likely to represent 
subcontracted workers whose pay and terms and conditions are not less favourable 
than regular workers. It is because, under this circumstance, a union can adopt 
inclusive policies without making too much extra effort to forge common interests 
between workers on a different basis of employment contracts. Therefore this study 
argues that in England where legal protection for pay, working conditions, and 
collective rights of subcontracted workers is higher than that in Korea, the union 
branches have been more involved in organising and representing these workers. It 
supports the alternative position of Booth and Francesconi (2003) arguing that legal 
provisions may act as opportunities for union representation. 
 
154 
 
To this end, this section explores patterns in branches’ responses to legal regulations 
on pay, terms, and conditions of the transferred and new recruits, and on collective 
rights of existing unions and workers involved in the transfer. 
 
5.3.1 Individual rights 
 
It is reasonable to assume that legal regulations to guarantee relatively reasonable 
pay and working conditions for subcontracted workers may discourage them from 
joining a union. This is because, without being organised which sometimes may 
result in losing their jobs due to management hostility toward unions, they can get 
benefits to some extent within the legal framework. For this reason, Baccaro et al. 
(2003) argue that a strong institutional position has a reverse impact on incentives to 
organise. Considering a union’s limited capacity and resources, however, another 
assumption could be formulated that a union is more likely to represent contingent 
workers whose pay and terms and conditions are not less favourable than regular 
workers. This would be because a union can make a positive outcome without 
making much more extra efforts to forge common interests between workers on 
different employment contracts. This is the point of departure of motivation for this 
section. 
 
A stark difference in legal regulations in the two countries was whether there were 
regulations designed to offer protection for pay, terms, and conditions of 
subcontracted workers. The TUPE regulations enacted in 1981 and amended in 2006 
have been implemented in England with the aim of preserving the continuity of 
employment and terms and conditions of the transferred when a transfer takes place 
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(BIS, 2009: 4). By contrast, there was no specialised legal regulation for the 
transferred in Korea. Pay and working conditions for these workers were regulated 
by laws applying to all employees regardless of employment status such as the 
National Minimum Wage Act and the Labor Standard Act. 
 
The difference in regulations concerning individual rights for subcontracted workers 
may have caused different union responses. This is because the extent to which these 
workers are covered and protected by legal provisions is likely to influence on the 
willingness and capacity of union branches’ representation. Given that a union is an 
organisation to represent, in a narrow sense, the interests of its members (Simms and 
Charlwood, 2010), the more diverse members’ interests are, the harder a union needs 
to put forth efforts to reconcile them. In this regard, this section argues that legal 
regulations in England represented by the TUPE regulations helped the branches of 
UNISON adopt a more inclusive approach to subcontracted workers than 
counterparts in KHMU. 
 
The TUPE regulations provided for the terms and conditions of employment set by 
one employer to be carried over to another employer following a merger or some 
forms of contracting-out (Rubery et al., 2005: 64). Under the regulations, employees 
of a hospital became automatically employees of the new private sector employer on 
the same terms and conditions, except some occupational pension rights when the 
transfer took effect (Cooke et al., 2004; Méhaut et al., 2010). A white paper states 
that ‘it is as if their contracts of employment had originally been made with the 
transferee employer’ (BIS, 2009: 4). However, there was a key concern over worse 
pay, terms, and conditions of new recruits directly employed by the contractor 
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because they were not covered by the TUPE regulations and their pay and benefits 
were set by the private employer (Givan and Bach, 2007: 146). This would cause a 
disparity in pay and conditions between transferred staff and newcomers for the 
same work. 
 
Since 2000, government policy has shifted following pressure from public sector 
strikes and a high profile ‘living wage’ campaign, resulting in the introduction of a 
new code of practice, so-called the ‘two-tier code’, which applied first to local 
government and then was extended to other areas, including the health sector 
(Méhaut et al., 2010: 343). According to the two-tier code, private sector service 
providers shall offer pay and benefits to new recruits that are ‘not less favourable’ 
than those of transferred employees covered by the TUPE regulations (Grimshaw 
and Hebson, 2005: 114; Méhaut et al., 2010: 343).  
 
Although there are critiques of the effectiveness of TUPE, in that it ensures only 
minimum standards and is limited in coverage and its effect declines (Cooke et al., 
2004; Domberger, 1998; Marchington et al., 2011), this study would argue that it 
certainly helped in protecting employees’ rights and employees from dismissal 
before or after a transfer. 
 
Turning to the case of Korea this point becomes much clearer. There have been no 
legal regulations specially aimed at protecting transferred workers and new recruits 
and thereby subcontracted workers could not get any legal protection in relation to 
continuity of both employment, and pay and terms and conditions after the transfer. 
Once a transfer took effect, they were urged to sign a completely new employment 
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contract containing worse pay and terms and conditions than they would have had if 
they were still employed by the original employer. To take caterers at Branch K4 as 
an example: 
 
Their pay was cut by almost 50 percent if they wanted to continue to work at 
this hospital. (Branch K4) 
 
Once a hospital decided to outsource a certain service, it dismissed workers who 
formerly provided that service and then let a new provider hire them at inferior pay 
and working conditions. If those workers wanted to work at the same workplace, 
most of them were forced to sign a new contract because it was not easy for them to 
find another job, so they felt they had no choice but to accept the terms of the 
contract. This was associated with the fact that most such are doing low-skilled and 
low-paid jobs. 
 
Although there were some Acts and regulations on the transfer of undertakings, these 
all were to regulate business contracts not employment contracts. Contracting-out 
was seen only as a part of business activities in Korea. Transferred workers have 
been forced to accept much worse pay, terms, and conditions. Although they were 
subject to employment laws as employees of a new employer, they were forced to 
make completely new employment contracts with inferior pay, terms, and conditions. 
 
There were national minimum wage regulations in both countries but the effect on 
subcontracted workers varied significantly. While the pay level for all in the NHS, 
including subcontracted workers, was far above the national minimum wage due to 
the Agenda for Change, as discussed in Chapter 6, legislation in Korea tended to 
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serve to fix the wage level for subcontracted workers at the minimum wage level 
every year. Although it is said that subcontracted workers in Korea have benefited 
from the national minimum wage, this study argues that it served to reduce the pay 
level to the lowest level legally. 
 
This difference raises a question about whether or not government initiatives with 
the aim of preventing the conditions of the workforce from deteriorating could 
facilitate unions’ inclusion of weak groups of the workforce. It is possible that such 
initiatives may act as a substitute for union initiatives to represent precarious workers 
in that legislation such as the minimum wage may replace collectively bargained 
wages (Booth and Francesconi, 2003: 387). However, data collected showed that 
unions in England, where laws and regulations have been enacted to prevent the 
lowering of wages and conditions of subcontracted workers, are more likely to 
organise them than those in Korea that lack protection provisions for workers 
involved in transfer of undertakings. In this regard, it can be argued that when a 
disparity of pay between regular and subcontracted workers decreases, a union is 
more likely to represent contingent workers without making much extra effort. This 
is in line with the alternative argument of Booth and Francesconi (2003: 387) that 
such legislations may be complementary with union recruiting and representing 
activities by allowing unions to monitor compliance with those initiatives which 
might result in attracting non-standard workers. 
 
This point is also closely connected with an issue about how unions’ interests are 
formed, as discussed in Chapter 2. A logic of interest representation is believed to 
rest upon changing union conceptions of the legitimacy of both contingent workers 
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and contingent work (Heery et al., 2004a: 148). Applying such an argument to this 
study, it is the case that unions in the two countries oppose outsourcing regardless of 
their success or failure to stop it, which means they do not legitimise this form of 
employment arrangements. But their conceptions of the legitimacy of subcontracted 
workers seem to be different. While unions in England were seeking to regulate and 
improve conditions for these workers, those in Korea (with two exceptional cases) 
tended not to involve themselves in the issues of subcontracted workers. This study 
argues that this difference comes in part from legal regulations in each country. 
Regulations which help decrease the gap between regular and subcontracted workers 
in pay and terms of employment have to some extent resolved a conflict of interest 
between workers. By contrast, unions in Korea where there were few regulations for 
protecting subcontracted workers have been experiencing a ‘them and us’ culture in 
large part resulted from far inferior pay and terms of employment of subcontracted 
workers. 
 
5.3.2 Collective rights 
 
While differences in legal regulations concerning individual rights for workers 
involved in a transfer in the two countries contributed to variations of branch 
responses of UNISON and KHMU, this study found that there was no great 
difference in legal provisions for collective rights. This is because collective rights in 
both countries were guaranteed on the basis of the employment contract (Park et al., 
2009; Wills, 2009). Workers were only allowed to exercise their collective rights 
toward an employer who employed them, which means workers’ rights were subject 
to their employment contracts. These experiences were in line with the work of Wills 
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(2009: 445) arguing that protocols of labour law have developed on the basis of the 
employment contract rather than on who has the real power over the contracting 
process. In a similar vein, Cotton (2010: 13) points to the difficulty in relying on 
contractual law, which makes it nearly impossible to establish who holds employers’ 
responsibilities. 
 
This division of employers causes the devolution of managerial responsibilities to 
subcontractors at a lower position than a user hospital. It makes it difficult for a 
union branch to conduct a substantial collective bargaining - ‘the sine qua non of 
trade union organization’(Wills, 2009: 445) – where subcontracted workers are 
involved. A hospital as a principal employer, with real power over the contracting-
out process, outsourced its responsibilities toward employees to subcontractors who 
are subject to the main employer’s discretion. Hence this situation is called as ‘a 
never-ending game of hide and seek and a never-ending carousel ride’ (Kang, 2007: 
5). The discussion concerning employer responsibilities receives more attention in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Despite the same approach to employer responsibilities towards employees, legal 
regulations in England were more favourable to the transferred in that transferred 
staff were able to exercise their collective rights which they had been granted before 
transferring such as those to organise collectively, to bargain, and to strike through a 
union, although the counterpart in their collective activities were unsurprisingly the 
subcontractor that employs them not the hospital that uses them. The experiences of 
UNISON branches show that when a transfer takes place, recognition of the union by 
the employer also transfers over to the new employer and thereby representatives of 
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the transferred can negotiate with their new employer without an additional 
procedure of recognition (UNISON, 2008b: 9). In this process it is vital to get an 
agreement from the new employer that recognition will continue (UNISON, 2008b: 
9). 
 
Under the TUPE regulations, as the cases of Branches E1, E2 and E3 all show, 
transferred workers could keep their union membership after a transfer. As such, the 
TUPE regulations were a huge help to the union branches in keeping their 
membership after some members were transferred to private companies. This 
highlights the fact that legal regulations in England have had a positive impact on 
union organising activities. This becomes increasingly evident as a more general 
principle in the Korean case where no legal regulations concerning the continuity of 
collective rights of transferred workers existed, which had a negative effect on the 
unions’ ability to act effectively. 
 
In Korea, once contracting-out takes place, the contract of employment for 
transferred workers with a hospital is completely terminated and they have to sign a 
new contract with a new employer. All workers employed by a subcontractor are 
considered as new recruits regardless of their previous employment contracts. Hence 
if they intend to call for formal collective bargaining with the new employer, they 
have to either establish their own union, join an industrial union individually, or a 
union branch. By contrast with England where legal provisions ensure the continuity 
of collective rights of transferred staff, those rights in Korea are regulated by the 
labour law applying to all workers without a special clause for transferred workers. 
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Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereafter TU Act) enacted in 
1997 and last amended in 2008 regulate workers’ collective rights as follows: 
 
Workers are free to organise a union or to join it (Article 5); and 
The representative of a union has the authority to bargain with its employer or 
an employer association and to make collective agreements for the union and 
its members (Article 29). 
 
Although unions in Korea did not need to win recognition for collective bargaining, 
unlike those in England, workers were only allowed to negotiate with a new 
employer only if they established or joined a legitimate union by TU Act. 
 
There are two conclusions that can be drawn from these findings. First, in respect of 
employer responsibility towards collective rights for subcontracted workers, the two 
countries had the same principle in common on the basis of the employment contract. 
There have been some conflicts on who was the real employer in practice so the final 
decision on that has rested on court judgements (Cotton, 2010; Kang, 2007). Second, 
despite the commonality there was a stark difference between the two: transferred 
workers in England were allowed to enjoy their collective rights under the TUPE 
regulations. Given that subcontracted workers were likely to lose their jobs if they 
were involved in union activities (Wills, 2009), this study argues that the TUPE 
regulations helped the transferred keep their union membership. There is little doubt 
that it encouraged the union branches to continue to represent the interests of 
subcontracted workers. In this regard, this study argues that legal regulations 
relatively generous to transferred workers helped the branches in England organise 
and represent subcontracted workers. 
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5.4 Variations in union responses 
 
This chapter so far has highlighted differences in patterns of union responses 
between countries with different sources of restructuring and differing legal 
regulations. This confirms that the capacity of union branches to represent the 
interests of subcontracted workers is in large part conditioned by national and 
sectoral institutions. It appears, however, that institutions alone are insufficient to 
explain variations in union branches’ responses, because of data from two branches 
of KHMU. Within a given institutional setting, the responses of Branches K4 and K5 
towards subcontracted labour differed markedly from the typical response 
represented in those of the three branches. The responses of these two outliers in 
Korea are closer to those in England: they implemented inclusive policies towards 
subcontracted workers by accepting these workers into their representational domain 
and improving their pay, terms, and conditions by negotiating with subcontractors. 
The experiences of Branches K4 and K5 demonstrate that despite the importance of 
institutions in shaping union branches’ responses, non-institutional factors such as 
the role of leaders, internal politics within a branch, and other resources available 
can also make a difference in responding to subcontracted labour. 
 
Branch K4 
 
Branch K4 resisted the hospital’s attempt to lower wages and conditions of 
subcontracted workers by replacing existing company with another in 2006. Without 
any legal protection for transferred workers when a transfer takes place in Korea, a 
new subcontractor for a catering service urged existing subcontracted workers to 
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accept new employment contracts with inferior wages and conditions of employment. 
A branch official explained: 
 
The new company announced that it would cut the annual pay by almost 50 
percent from 25 million KRW (around 12,000 GBP) to 13 million (around 
7,000 GBP). The existing workers were really upset and intended to refuse the 
new pay scheme. Some of them visited us [the branch] saying that they wanted 
to join the union to fight against it. We [the branch] decided to accept them as 
branch members without hesitation and began to fight for decent wages. 
(Branch K4) 
 
Most of the workers (19 of 20) in the catering service joined Branch K4 and the 
branch organised demonstrations including a sit-in protest and a strike against the 
new subcontractor as well as against the hospital at the top of the process of 
contracting-out. After these prolonged collective actions, the branch succeeded in 
making an agreement with the new subcontractor to secure decent pay for the 
caterers, although the new pay level was lower than before. In this process the 
branch profited from coalitions with allies in the community as well as patients. 
 
We thought that it was important to pressurise not only the new subcontractor 
but also the hospital K4 by showing there was solidarity from other unions and 
social movement organisations. As you know, the hospital belonged to the 
service industry so that its reputation and image was part and parcel of its 
business. We made concerted efforts to show that inferior pay and working 
condition would lead to worse service quality because the food these workers 
provided was important for patients. (Branch K4) 
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Branch K5 
 
Branch K5 did not only improve working conditions of subcontracted workers by 
supporting to establish and operate a separate branch for them, as discussed in 
chapter 7, but it also achieved regular employment status with employment security 
and better pay and working conditions through legal actions for some of those 
workers. The branch paid particular attention to the legal status of nursing assistants 
since they were employed by an intermediate company but ordered and controlled by 
Hospital K5. As explained in Section 5.2, this form of employment relationship for 
nursing assistants is classified as a temporary agency work which is banned in the 
health sector in Korea. 
 
The branch accused the hospital of illegally using temporary agency workers and the 
hospital then received a decision from the Ministry of Employment and Labor 
ordering that the hospital should directly hire these workers (MoEL 2012). 
 
We prepared for more than a year in order to prove the hospital’s guilty by 
collecting documentary evidence and doing interviews with these workers and 
their co-workers and finally we did it. (Branch K5) 
 
The experience gives insight in three ways. First, despite a conservative shift in legal 
regulations regarding flexible use of workforce (Lee and Eun, 2011), this case 
highlights that there is room for turning the tide in the use of subcontracting at least 
for a certain form of employment. Due to the increasingly complexity of workforce 
utilisation, this form of illegal use of agency workers is expected to be popular in the 
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Korean health sector, which means that there is still scope for the involvement of 
trade unions to reverse this trend. 
 
Second, Branch K5 used this legal action as a platform to reconcile potential 
competing interests between workers in different employment contracts. While 
collecting data for the accusation against Hospital K5, branch officials not only met 
nursing assistants but also nurses employed by the hospital on a permanent full-time 
basis. By doing so, the branch helped the nurses grasp the magnitude of the problem 
regarding illegal use of temporary agency workers and encouraged them to have a 
sense of solidarity. 
 
They [the nurses employed by Hospital K5] were not reluctant to give 
evidence on how closely their jobs are connected with those of nursing 
assistants, which was essential to prove that the nursing assistants were ordered 
by the hospital not by the agency they were employed. The nurses we met all 
were kind to the branch trying to turn the nursing assistants into regular 
workers, because they began to understand that this form of labour utilisation 
was not fair and would cause a problem such as reduction in health service 
quality in a long term. (Branch K5) 
 
As this quotation shows, this branch took advantage of likely tensions between 
workers to promote increased mutual understanding by persistent work towards 
regular workers. Third, cooperation between branch K5 and a separate branch for 
subcontracted workers (see chapter 7 for a detailed discussion of this separate union 
branch) in this process played an important role. While the two branches were 
preparing for legal action, both were mobilising and encouraging their own members. 
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As such, in contrast to Branches K1, K2 and K3 of KHMU, these two actively 
intervened before and after contracting-out despite the fragmented nature of the 
contracting-out process and unfavourable legal contexts. Despite the fact that all 
branches studied considered managerial restructuring to be a threat, while three 
branches (K1, K2 and K3) were passive, the other two utilised employers’ initiatives 
as a platform to expand their representation. The experiences of these two show that 
under the same institutional constraints on union activities towards subcontracted 
labour, branches can make different responses, which is not explained by the 
institutional approach. Hence, this analysis demonstrates the limitation of 
institutional path-dependency approaches. The way in which unions make use of 
institutions depends on the capacity of unions to pursue their interests (Dekocker et 
al., 2011: 604). 
 
This study reveals that branches’ leaders played a decisive role in this process by 
formulating and sticking to the rules and having long discussions with their existing 
members who may have been either reluctant to approve or opposed to agree their 
unions’ focus. Despite limitations and constraints on branches concerning 
representation of subcontracted workers, branches with strong leadership, active 
involvement of subcontracted workers, and effective contacts with allies in the 
community could make a difference within a given sectoral setting. 
 
5.5 Concluding summary 
 
This chapter analysed how the process of contracting-out under a certain legal 
context affected branches’ responses. As shown throughout the Chapter, the 
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UNISON branches E1, E2 and E3 implemented a twin-track strategy of both 
opposing contracting-out through campaigning and lobbying at national level and 
protecting contracted-out workers at branch level, in a context of government-driven 
contracting-out and the existence of legal provisions regulating the process and the 
rights of transferred workers. By contrast, the three KHMU branches K1, K2 and K3, 
in a relatively unfavourable context acquiesced or agreed the management decision 
of contracting-out in hope of securing the conditions and pay of existing members 
and excluded subcontracted workers from their constituencies. 
 
The more centralised and practical responses of UNISON branches were affected by 
massive government initiatives, coupled with the relatively higher level of legal 
protection for subcontracted workers in England compared with that in Korea. The 
decentralised (workplace-level) and receptive responses of KHMU, represented by 
three branches (K1, K2 and K3) were highly influenced by fragmented management 
initiatives and the lack of legal regulations on the process of contracting-out and 
rights of workers involved. Importantly this study also found two outliers (K4 and 
K5) in Korea which adopted inclusive strategies, as shown in the UNISON branches. 
These two explicitly showed that despite common constraints in a given institutional 
setting, union branches could make a difference in patterns of union responses. Three 
non-institutional factors, i.e., the role of leaders, the willingness of subcontracted 
workers, and relationship with allies in the community played an important role in 
shaping these inclusive strategies towards subcontracted workers.  
 
From the interview and documentary data collected, this chapter argued that the 
differences in patterns of union responses confirm that institutional factors, the 
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source of restructuring and legal regulations have an important role in shaping union 
responses. It has also been shown that an emphasis on the differences in institutional 
factors gave an insufficient understanding of union branches’ responses by 
addressing the experiences of two outlying KHMU branches that showed a similar 
response to those of UNISON. These cases support the analysis of Turner (2007: 10) 
who argues that trade union representatives ‘have a range of choices even in the most 
difficult circumstances’. Although the existing literature accounts for patterns of 
union responses by referring solely either to institutionalist or actor-centred approach, 
this chapter suggested that the explanatory power is enhanced by combining these 
two approaches into a single analytical framework. A more detailed discussion of an 
integrated approach is addressed in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 6 Collective bargaining and subcontracted labour 
 
Having examined differences and similarities in unions’ policies and activities 
towards subcontracted labour in the context of the restructuring and legal regulations 
in Chapter 5, this study turns its attention to collective bargaining systems. Among 
various kinds of representation methods, collective bargaining plays a pivotal role in 
industrial relations. This is because the process of collective bargaining and its 
outcome determine the terms and conditions which regulate pay levels, working time, 
methods of working and procedures for resolving differences between workers and 
employers (Marchington et al., 2011: 49). 
 
The reason collective bargaining is particularly important in this study is that under 
triangular employment relationships, unions need to adopt new strategies for 
collective bargaining. Unions need to decide how to represent employees of the third 
party (subcontractors), which presents different challenges in collective bargaining 
from the traditional one. Wills (2009: 444) summarises this new phase as follows: 
 
Subcontracting works to break the mutual dependency between workers and 
employers that has been so central to the labor movement in the past. 
 
When representing subcontracted workers, not only do unions need to reconcile the 
various demands of members with different employers, but to decide whom unions 
will negotiate with. Their counterparts can be either subcontractors or a user 
company, or both of them in determining pay, terms, and conditions of subcontracted 
workers. Unions may decide to negotiate only with subcontractors, as contractual 
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employers of these workers, as unions do under traditional employment relationships. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the relationship between a user company and 
subcontracted workers is not clearly defined. Despite no relationship existing 
between the two in theory, a user company may be involved in supervision 
(Kalleberg, 2000: 350; Olsen, 2006: 97). More importantly, unions need to negotiate 
with a user company because the final decision on conditions of work of 
subcontracted workers is made by a user company, ‘their real employer’ (Wills, 
2009: 444) through a business contract with subcontractors. The complexities of this 
type of employment relationships make it difficult, in general, for unions to represent 
subcontracted workers through existing channels (Kalleberg, 2000: 358). As such, 
studying union responses to subcontracted workers in relation to collective 
bargaining is important for developing an understanding of union strategies and the 
factors affecting their responses.  
 
This chapter investigates how collective bargaining systems have contributed to 
particular responses of union branches in the two countries. To this end, it explores 
the dynamics of collective bargaining over the issues of subcontracted labour in the 
different national settings and examines the factors that help explain variations in the 
process and outcomes of bargaining within and between countries. 
 
Before moving on to the analysis of empirical evidence, it is necessary to address 
two criticisms of the use of collective bargaining to explain union responses to 
subcontracted workers. First is a criticism of Clegg’s view on collective bargaining 
and second is that of the adequacy of bargaining as an effective method to represent 
the interests of these workers. 
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Clegg (1976) emphasises the role of collective bargaining in explaining several 
aspects of union behaviour such as union government, strike action, and union 
attitudes to industrial democracy. By saying that ‘differences in collective bargaining 
can explain variations in union behaviour’ (1976: 8), he argues that unions’ power is 
based on where bargaining is conducted. This view, however, has been criticised on 
the grounds that the direction of causality is not clear and his explanation, with a 
focus on institutional contexts surrounding unions, is deterministic (Frege and Kelly, 
2003: 11-12; Shalev, 1980: 28-29). This criticism is supported by data collected in 
this study from KHMU, showing that the reform of union structure to industry union 
from enterprise unionism has led to a change in collective bargaining structure at 
sectoral level, irrespective of how well this new bargaining structure has been 
established, which is discussed in the next section. 
 
The other criticism of the use of collective bargaining is whether collective 
bargaining is effective for representing contingent workers. Among others who raise 
this question (Heery, 2009; Kretsos, 2011; Wills, 2009; Wills and Simms, 2004), 
Simms (2010) presents two reasons for doubt. First, large numbers of contingent 
workers are employed in the sectors where employees are not organised into unions 
such as hotel, catering, retail, and so forth. Second, lack of unions’ engaging in 
‘distant expansion’ (Kelly and Heery, 1989: 198) makes it likely that collective 
bargaining will remain a poor mechanism for representing these workers. Here the 
term ‘distant expansion’ refers to ‘recruiting employees in workplaces without any 
union presence or recognition’ (ibid.). Although some contingent workers are 
covered by collective bargaining (sometimes through expanding bargaining 
coverage), this difficulty for the effectiveness of collective bargaining became more 
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evident given declining union membership. In the UK, total union membership stood 
at 26.0 percent in 2012 (BIS, 2013) and in Korea at 10.1 percent in 2011 (MoEL, 
2012). These compare to the twentieth century peak of membership at 55.4 percent 
in 1979 (BIS, 2013) and 19.8 percent in 1989 (MoEL, 2012) of the working 
populations in each country. Although in the English public sector (including health 
care) union density was 56.3 percent as of 2012 which was far above the average 
density (BIS, 2013), the trend towards decline is not significantly different than in 
other sectors. 
 
Despite the importance of these criticisms, data from this study suggest that 
collective bargaining is one of the main factors which have influenced union 
behaviour for the following reasons. Clegg’s emphasis on collective bargaining in 
explaining union behaviour does not seem to be supported. As mentioned above, 
data collected from KHMU shows that union behaviour was not fully dependent on 
collective bargaining, but unions rather took the lead in reform of collective 
bargaining structures. Nevertheless, this study pays attention to collective bargaining 
because collective bargaining remains ‘the primary trade union vehicle for advancing 
the interests of its members’ (Conley and Stewart, 2007: 518). It is important to 
examine how established institutions for collective bargaining have contributed to 
shaping union representation for subcontracted workers.  
 
In relation to the context of declining membership and influence of unions, collective 
bargaining may not be effective to improve conditions of employment for 
subcontracted workers who are likely to work in sectors which are less likely to be 
unionised. Whilst this limitation of the power of collective bargaining to explain 
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union responses should be noted, where union branches exist with involvement in 
the conditions of subcontracted workers, union responses must be explored. 
Investigating the role of bargaining should show whether or not existing bargaining 
systems are capable of incorporating the interests of subcontracted workers. More 
importantly, the triangular employment relationships provides unions with a new 
challenge of separation of employers, which means they need to decide how to deal 
with the third party employing subcontracted workers. In this chapter, the 
experiences of union branches are analysed, three in UNISON and five in KHMU, in 
relation to the challenge of the rise of subcontracted labour. 
 
Despite the criticism of his deterministic view of collective bargaining that shapes 
union behaviour, Clegg’s terms regarding the level and the extent of bargaining 
(Clegg, 1976: 8-11) are useful and have been adopted for this analysis. The level of 
bargaining means where it takes place and with whom, i.e., at workplace level with 
managers or at industry level with employers’ representatives, or at national level 
with the government. The extent of bargaining refers to its coverage, i.e., how many 
workers in a workplace (or a company), an industry or a country are actually covered 
by collective bargaining agreements (ibid.). These two terms, the level and the extent 
of bargaining, are widely used in industrial relations studies (Kuruvilla et al., 2002; 
Schmitter, 1981; Soskice, 1990; Traxler and Behrens, 2002; Western, 1997). The 
issue of the level and coverage of collective bargaining is related to the question of 
which interests a branch seeks to represent and how it does so. 
 
Data collected in this study show that differences in collective bargaining systems 
have led to different union responses to subcontracted workers. The branches of 
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UNISON where collective bargaining is relatively centralised have negotiated at 
sectoral level (Bosch et al., 2010; Galetto et al., 2012) as well as with private 
contractors in order to represent interests of subcontracted workers. They have dealt 
with issues concerning these workers ranging from wages and working conditions to 
their collective rights. The experience of KHMU differed. A bargaining structure at 
sectoral level was established and had operated since 2004 but did not last long, as 
discussed in Chapter 4 and later in this chapter. Eun et al. (2007) and Lee (2011c) 
argue that collective bargaining structures in the Korean health sector have become 
centralised but this is not well established. This ‘disorganized centralisation’ (Lee, 
2011c: 768) influenced the three KHMU branches that have hardly negotiated with 
either hospital employers or subcontractors over issues related to subcontracted 
workers. Even at the bargaining table, they rarely addressed these workers’ specific 
concerns other than implementing a few clauses agreed during sectoral bargaining. 
This finding is in line with the work of Bosch et al. (2010: 91) highlighting that ‘the 
more inclusive the set of institutions, the better protected are those at the low end of 
the workforce’. However, the two outliers showed different stories from the typical 
responses in Korea: negotiating with subcontractors for pay, terms, and conditions of 
subcontracted workers even within a shared institutional setting. 
 
Branches in England reported a wider agenda than those in Korea which focused 
mainly on representing existing members’ interests. This can be accounted for by the 
different levels and structures of bargaining between the two. The discussion about 
the level, structure, and agenda of collective bargaining in both countries in this 
study requires explanation of the issues of bargaining coverage and employer 
responsibility which also depend on institutional settings.  
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Empirical evidence enables this study to question a purely institutionalist approach. 
The institutionalist approach asserts that social actors behave in a way which is 
strongly affected by their national and sectoral institutional arrangements (Allen, 
2004; Pontusson, 1995). According to this approach, there remains little scope for 
social actors to shape outcomes with their own aims. Nevertheless, this study found 
two exceptional cases KHMU branches (K4 and K5) which showed more inclusive 
activities compared with the typical cases. This shows that branches can gain an 
independent voice in representing interests of subcontracted workers which may rely 
on the role of leaders who mobilise bargaining resources (internal and external to 
branch) and the willingness of subcontracted workers . 
 
This chapter consists of five sections. In Section 6.1, the evolution of collective 
bargaining in the two countries and the current level of bargaining are explained. 
This section also addresses the degree of centralisation of bargaining and the issue of 
articulation in the process of bargaining. Section 6.2 then examines the variety of 
bargaining agendas by looking at pay, conditions of employment, social benefits, 
and other relevant issues. Sections 6.3 discusses the collective agreement coverage, 
and Section 6.4 the related legal issues, both with a focus on employer’s 
responsibilities toward subcontracted workers. These are followed by Section 6.5 
which analyses two outlying cases in Korea which shows the limitations of an 
institutionalist approach and the possibilities for an integrated approach. The chapter 
concludes by summarising the findings and considering the implications of the 
findings. 
 
177 
 
6.1 Bargaining level 
 
This section examines the ways in which the level and structure of collective 
bargaining have influenced similarities and differences in patterns of branch 
responses to subcontracted workers. Union strategies seem to differ from country to 
country due to different institutional arrangements in the areas of industrial relations 
(Frege and Kelly, 2003: 12). Some argue, however, that the growth of flexibility in 
the labour market resulting from deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation has 
reduced the extent of variation in union behaviour caused by different institutional 
arrangements (Pernicka, 2009: 462). 
 
Collective bargaining is an important mechanism for improving terms and conditions 
of employment and a key issue is where such activity takes place (Benson and 
Gospel, 2008: 1366-1368). In UNISON and KHMU, where the branches studied 
were established at the national or industry level, as described briefly in Chapter 4, 
their main locus of collective bargaining lies beyond the workplace. These unions 
experience a relatively centralised structure compared to those in other sectors within 
each country in the context of union decline and the decentralised bargaining 
structure (Bosch et al., 2010; Eun et al., 2011; Lee, 2011c; Méhaut et al., 2010; 
Marchington et al., 2011). Here the term ‘centralisation’ refers to the level of 
bargaining, with collective bargaining taking place at sectoral, regional, or national 
level (Bosch et al., 2010: 101). 
 
In the experience of the branches in England, the bargaining systems represented by 
Agenda for Change (AfC) and the Pay Review Body (PRB) allow unions to operate 
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in a centralised bargaining structure, although the institutional arrangement of 
collective bargaining in the public sector have been pressurised to decentralise over 
the last twenty years (Bosch et al., 2010: 103). In addition, several distinctive 
characteristics of institutional settings were abolished such as the principle of ‘fair 
comparison’ (Bach and Winchester 2003). Under the Agenda for Change which is 
the national pay, terms and conditions agreement for almost all NHS staff (UNISON, 
2012a), it would be impossible for UNISON branches to set up a separate bargaining 
structure unless employers were trying to drive down the terms and conditions 
(National Officer, UNISON).  
 
By contrast, the bargaining structure in the Korean health sector, which was regarded 
as fragmented at enterprise level has become relatively centralised, following the 
successful reorganisation of enterprise unions into the industrial union, KHMU, in 
1998. But this can best be described as ‘disorganized centralization (Lee, 2011c) due 
to the hostility of employers toward sectoral bargaining and the high level of 
branches’ autonomy, which is rooted in the legacy of enterprise unionism. Since its 
establishment, KHMU has demanded a transformation of bargaining structure at the 
industry level and has succeeded in bargaining with employer representatives of 
hospitals where branches of KHMU existed and in making the first industrial 
agreement in 2004. However since the organisation representing employers’ interests, 
KHMEA (Korean Health and Medical Employers Association) which was only 
established in 2007 resolved to disband itself in 2009, there has been no employer’s 
association in the Korean health sector so that KHMU has been conducting 
negotiations with all hospitals where its branches are organised separately. 
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This section investigates how the differences in bargaining level have contributed to 
patterns in union responses to subcontracted workers. Drawing on empirical 
evidence, it argues that the dominant collective bargaining structure is an important 
factor that shapes a particular response. To this end, it traces the trajectory of 
collective bargaining structures in the English and Korean health sectors, followed 
by an analysis of the bargaining level in relation to interest representation for 
subcontracted workers and the issue of articulation between the national unions and 
branches. 
 
6.1.1 Trajectory of bargaining structures 
 
This section describes the development of bargaining structures in the health sectors 
in both countries before examining the relationship between the level of collective 
bargaining and the extent of interest representation for subcontracted workers. The 
discussion of the trajectory of bargaining structure allows insight into how unions 
have attempted to get bargaining structure centralised in the face of the opposition of 
government’s and employers’ attempts to decentralise the bargaining structure in 
England and employers’ attempts to keep the fragmented bargaining structure by 
refusing to participate in sectoral bargaining in Korea. 
 
In England, where centralised bargaining was dominant in almost all industries, 
collective bargaining began to be decentralised in much of the private sector from 
the mid-1970s. This trend was accelerated during the Conservative governments 
following the 1979 election (Flanagan, 2008: 413-415; Marchington et al., 2011: 50). 
Detailed analyses of the 2004 and the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations 
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Survey (Kersley et al., 2006; Wanrooy et al., 2013) show this trend clearly. The 
proportion of workplaces with 10 or more employees covered by collective 
bargaining has declined from around 70 percent in 1970 to approximately 27 percent 
in 2004 (Kersley et al., 2006: 180). Across all workplace data (regardless of the 
number of employees), this declined further to 16 percent in 2004 and 13 percent in 
2011 (Wanrooy et al., 2013: 22). Between public and private sectors, there is a 
noticeable difference in the proportion of workplaces with any collective bargaining 
and of employees covered by collective bargaining. Those in the public sector where 
the health sector belongs was 70 and 69 percent respectively in 2011, compared with 
8 and 17 percent in the private sector (Wanrooy et al., 2013: 22).  
 
Although bargaining structure seems to be stable in the public sector, the 
institutional arrangements of bargaining  have been pressurised towards 
decentralisation over the last twenty years (Bosch et al., 2010: 103). This trend 
reflects the abolition of several distinctive characteristics of institutional settings. For 
example, the bargaining principle of ‘fair comparison’ with the private sector in 
terms of pay levels and increases was replaced with that of ‘affordability’ which is 
defined by strictly enforced cash limits on public expenditure (Winchester and Bach, 
1999: 45-46). In addition, this study considers the effects of Agenda for Change and 
Pay Review Body in the health sector. 
 
The Labour government published Agenda for Change in early 1999, and it was fully 
implemented by 2004 having outlined the case for a comprehensive modernization 
of NHS pay systems  (Bach and Winchester, 2003: 302-303). The main elements of 
the AfC system were as follows: first, pay structures for different occupational 
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groups were reclassified into three: doctors and dentists, nurses and other professions, 
and all other staff. Second, grades within each pay spine were determined locally 
based on a single, NHS-wide job evaluation scheme. Third, progression on the basis 
of responsibilities and competencies was introduced in order to improve the links 
between education and development and pay progression. Lastly, while a set of 
‘core’ conditions of service were determined at national level, others were subject to 
variation at local level (Bach and Winchester, 2003: 302-303). 
 
In contrast, the bargaining structure in Korea has been fragmented at the enterprise 
level, maintained by a long history of enterprise-level union (Bae et al., 2008; Lee, 
2011c: 785). Most collective bargaining was conducted at the enterprise level 
corresponding with the enterprise-based union structure (Lee, 2011a: 293). Since the 
mid-1990s, labour movement leaders began to realise that enterprise unionism could 
not protect members’ interests, which were under threat of high unemployment and 
redundancy. Unions were established at industry level in the banking, metal, and 
health sectors, following concerted efforts to integrate enterprise unions into 
industrial ones and then to make sectoral agreements. Considering the evidence 
showing a tendency towards decentralisation of collective bargaining in many 
developed countries (Benson and Gospel, 2008; Brown, 2003; Flanagan, 2008; Katz, 
1993; Streeck, 1991), the Korean case is an anomaly. As Lee (2011c: 786) argues, 
 
[T]he Korean case demonstrates that even if a change in the economic context 
weakens the rationale for multi-employer bargaining, the collective bargaining 
structure can still be centralized. 
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This study seeks to account for this exceptional trend in Korea and assess the likely 
consequences of this development using the example of KHMU. The union made 
great efforts to establish an industry-level bargaining structure even before 
integrating enterprise-level unions into the industrial union. Uniform demands were 
established during a synchronised schedule of negotiations (Lee, 2007). KHMU 
leaders thought that changing its organisational structures did not directly mean the 
transformation of bargaining structure. Since its establishment in 1998, KHMU 
demanded a transformation of bargaining structure at industry level and made the 
first industrial agreement in 2004. This triumph was due to KHMU’s consistent 
efforts including industrial actions, lobbying government and politicians, 
campaigning for industrial bargaining, sit-in protests, to argue for the new bargaining 
structure. Although it can be argued that ‘it remains unclear whether Korea’s 
collective bargaining structure can be stabilised at the industry level largely because 
of the refusal of employers to participate in sectoral bargaining’ (Lee, 2011c: 778), 
these experiences presented significant changes in bargaining structure toward 
centralisation. 
 
This study examines the extent to which change and reform in the two countries have 
contributed to the capacity of union representation of subcontracted workers’ 
interests in terms of enhancing employment security, improving pay and terms of 
employment and reducing the disparity between workers. One of the main reasons 
for the drive toward collective bargaining at the industry level was to represent the 
wider interests of workers, covering subcontracted workers. 
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6.1.2 Bargaining structure 
 
This study turns its attention to the bargaining level by looking at where the 
collective bargaining for subcontracted workers takes place. As shown above, 
despite the decentralisation trend in collective bargaining in most developed 
countries, the English heath sector has enjoyed centralisation with an ability to exert 
an influence over the government as employer, and establishing a national pay scale 
even for frontline employees  (Bosch et al., 2010: 103). The health sector in Korea 
has also experienced a new development toward centralisation (Lee, 2011c: 783-
784). Nevertheless, there were marked differences in the level of centralisation, 
coordination, and stability of bargaining structure between the two. By investigating 
the experiences of union branches, this study argues that different approaches to 
subcontracted labour have resulted from different bargaining structures.  
 
UNISON 
 
One of the stark differences is whether subcontractors are involved in collective 
bargaining for subcontracted workers. UNISON was involved in a separate forum for 
these workers with the Department of Health and the organisations representing 
contractors. They reached an agreement in October 2005 entitled ‘Agenda for 
Change and Private Contractor Staff Agreement – A Joint Agreement’ (hereafter the 
Agreement) aimed at protecting terms and conditions of such staff as an equivalent 
to Agenda for Change (DH, 2007: 4; UNISON, 2008b: 14). In order to enforce the 
Agreement, it regulated that ‘contractors who do not accept terms of agreement will 
not be allowed to bid for contracts’ (UNISON, 2006a: 1). The Agreement covered 
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staff working for private companies on soft facilities management contracts such as 
catering, cleaning, portering, laundry, and switchboard. This was implemented from 
1 October 2006 following an interim period from 1 October 2005. (DH, 2007: 4). 
 
One of the biggest concerns of UNISON was the two-tier workforce within the NHS. 
Workers transferring from the NHS to the private sector as part of an outsourcing 
move were entitled to receive protection of their terms and conditions following the 
TUPE (UNISON, 2008a: 18). There were, however, still issues that remained 
unsolved. If new workers were required in the outsourced organisation due to 
retirement, turnover of existing workers, or some other reason, they could be offered 
a different employment package including different levels of pay, pension, training, 
and annual leave, which resulted in a two-tier system (UNISON, 2008a: 18). Two 
individuals doing the same work could receive remuneration packages of a differing 
value. 
 
As such, UNISON has improved the position of subcontracted workers by 
reintegrating them into NHS pay systems by the Agenda for Change framework and 
the extension of the Code of Practice on Workforce Matters (the ‘Two-Tier Code’) 
throughout the public sector with the aim of ensuring that new contract staff have 
terms and conditions no less favourable than transferred employees (Cabinet Office, 
2005). Despite pension provision being excluded, this agreement has been 
considered to have a positive effect on pay, terms, and conditions of subcontracted 
workers (Grimshaw et al., 2007). As discussed in Chapter 5, under the TUPE 
Regulations, employees of a hospital automatically became employees of a new 
private contractor on the same terms and conditions except some occupational 
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pension rights when the transfer took effect (Cooke et al., 2004; Méhaut et al., 2010). 
With the AfC which came into effect from 2004, UNISON sought ‘legal advice on 
whether staff who have been TUPE’d out of the NHS to private contractor were 
eligible for AfC terms and conditions under TUPE entitlements’ and received the 
legal advice which suggested that ‘this would depend entirely on the wording of the 
individual’s contract of employment’ (UNISON, 2005a: 8).  
 
Whilst all parties involved refer to it as an ‘agreement’, it is not ‘what is traditionally 
understood as a ‘collective agreement’ such as the agreements in the NHS Staff 
Council Handbook. It is basically an agreement reached between the parties and 
approved by the government’ (UNISON, 2005a: 11). Notwithstanding, it is believed 
to be enforceable in that the ministerial statement said that ‘[m]y department will be 
contacting NHS organisations as soon as endorsement is confirmed urging them to 
implement with immediate effect. In future, should industrial relations or service 
quality issues arise in relation to soft FM (Facilities Management) contracts one of 
our first questions will be whether the terms of the statement have been followed as 
well as all parties involved agreed not to give an entitlement to any further contracts 
to contractors which attempt to opt out of this agreement’ (UNISON, 2005a: 11). 
According to the Agreement, NHS contracting authorities need to make sure that all 
contractors ‘are priced to cover the costs of applying its terms for the duration of the 
contract’ in order to adopt and implement this agreement   (UNISON, 2006a: 16). 
 
This was a national agreement but it was implemented at each hospital in the NHS 
which raises questions for unions at branch level. All contractors had to ‘employ 
staff on terms and conditions (excluding pensions) that are no less favourable than 
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those set out in the NHS AfC Staff Handbook’ (UNISON, 2006a: 7). The meaning 
of ‘no less favourable’ is understood to mean that ‘the private contractor companies 
will have to employ staff on terms and conditions that are broadly similar to those in 
the NHS AfC Staff Handbook. They have to be at least of equal value in total’ 
(UNISON, 2006a: 7).  
 
For example, Branch E1 reached an agreement with the Hospital Trust and its private 
company in 2004 which provided a revised rate of pay for contract staff (Interview, 
Branch E1). Three parties agreed to end pay parity issues that existed not only 
between NHS and contract staff, but also between differing groups of contract staff. 
This agreement is not exactly same as the Agreement but is considered to achieve 
nearly all that the Agreement set out. In addition UNISON, along with other unions 
such as GMB and Unite signed a national agreement with a big private contractor in 
order to ensure terms and conditions of all contract staff were no less favourable than 
transferred employees (UNISON, 2008b). 
 
There is a need for local discussions to ensure that any national agreements are 
implemented appropriately (UNISON, 2006a: 8). Otherwise a lack of local 
discussions, largely caused by employer’s strong intention to reduce cost or its 
hostility toward unions may prove a source of deteriorated terms and conditions of 
contract staff and likely conflicts. One of the main reasons for two strikes led by 
domestic, porters, and catering staff working at two NHS hospitals in December 
2010 was because private contractors refused to pay sick pay, overtime, or unsocial 
hours payments equivalent to Agenda for Change (UNISON, 2010b). 
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However, following the government announcement of the withdrawal of the Two-
tier Code with immediate effect on 13 December 2010, the Agreement has also not 
been applicable (Cabinet Office, 2010). This move followed the government’s 
abolition of the two-tier workforce agreement and meant that, for new contracts, 
contractors were now free to offer different terms and conditions of employment to 
new starters working on public sector contracts. However, where the Agreement is 
already in place, it has become part of terms and conditions for employees and 
consequently, can only be changed with agreement from employees. This is in line 
with general employment practice (NHS Employers, 2011). Three branches studied 
already reached agreements concerning subcontracted workers, so that they can rely 
on that agreement regardless of the abolition of the joint agreement. 
 
KHMU 
 
In the Korean case, this study found that there was no formal mechanism for 
representing subcontracted workers at sectoral level. This was partly caused by a less 
developed sectoral bargaining structure, coupled with a long tradition of enterprise-
level unionism. In accordance with the agreement of 2004, the Korean Health and 
Medical Employers Association (KHMEA) was established in 2007 with the aim of 
representing the interests of hospital employers in negotiating with KHMU (Lee, 
2011c: 784). Although KHMU claimed to represent the interests of subcontracted 
workers, subcontractors were not allowed to join the KHMEA on the grounds that 
they did not deliver medical services (National Officer, KHMU). As a result, there 
has been no mechanism for subcontractors to get involved in collective bargaining at 
sectoral level either before the breakup of the KHMEA in 2009 or afterwards. 
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As described previously, subcontracting raises concerns at the branch level over 
bargaining structure and whether a hospital or subcontractors, or both could be the 
appropriate counterpart. Data collected show that majority of branches of KHMU, as 
shown in the branch K1, K2 and K3, has no relationship with subcontractors. Apart 
from sectoral agreements, the three branches conduct additional or supplementary 
bargaining with their employers over how to implement the outcomes of sectoral 
bargaining. There are different pay structures depending on occupation, length of 
service, specific qualifications, and so on which must be accounted for appropriately. 
Furthermore they bargain with their counterparts over specific issues which only 
apply to employees of that hospital such as working time, annual leave, the number 
of staff to be employed. The situation is totally different from English cases where 
workers in the NHS were put into the one pay structure nationally which comprised 
different pay level depending on occupation, qualifications, and length of service. 
 
A new development of the bargaining structure in relation to subcontracted labour 
has been under consideration in Korea to address these difficulties. One possible way 
is to establish a bargaining table between KHMU and some of the large 
subcontractors, a strategy UNISON took. Given that hospitals tend to be provided 
with workers only from selected subcontractors, such companies begun to play a 
bigger role in providing workers for ancillary jobs in hospitals. Hence, KHMU 
expects that once it establishes a bargaining table and reaches an agreement with 
leading subcontractors, subcontracted workers, working for different hospitals can 
get the same terms and conditions of employment. 
 
There are big companies which provide workers in cleaning, catering, security, 
and so on to big hospitals. If we set up a bargaining table with the companies, 
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we expect it to become much easier not only to improve working conditions of 
workers but to organise them. It could be called ‘pattern bargaining’. Once we 
make an agreement with one subcontractor, we expect to see the spread of 
similar agreements to others. I think this is very challenging, we know this is 
very important and a crucial way to represent the interests of contingent 
workers. (National Officer, KHMU) 
 
However, this intention has not been implemented as a formal policy and is still in a 
conceptual stage. One of the main reasons why KHMU was not yet able to 
implement this idea into policy is because there is still a feeling that negotiating with 
subcontractors is to be considered as admitting the legitimacy of intermediary 
function in the labour market. Despite a long debate about the abolition of indirect 
employment or the elimination of discriminatory practices of the indirectly employed 
combined with the prohibition of illegal indirect employment, KCTU, one of the 
national labour federations that KHMU affiliates to has been pushing hard for the 
elimination of indirect employment practices from the labour market (Korea Daily 
Labor News 2012). This seems to be a political and ideological issue. 
 
I have been arguing for the adaptation of ‘two track’ strategy. But many said 
this may result in the weakening of our principle that the principal employer 
should have responsibility... ... but my view is different. I think there are some 
issues to be solved through negotiating with contractors. But many disregard it. 
(National Officer, KHMU) 
 
Other officials at national level who were interviewed also emphasised this practical 
approach and expected pay and working conditions of contingent workers to be 
ratcheted up. 
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There is no doubt that we should negotiate with a hospital, the real employer 
of subcontracted workers. However it was not a propitious circumstance due to 
the limitation of legal regulation on employers’ responsibilities, coupled with 
the refusal of hospital employers to negotiate. Accordingly I think we need to 
negotiate with contractors first and then expand our room to manoeuvre 
towards the negotiation with hospital employers. (National Officer, KHMU, 
italics added for emphasis) 
 
This idea can be interpreted as being similar to the strategy of UNISON, the so-
called ‘twin-track approach’ which means not only to opposing privatisation but also 
putting a pragmatic strategy in place through intervention and involvement in the 
procurement process and its outcomes. As the process develops and privatisation has 
been proceeding in spite of union opposition, UNISON has shifted its focus from 
‘political’ to ‘pragmatic’ (National Officer, UNISON). 
 
6.1.3 Articulation 
 
This section examines the degree of articulation of bargaining activities at different 
levels within the unions. Drawing on empirical evidence, it argues that the level of 
vertical integration within unions has had positive effects for representing interests 
of subcontracted workers. The most resilient union movements refer to those that 
maintain an effective articulation between central and local levels with strong 
organisation at both levels (Kjellberg, 1983, cited in Hyman, 1997a: 313). 
 
Under Agenda for Change it would be impossible for union branches to set up 
separate pay and terms of employment (UNISON, 2012a). There was little room for 
branches to manoeuvre. Although branch officials found themselves negotiating 
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workplace-specific issues such as arrangements for carrying over annual leave, 
special leave, resolution of disciplinary matters and so on with their contractual 
employers (ibid.), almost all pay and terms and conditions of employment were 
determined at sectoral level. 
 
KHMU also had control over the bargaining of its branches. For example, wage rates 
negotiated through sectoral agreements have generally been respected at the local 
bargaining table (Lee, 2011c: 784). However, it can be said that KHMU did not have 
very strong power over the decision of branches, although it was considered that the 
level of control of headquarters was relatively strong compared with other industrial 
unions in the metal and banking sectors (Lee, 2011c). While branch leaders had to 
redistribute upward the organisational resources including union dues, they also had 
to consider the needs of existing rank-and-file members of the branch. Given a long 
tradition of enterprise unionism coupled with the relatively unstable bargaining 
structure at sectoral level and members’ concerns over sectoral bargaining, which 
could be used as an instrument for wage restraints (Lee, 2011c: 778), branch officials 
were likely to demand autonomy in implementing policies of the central union. 
Union branches of KHMU have been under the strong influence of the structure and 
practices of enterprise-level bargaining, represented by enterprise consciousness and 
financial autonomy. As a result, a unique two-tier model of bargaining has developed 
in Korea where industrial unions wield little power over the decisions of branches. 
This arises from the relatively high level of each branch’s autonomy, although rights 
to sign up to collective agreements and to strike were at the headquarters’ discretion. 
This is one of reasons why the transformation of the bargaining structure in KHMU 
was described as ‘disorganized centralization’ (Lee, 2011c: 768) 
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This confirms that there is a positive relationship between the level of vertical 
integration within unions and unions’ ability to represent interests of subcontracted 
workers. This finding supports Heery’s work (2004: 441) arguing that a union with 
decentralised bargaining and relatively autonomous workplace trade unionism is 
likely to present the type of regulation which involves the regulation of 
subcontracted workers’ terms and conditions through engagement with 
subcontractors or a user company without organising these workers into its 
representational domain. Empirical evidence collected for this study shows that 
Heery’s argument drawing on the UK unions’ experiences is well applied to the 
Korean health sector context. This shows more clearly through a comparative lens of 
this study. 
 
6.2 Bargaining agenda 
 
This section explores how far interests of subcontracted workers have penetrated the 
bargaining agenda by looking at pay determination and other terms and conditions of 
employment. The analysis of bargaining agenda highlights three aspects in relation 
to representing the interests of subcontracted workers pertinent to this study. First, 
the extent to which bargaining has contributed to the improvement of employment 
conditions of subcontracted workers in terms of employment stability, social benefits, 
voice at the workplace, and so on. Second, whether the bargaining has resulted in 
mitigating income inequalities between regular and subcontracted workers. Third, 
how unions have been involved with subcontracted workers in the process of setting 
up the agenda at the bargaining table. 
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In order to address these questions posed, this section investigates the ways in which 
differences in bargaining agenda have contributed to patterns in union branches’ 
responses by looking at the issues of pay determination, terms and conditions of 
employment and the process of agenda settings. Data collected reveals that although 
UNISON and KHMU have been operating to a greater or lesser extent under national 
systems of collective bargaining, the scope of the branches’ representation with 
regard to pay and conditions of employment of subcontracted workers varied in 
comparison between the two unions. This study found that it was caused by the 
degree of centralisation of bargaining, which supports the institutionalist approach. 
However this study also highlights the limitation of this approach by presenting 
empirical data from the outlying branches of KHMU which showed a different 
approach from the typical one in Korea, as discussed in Section 6.5. 
 
6.2.1 Pay determination 
 
Pay for all staff in the NHS is determined by government ministers, on the basis of 
recommendations of the NHS Pay Review Body (NHSPRB), an independent body 
composed of members from a variety of professional, academic and business 
backgrounds (Newell, 2009; OME, 2013). All concerned parties such as government, 
NHS Employers, and staff organisations submit evidence on pay and related issues, 
and also NHSPRB members visit trusts and other health care units to meet staff and 
managers, to gather information and views on pay and related issues before making 
recommendations (OME, 2013). Although it does not look like the common kind of 
collective bargaining, it is regarded as an extension of bargaining (Winchester and 
Bach, 1999: 44-45). 
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The work of NHSPRB applies to all staff including ancillary and maintenance and 
estates staff, administrative and clerical, administrative managers and other groups of 
staff  (OME, 2013). The pay level of employees working for private companies is 
determined based on this system and majority of them fall into the bottom three of 
the nine pay bands (UNISON, 2006a). In the case of Branch E1, for instance, an 
agreement between three parties – the branch, the Trust and a private contractor – 
put all posts for subcontracted workers into pay bands 1 to 3 in 2006 and this has 
persisted to date. This has to be ‘no less than specified in the Agenda for Change pay 
band’, which means that a subcontractor cannot simply try to apply the bottom point 
of each pay band (UNISON, 2006a: 8). Each band has several pay points and two 
gateways. Progression through the gateways in each pay band is linked to the 
application of the Knowledge and Skills Framework (KSF in the NHS) (UNISON, 
2006a). A subcontractor must ‘adopt and implement an objective method of job 
evaluation, agreed in partnership that results in equal pay for work of equal value 
compared to other employees of the contractor working on NHS contracts’ 
(UNISON, 2006a: 13). 
 
It is noteworthy that one of the contested issues in UNISON’s Health Care Service 
Conference in April 2012 was whether there was a need to establish another forum 
for negotiations on NHS pay instead of the NHSPRB. This motion was triggered by 
the government’s decision to freeze pay for NHS staff between 2011 and 2013. This 
raised a question of the validity and the future of the pay review body in determining 
pay awards for NHS staff (UNISON, 2012b: 26-27). Despite its failure to pass, it 
showed that members’ concerns about the independence of NHSPRB have been 
building up. It also showed a distinctive feature in the English health care systems is 
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that pay determination was used as a political instrument by governments aiming to 
meet fiscal pressures (Grimshaw et al., 2007). 
 
In contrast, pay increase rates in Korea were determined to varying degrees 
depending on hospital types. KHMU and KHMEA agreed, for example, in 2007 on a 
4.0-5.3 percent of wage increase rates depending on the size and characteristics of 
hospitals. The two parties also reached an agreement to use a certain amount of the 
pay increases for members to improve pay and terms of employment for contingent 
workers. Accordingly, contingent workers or those who cannot join KHMU can 
benefit from the agreement, by describing the way to apply that provision to them in 
supplementary agreements at the branch level. Following the agreement, each branch 
made a further agreement with its counterpart over how to implement this at 
workplace level. For example, the agreement in Branch K1 applied 5.0 percent wage 
increase rates outlined: 4.2 percent applied to existing members and the remaining 
0.8 percent was used for contingent workers by spending the amount of money on 
increasing their pay. However, since the sectoral bargaining system was suspended 
in 2009, there has been no mechanism to regulate the pay of subcontracted workers 
at sectoral level. 
 
6.2.2 Terms and Conditions 
 
As with pay determination, terms and conditions for these workers were protected by 
the NHS Agenda for Change agreement in England, while those in Korea were not 
covered by any official agreements. 
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Terms and conditions of employment for subcontracted workers in England were 
also protected by the Agreement which prescribed that whatever terms contractors 
proposed to apply under this agreement must be no less favourable than the terms 
and conditions operating under the NHS Staff AfC Handbook (UNISON, 2006a: 15). 
The NHS AfC agreement contained conditions on the following: maternity leave and 
pay, redundancy pay, mileage allowances, subsistence allowances, equal 
opportunities, dignity at work, caring for children and adults, flexible working 
arrangements, balancing work and personal life, an employment break scheme, and 
other relevant provisions. A striking recent change in pension schemes for 
subcontracted workers was that they would be entitled to the NHS pension scheme 
later in 2013 (People Management, 2013). Since 1999, according to the TUPE 
regulations, NHS staff transferred to the private sector have been guaranteed a 
‘broadly comparable’ pension scheme. But the schemes applied to subcontracted 
workers were not the public-sector pension schemes. Although the government move 
was triggered by private providers arguing that ‘this pension requirement has put 
them at a disadvantage when bidding for contracts against other NHS trusts who are 
part of the government-backed schemes’ (ibid.), unions backed this move because it 
helped preserve membership numbers and thereby could enhance the viability of the 
NHS pension scheme. 
In the Korean case, according to sectoral agreements from 2004 to 2008, provisions 
ranged from the principle of sectoral bargaining to enhancing the public role in the 
health service, employment, pay, labour process including working hours, the form 
of shift work, overtime pay rates, annual and maternity leave, sexual harassment, 
health and safety, and other relevant issues. However, most of these provisions 
applied to members with a full-time permanent job. There was a section specifying 
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conditions for contingent workers in the sectoral agreement in 2007 with the aim of 
improving pay and conditions of employment of contingent workers. As a result, 
more than one thousand workers who were indirectly employed began to have 
entitlements to special holiday benefits and medicare reimbursement which only 
applied to workers employed by a hospital. More importantly, the agreement in 2007 
contained a provision stating that an employer shall make an effort to guarantee 
continuity of employment for subcontracted workers in the case of the change of an 
existing contractor. It needs to be appreciated that KHMU made sectoral agreements 
including provisions for subcontracted workers who usually did not have 
membership. Nevertheless, this type of bargaining is regarded as proxy bargaining. 
The three branches of KHMU did little to communicate with subcontracted workers 
during the bargaining process to find out what they really wanted. Although the 
process of agenda setting is closely related to the ways in which subcontracted 
workers get involved in union activities, these branches negatively objectified the 
subcontracted workers. The experience of these three branches (K1, K2 and K3) is in 
stark contrast with that of two outliers in KHMU (K4 and K5) where branch officials 
communicated with subcontracted workers in person and mobilised them in order to 
advance their demands. 
 
6.3 Bargaining coverage 
 
This section addresses bargaining coverage in order to examine how the scope of 
collective bargaining coverage is related to patterns of union responses to 
subcontracted labour. The share of workers who benefit from a collective agreement 
rests on the coverage of the agreement (Bosch et al., 2010: 93; Clegg, 1976: 8-11). 
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The term ‘coverage’ is distinguished from union density but it approximates the 
unionisation rate in England and Korea (Bae et al., 2008; Flanagan, 2008; Freeman, 
2008). This is rooted in the lack of mechanism to extend coverage to all workers and 
firms in a sector (or a country). Declining unionisation level in the two countries is, 
therefore, related to declines in collective bargaining coverage (Freeman, 2008: 643; 
Yoon, 2008b). In contrast to other sectors in each country, UNISON and KHMU 
have been conducting collective bargaining at sectoral level. 
 
This section argues that the degree of bargaining coverage has a positive influence 
on union representation capacity by improving pay and terms of employment for 
subcontracted workers who are mostly in low-wage jobs. It is in line with the work 
of Méhaut et al. (2010) arguing that there is a positive relationship between the 
degree of inclusiveness of a wage-setting system and the incidence of low-wage 
work. This study takes a further step by uncovering dynamics in the process of 
implementing national or sectoral bargaining agreements at workplace level. It 
argues for the importance of institutional arrangements which result in different 
branch responses. To this end, this section explores the extent to which workers are 
covered by collective agreements and pay determination by examining the Agenda 
for Change and Two-tier Code in England and the annual sectoral agreements and 
their related supplementary agreements at branch level. 
 
6.3.1 Coverage and union density 
 
The scope of collective bargaining coverage relies on different institutional setting in 
countries. The work of Bosch and his colleagues (2010: 94-102) demonstrates that 
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institutional linkage can be classified into four types: 1) low trade union density 
causes low inclusiveness; 2) high union density leads to high inclusiveness; 3) 
extended bargaining agreements and strong employer organisations contribute to 
high inclusiveness; and 4) high employer density and high coverage do not result in 
high inclusiveness due to the employers’ refusal to extend agreements. The first two 
types are based on the link between union density and collective bargaining coverage. 
The low-low connection found in the liberal market economies with few other 
mechanisms to cover non-union members signifies that a low union density has led 
to low coverage in collective bargaining. 
 
In broad terms, England and Korea fit into the first category that coverage is mainly 
influenced by one single factor: union density (Bosch et al., 2010: 95; Lee, 2011a). 
The two are a typical case which shows that when union density is low, bargaining 
agreement coverage reflects this (Bosch et al., 2010: 102; Eun et al., 2012b). In other 
words, the coverage in England and Korea is almost equal to, or only slightly higher 
than unionisation level. In this context, declining union density produces 
commensurate declines in collective bargaining coverage (Freeman, 2008: 643). 
 
Looking into the sectoral level in the two countries, however, a different picture 
appears. Whilst collective agreement coverage in Korea is slightly higher than 
unionisation level across the board including the health sector (Eun et al., 2012b), 
that in the English health sector has trodden different trajectories compared to that in 
the private sector. All workers employed in the NHS are covered by a centralised 
pay determination system and the Agenda for Change agreement (Newell, 2009). 
Furthermore, employees of companies that provide outsourced services can benefit 
200 
 
from the quasi-extension of the national wage agreement (Méhaut et al., 2010: 335). 
This means that the English health sector can be regarded as the third type with 
extended bargaining agreements. As such, the more stable institutional arrangement 
in the English health sector is more propitious for representing the interests of 
subcontracted workers than that in Korea. 
 
6.3.2 Mechanism for extension 
 
Terms and conditions of employment for all employees in the NHS were determined 
by the Agenda for Change (hereafter AfC) agreement so that all employees could be 
covered by this highly centralised agreement regardless of union membership, across 
all regions and hospitals. There was no need to make an effort to extend the 
collective agreement to employers who are not affiliated to the signatory employer 
associations because the system already embraced all NHS employees (Newell, 
2009). 
 
Although pension schemes (for private companies’ workers) differ, Agenda for 
change applies to all workers. (Branch E1) 
 
By contrast, the experience of KHMU reflects that of other sectors in Korea. Like 
other industrial unions, KHMU was also confronted by difficulties such as low union 
density, limited resources in terms of union finance and the number of staff, 
employers’ hostility to sectoral bargaining and very few mechanisms for ensuring 
the extension of sectoral agreement to employers who did not take part in the 
sectoral bargaining system. In this situation there is little opportunity to address the 
extension of bargaining agreements to the unorganised or contingent workforce. 
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Taking the sectoral agreement of 2007 as an example, there was no separate 
provision about the extent of agreement coverage. It was interpreted that the 
agreement covered only KHMU members employed by hospitals that took part in the 
sectoral bargaining. Considering low density of KHMU membership that stood 
slightly above 10 percent among all health sector workers, the extent of the influence 
of collective agreement was limited. This is one of the marked differences between 
UNISON and KHMU. In England, all NHS hospitals are obliged to implement the 
AfC agreement every year regardless of union presence in their hospitals and 
unionisation rate. Once pay, terms, and conditions of employment are agreed at NHS 
Pay Review Body and NHS Staff Council, they ought to be implemented for all NHS 
workers. 
 
It should be noted that there were efforts by KHMU with a positive outcome which 
resulted in the extension of the bargaining agreement by providing for non-unionised 
workers, as explained in Section 6.2. Apart from this exceptional provision, two 
questions arise in relation to union members employed by hospitals that did not 
participate in the sectoral bargaining, and non-union members in hospitals that did 
take part in the bargaining. The question is whether the sectoral agreement can 
extend beyond the core groups of members to cover contingent workers. It was not 
possible to extend coverage of sectoral agreements to subcontracted, and other 
contingent workers. Employers who did not take part in the sectoral bargaining 
system are not bound by the agreement and instead, take responsibility only for an 
agreement negotiated with a branch at the workplace. Non-union members in 
hospitals participating in sectoral bargaining may or may not be covered, depending 
on branch density. This is because there is a legal provision regarding binding force 
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of collective agreements in Korea. The Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment 
Act (TULRAA) states that:  
 
[W]here a collective agreement applies to at least half of the ordinary number 
of workers performing the same kind of job and employed in a single business 
or a workplace, it shall also apply to other workers performing the same kind 
of job and employed in the same business or workplace (Article 35: General 
Binding Force).  
 
Due to this provision all employees, regardless of union membership, are covered by 
the sectoral agreement in all branches studied with above 50 percent unionisation 
level except Branch K4. However, there is no reason to assume that this provision 
applies to subcontracted workers because they are not employed by a hospital. 
 
6.4 Employer responsibilities 
 
A fundamental problem that arises in triangular employment relationships is about 
joint employer status: who should take responsibility towards workers employed by 
the third party. This issue is based on the questions of ‘who controls the employees, 
gives orders, directs work, hires, and fires’ (Kalleberg, 2000: 352) and thereby 
leading to the issue of who is bound by labour law to participate in collective 
bargaining and implement collective agreements. 
 
Unlike temporary help agencies, as discussed in Chapter 1, subcontractors supervise 
their employees’ works but the extent of control exerted by the client may not be 
clear-cut in practice (Kalleberg, 2000: 350). Taking a contracted-out cleaning service 
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in a hospital as an example, this ambiguity becomes evident. Cleaners conducted 
their jobs all around the hospital including cleaning patients’ rooms and the wards in 
which most regular medical staff were working. Cleaners were likely to get orders 
from staff employed by the hospital because tidiness was also related to the quality 
of medical service. Due to such circumstances, the question of who should be 
considered the real (or genuine) employer of subcontracted workers in question is 
still unclear (Davidov, 2004: 729).  
 
 In other words, it is directly associated with the question of whether a union 
confirms the legitimacy of the third party and to what extent a union would call for 
employer responsibilities from both or either employer. This section explores the 
ways in which legal regulations concerning employer responsibilities have 
contributed to variations in union responses. To this end, it examines legal 
provisions concerning employer responsibilities and analyses evidence from the 
process and outcomes of supplementary bargaining at workplaces. On this basis, it 
argues that despite the similar legal frameworks in relation to employer 
responsibilities in the two countries, union branches have responded in a different 
way which relates to a broad national context. 
 
6.4.1 Protocols of labour law 
 
Given that one of the reasons for subcontracting is to outsource employer 
responsibilities towards employees to the third party, it is vital to clarify who is the 
legitimate employer for subcontracted workers  (Davidov, 2004). The triangular 
employment relationships have, as Cho (2012b: 6) argues, the risk of not only 
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intermediary exploitation but also of exempting the employer from their 
responsibilities. If an employer takes an ambiguous attitude toward subcontracted 
workers or tries to avoid responsibilities, terms and conditions of employment will 
deteriorate and their employment security will be undermined. On this account Wills 
in the study (2009: 447) dealing with community-union organising efforts insists on 
the need to put pressure on the ‘real employer’ at the top of any contracting chain. 
 
The reason this issue comes into question is because of the protocols of labour law 
that have developed subject to only two parties’ involvement in the supply and 
management of labour in England and Korea. Additional ambiguities arise in 
triangular employment relationships (Kang, 2007; Park et al., 2009; Wills, 2009). 
With respect to the issue of employer responsibilities, both countries have broadly 
similar regulations.  
 
Employer responsibilities in England and Korea are based on the principle of an 
employment contract with ‘clearly identified parties’ which makes it extremely 
difficult to establish who holds employers’ responsibilities beyond employment 
contracts (Cho, 2012b; Cotton, 2010). As Cotton noted: 
 
In the absence of a contract of service, how this is established rests on the 
deliberation of courts. (Cotton, 2010: 13) 
 
Interestingly, a similar pattern of court decisions is found in the two countries. While 
decisions are not consistent, only a few imposed employer responsibility on the 
principal company on the grounds that there is an implied contract between the 
principal company and agency or subcontracted workers. Taking the decision of the 
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Supreme Court in Korea
2
  - as an example, the point becomes much clearer. In 
contrast to other decisions from the Court which focused on the employment contract 
itself, the judgement in this case was based on who has the right to give work 
instructions. It was ruled that even if a field manager of the subcontractor gave 
specific work directions to the subcontracted workers, that manager was simply 
delivering the decisions of the principal company, or under such control  (Cho, 
2012b: 7; Kang, 2011). 
 
This is, however, an exceptional ruling. In reality, most subcontractors take 
fundamental responsibility for their employees, according to the spirit of legislation 
in the two countries. This legal framework contributes to patterns of union responses. 
This is because, considering that a union seeks to improve terms and conditions of 
employment for, in a narrow sense, those who are in the union through collective 
bargaining with its legitimate employer(s), the union has to decide with whom to 
negotiate. This issue is illuminated by analysing the union branches’ policies and 
actions in relation to this legal framework in the next section. 
 
6.4.2 Union branches’ dilemma 
 
With respect to employer responsibilities, union branches were confronted with two 
main options. First, if a union seeks to challenge the legitimacy of the third party, it 
is likely to call for bargaining with the real employer at the top of the chain in order 
to turn subcontracted workers into directly employed positions or at least to improve 
pay and working conditions of these workers. In this case, the ultimate goal of the 
                                                 
2
 Supreme Court of Korea Decision, 2008Du4367, Decided 22
nd
 July 2010 
206 
 
union is to determine who should be considered the employer by probing the nature 
of the triangular employment relationships. Second, if a union admits that it is almost 
inevitable to accept subcontractors as employers under the existing legal framework, 
it is likely to see their responsibilities as existing jointly or severally with the client 
hospital. 
 
Data collected revealed that the responses of three KHMU branches seemed to be 
predicated upon the principle of not confirming the legitimacy of the third party, in 
that they all refused to accept subcontractors as counterparts in their bargaining unit. 
In contrast, the three UNISON branches had been negotiating with private 
companies. At least, in legal terms, the UNISON branches seemed to confer 
legitimacy on subcontractors as employers. But this study cannot state that the three 
Korean branches were more committed to their principles because they had hardly 
done anything to turn the tide of emerging subcontracted labour. In a similar vein, it 
is hard to say that English branches had deserted their principles just because they 
have negotiated with subcontractors to improve subcontracted workers’ conditions of 
employment practically. 
 
With respect to the issue of responsibilities of both employers, all branches studied 
in England and Korea have to some extent demanded employer responsibilities of 
hospitals through the sectoral and/or enterprise level bargaining agreements. 
UNISON branches have pressurised hospital trusts to extend their responsibilities 
towards subcontracted workers by enhancing bargaining resources based on 
organising these workers. In contrast, the three typical KHMU branches (K1, K2 and 
K3) have paid less attention to this issue and were more focused on encouraging 
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hospital employers to have sympathetic attitudes to subcontracted workers without 
extending collective agreements and organising them. Under the same context of 
triangular employment relationships which could create  difficulties for unions in 
attracting and thereby organising subcontracted workers (Gallagher and Sverke, 
2005), the English union branches responded in a more inclusive way based on 
existing institutional resources such as the more centralised bargaining system than 
those in Korea. 
 
This issue is associated with not just legal regulation but also with activities at 
branch level in relation to how it can be implemented. The experience of KHMU 
presents a good example. Regarding the influence of the change in bargaining 
structure on issues of subcontracted workers, KHMU seemed to have had some 
positive impact on revealing the real employer. In the first sectoral agreement in 
2004, a provision for the indirectly employed was put in section 5 regulating the 
societal responsibilities of hospitals. This was aimed at imposing to some extent 
employer responsibility on hospitals by stating that ‘hospital employers endeavour to 
help subcontracted workers to be hired by a new company in the case of transfer of 
undertaking’ (The Sectoral Agreement in 2004). It seems similar to that in the TUPE 
regulations even if there is a little difference in the phrases. This must be a 
significant outcome. 
 
Despite the importance of this provision, it cannot be said that it functioned 
adequately because most hospital employers preferred using subcontracted workers 
without union involvement and even if they were asked to comply with the provision, 
they could say that it compelled  them to “endeavour to do” rather than requiring 
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success at doing so. Furthermore the agreement included the phrase of ‘a hospital is 
not an employer with obligations by law towards subcontracted workers’, which 
reflects hospital employers’ strong intentions not to be involved in legal 
responsibilities for these workers. From KHMU’s point of view, accepting this 
phrase is a strategic retreat. It is assumed that KHMU took one step back in this 
battle in order to sign the first sectoral agreement. A National Officer of KHMU 
commented: 
 
This first sectoral agreement was a historical triumph for the Korean labour 
movement. Although we did not succeed in explicitly fixing the hospitals’ 
responsibilities towards the indirectly employed, the section that mentions to 
some extent hospitals’ obligations towards them is considered to be a big step 
forward. (National Officer, KHMU) 
 
This provision had been put into collective agreements regardless of how powerfully 
it has been implemented at the workplace level until the sectoral bargaining ceased 
in 2009. In the process of supplementary bargaining following the sectoral 
agreement, this study found that branches did usually not consider subcontractors. 
Even if there were some provisions which should be applied to subcontracted 
workers, they usually deal with these matters through the subcontracting employers. 
An example includes the case of branch K1 which sought to apply the agreement to 
subcontracted workers in supplementary bargaining with Hospital K1. 
 
The sectoral agreement of 2004 stipulated that ‘33,000 KRW (approximately 18 
GBP) per month should be given to the indirectly employed in order to improve their 
working conditions’, which gave rise a question as to who had responsibility to do so. 
This could be interpreted in two ways: the hospital employer should take 
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responsibility in terms of interlocutors of the agreement; or the subcontractor should 
do it in terms of the legal status of the employment contract. The solution the branch 
achieved was that the subcontractor gave that benefit to its employees after being 
given the amount of money by the hospital. 
 
Negotiating over the financial benefit for these workers was part of 
implementing the sectoral agreement. Regarding this issue, we have never 
bargained with subcontractors. We’ve never thought about that. When we 
signed the agreement including the provision for these workers, we thought the 
responsibility for implementation should be on the hospital not subcontractors. 
(Branch K1) 
 
As such, the three branches K1, K2 and K3 of KHMU had little direct relationship 
with subcontractors in terms of bargaining. Instead, they attempted to improve pay 
and working conditions of subcontracted workers to some extent by imposing the 
responsibility towards them on the principal employer even if the extent of 
improvement is very limited. 
 
6.5 Variations in union responses 
 
It is certainly the case, as discussed in previous sections, that differences in the 
collective bargaining system in terms of bargaining level, agendas, and coverage in 
the two countries have contributed to a different scope of union branches’ 
representation of subcontracted workers’ interests. The branches of UNISON with a 
more centralised and stable collective bargaining system have better represented the 
interests of subcontracted workers than those of KHMU. This section, however, 
indicates that the two outliers of KHMU exerted a significant influence in 
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representing these workers’ interests despite practical impediments to meaningful, 
legally bounded or practically influential, collective bargaining. 
 
Unlike the three typical branches of KHMU, empirical evidence from Branches K4 
and K5 highlights similar responses to those of UNISON branches. Branch K4 had 
been negotiating with both Hospital K4 and two subcontractors. In the case of 
Branch K5 which played a decisive role in establishing a separate branch for 
subcontracted workers, it had supported the separate branch’s bargaining with 
subcontractors by sharing information from the user hospital and the branch’s own 
resources. These two cases reveal that union responses faced with similar challenges 
might be similar to those under different institutional settings and can differ from 
those within a given national and sectoral context. These findings clearly indicate the 
limitations of the institutional approach which more focuses on differences mediated 
by different institutions (Wailes et al., 2003: 621). Furthermore, they lend weight to 
the criticism of Clegg’s view (1976) because experience of two outlying branches 
explicitly shows that under a given collective bargaining structure, union behaviour 
in relation to representing subcontracted workers can differ. This shows, as discussed 
in Chapter 8, additional evidence to reveal the weaknesses of Clegg’s exclusive 
focus on collective bargaining for explaining various aspects of union behaviour.  
 
Accordingly, this section argues that coupled with the institutional approach, non-
institutional factors need to be integrated in explaining patterns of union responses. 
To this end, the two outlying branches of KHMU responded to subcontracted labour 
through collective bargaining is analysed and then why they have responded in a 
211 
 
particular way with a focus on leaders, the represented and internal politics within a 
branch is investigated. 
 
6.5.1 Constraints but also opportunities 
 
The two KHMU branches adopted an inclusive approach towards both 
subcontractors and their employees, which means that the type of responses can vary 
even within a single national setting. While other three branches have played a 
minimal role in representing these workers through collective bargaining, Branches 
K4 and K5 were actively involved in negotiating with subcontractors, directly or 
indirectly in order to regulate and improve terms and conditions of employment of 
subcontracted workers. Despite less favourable institutional settings surrounding the 
branches compared to those in England, these two used more inclusive strategies.  
 
Branch K4 
 
This study found that Branch K4 had negotiated with three different companies: the 
hospital, and two subcontractors for cleaning and catering respectively. Different 
bargaining agenda were present for these negotiations, depending on the coverage of 
each collective agreement and the interests of each group. Like the other branches, 
this branch did supplementary bargaining with the hospital following a sectoral 
agreement. In addition to this, the branch bargained with the two contractors. 
Speaking strictly, a bargaining agent, usually the secretary of the branch, is not an 
employee of the subcontractors but they accepted the secretary as a representative of 
their employees. According to the principle of labour law based on employment 
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contract, it seems to be difficult to organise but was possible due to the union 
structure at industry level not on an enterprise basis. Regarding this bargaining 
structure, Branch K4 secretary commented: 
 
Despite a big change in our bargaining structure at sectoral level, members 
employed by subcontractors are hardly regulated by the sectoral agreement. It 
is impossible for subcontractors to join the sectoral bargaining and thereby the 
agreement did not apply to cleaners and caterers. This is why we have to 
negotiate with contractors separately. (Branch K4, italics added for emphasis) 
 
While most collective agreements concerned regular workers employed by hospitals 
who joined the KHMEA, there was little room for subcontracted workers, which is 
interpreted as ‘structural exclusion from collective bargaining’ (Simms, 2010: 27). 
Under this constraint, Branch K4 has sought to find room to manoeuvre and then 
began to negotiate with two subcontractors. The collective agreement between 
Branch K4 and the subcontractors covered almost the whole range of issues from 
succession of employment contracts in case of transfer of undertakings to 
refurbishment of staff lounge facilities. In addition pay, extra work premiums and 
severance pay, working conditions including working time, holiday, annual leave, 
disciplinary matters, welfare benefits, collective rights including bargaining and 
collective action and works council, and other relevant matters were also addressed 
in these negotiations. An official of this branch commented: 
 
It is no exaggeration to say that our branch has been negotiating all year round. 
Through this process we’re trying to make the responsibility of a real employer 
at the top of contracting chain clear. (Branch K4) 
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What this study points out is about the issue about the legal provision regarding 
binding force of collective agreements. While the two subcontractors have to comply 
with this rule because majority of cleaners and caterers joined the branch, all 
employees of Hospital K4 are covered by the sectoral agreement despite low density, 
around 10 percent. This rate is far below the eligible level for the binding force of 
collective agreements by law. Coverage seems to come from the employer’s attitude 
toward the branch. 
 
All employees can be covered by both the sectoral and supplementary 
agreements at the workplace level. I think it is because management does not 
want non-union members to join the branch and to recognise the privilege of 
union members by treating all employees equally regardless of their 
membership. (Branch K4, italics added for emphasis) 
 
This comment recalls the work of Booth and Francesconi (2003), discussed in 
Chapter 5, arguing that legal regulations might either weaken union organising 
campaigns or act as opportunities to attract low-paid workers. This case indicates 
that management may wield power on the basis of legal provisions in order to 
discourage employees to join the branch. Nevertheless this study argues that the 
generous coverage of collective agreements is an outcome of branch’s prolonged 
demands, power and influence. In this regard, there is a need to discuss the low 
union density of Branch K4, which will be explained in Chapter 7. 
 
Branch K5 
 
The case of branch K5 presents similar evidence despite a difference from that of 
branch K4. Branch K5 had actively supported the establishment and activities of a 
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separate branch for subcontracted workers for the hospital K5 without organising 
them into its own branch (see Chapter 7 for a more lengthy discussion of union 
structure of the branch K5). The separate branch had conducted collective bargaining 
with subcontractors. What should be noted is that the representative(s) of Branch K5 
also went to the bargaining table as one of interlocutors despite the subcontractors’ 
refusal at the beginning of the bargaining. 
 
Due to the change in our organisational structure to the industry level, officials 
of the national union are eligible to attend collective bargaining at the branch 
level. We fully have been exploiting this opportunity. (Branch K5) 
 
Under enterprise-level unionism, it was hardly possible for representatives not 
employed by the company to attend bargaining at the workplace level because they 
were considered a third party which had no direct relationship with the company. 
The involvement of a third party in activities of an enterprise union such as 
bargaining or collective actions was banned in Korea. Reorganising enterprise 
unions to industry level, however, created new opportunities for union officials by 
allowing them to engage in activities at the branch level. An official of Branch K5 
commented: 
 
A subcontractor was not able to refuse the attendance of representatives of the 
industry union at the bargaining table. The person eligible to sign an agreement 
at the branch level is the General Secretary of KHMU and thereby any other 
officials can negotiate with hospitals and their subcontractors where members 
of KHMU exist on behalf of the General Secretary. Managers of 
subcontractors did not understand our legal positions at first but began to 
understand. (Branch K5) 
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The experiences of Branch K5 indicate that it made full use of the resources of the 
industrial union despite legal regulations based on employment contracts and lack of 
understanding of employers. This is a good example of turning limitations into 
opportunities. To achieve this, officials of the branch had been working with those of 
the separate subcontracted workers’ branch not only during bargaining but before 
and after that. 
 
6.5.2 Branches’ capacity of representation 
 
The experiences of Branches K4 and K5 leads to a question about what contributed 
to these exceptional cases, in stark contrast to the other branches of KHMU studied. 
This study, first and foremost, pays attention to the role of leadership. Officials of 
Branches K4 and K5 have a clear goal and willingness to represent the interests of 
subcontracted workers. An official of Branch K4 commented: 
 
I have been as busy as a bee. I took on too many tasks which should be shared 
with other representatives. But we don’t have adequate facility time. We have 
no way. So I have to break up my sleeping time in order to undertake union 
duties and activities. During the period of collective bargaining – as I told you, 
I had to conduct three different bargaining processes [with the hospital and two 
subcontractors] – I could not go back home frequently nor have enough sleep. 
(Branch K4) 
 
Officials of this branch were imbued with a sense of purpose about what unions do, 
and devoted themselves to workers regardless of their membership and employment 
status. In the case of Branch K5, much effort was made to forge similar interests 
with the separate subcontracted workers’ branch by sharing information received 
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from the hospital and the branch’s resources such as the office, desks, computers, a 
printer and other facilities. This co-operation helped the branches to plan and 
evaluate joint bargaining strategies and daily activities for members of both branches. 
An official of this branch commented: 
 
It was not difficult to share facilities such as the office space that we [the main 
branch] already had. We [Branch K5 officials] took it for granted. By using the 
same office, we [officials of the main branch and the separate branch] were 
able to see each other every day and thereby develop joint strategies and 
actions on a daily basis. (Branch K5) 
 
These examples underline that leaders of the two branches have more actively sought 
to explore workers’ interests rather than merely selecting interests from amongst 
union members. In addition, it must be emphasised that one of the factors which led 
to different responses from those in the other three branches was the existence of 
unionised subcontracted workers in the two exceptional branches. Regardless of 
whether they joined the same branch or not, workers with membership are likely to 
encourage branches to do something for them through collective bargaining. 
 
When they [subcontracted workers] joined a union, they were in a very 
vulnerable position, for example, on the verge of redundancy caused by a 
change of subcontractors or under the threat of wage cutting, and so on. So 
they made desperate efforts to achieve what they wanted to achieve at the 
bargaining table. (Branch K4) 
 
Unionised subcontracted workers, whether as a result of a branch’s organising 
campaign or a voluntary decision of their own, were more likely to be represented in 
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consideration of their inferior pay and working conditions. Furthermore they could 
often not even consider joining a union because there were many cases that a user 
company fire subcontracted workers on the basis of union membership through 
changing subcontractors (Eun et al., 2007). Hence when subcontracted workers join 
a union often means that they are willing to take that risk and ready to fight to get 
their decent working conditions back. This makes it easier for a union to represent 
their interests through collective bargaining. 
 
It is also worth noting that there might be tension between a branch and existing 
members with mostly permanent contracts when the branch seeks to represent the 
interests of subcontracted workers. Existing union members might express 
dissatisfaction with allocation of resources of a branch, which is associated with 
‘them and us’ attitude. 
 
Members among regular workers may think that we [the branch] should devote 
ourselves to them not non-organised subcontracted workers. So they are 
somewhat discontent with the union spending union budget for and using my 
facility time for these workers. (Branch K1) 
 
In most cases, a union branch suffers from budget constraints and resource 
limitations and thereby a branch’s activities on behalf of subcontracted workers are 
likely to be limited. Despite this, Branches K4 and K5 made a different response 
towards inclusion of these workers through persistent efforts to reconcile likely 
conflicting interests of workers with different types of employment contracts. 
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This clearly shows that union branches within a given institutional setting are able to 
adopt a different strategy towards subcontracted workers, which highlights the 
limited explanatory power of institutions despite their importance in explaining 
differences of typical responses between the two settings. Hence this section 
highlights the potential of union branches to maximise opportunities even within a 
constraint institutional context depending on the role of leaders and willingness of 
subcontracted workers to act.  
 
6.6 Concluding summary 
 
This chapter explored the way in which collective bargaining systems have 
influenced union responses in the English and Korean health sector. The bargaining 
systems in terms of the level, structure, agenda and coverage differed markedly 
between the two, which had a significant impact on different patterns of branch 
responses to subcontracted labour. The branches of UNISON operating within the 
relatively centralised and stable bargaining system have been involved in and dealt 
with issues of subcontracted workers, which provided these workers with a 
mechanism to get their voice heard. In contrast, the ‘disorganized centralization’ 
(Lee, 2011c) of the bargaining system in the Korean health sector made it difficult 
for branches to actively address the concerns of subcontracted workers, coupled with 
the legacy of enterprise unionism which led to branches focusing more on existing 
members within the workplace. The differences in industrial relations institutions, 
collective bargaining systems in this chapter, helped explain different patterns of 
union responses to subcontracted workers. Institutions matter in shaping union 
strategies. 
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This chapter also marked significantly different responses within a single national 
and sectoral context by presenting the experience of Branches K4 and K5. These two 
showed that despite unfavourable collective bargaining systems for representing 
workers employed by a third party, branches could adopt a different response from 
the typical one represented by the three KHMU branches K1, K2 and K3. This 
supports the assertions that the institutionalist approach alone is not sufficient to 
account for variations in union responses because there is scope for unions to make 
significant choices whatever their institutional constraints are. This chapter argues 
that institutions matter but provide only a partial framework for understanding 
various patterns of union responses, which is discussed in Chapter 8 with the wider 
relevance. To summarise, the findings presented in this chapter lend weight to the 
importance of an integrated approach between institutional and non-institutional 
factors in explaining patterns of union responses. 
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Chapter 7 Union structure and governance 
 
This chapter addresses the question of how union structures in the two institutional 
settings have contributed to similarities and differences in patterns of union 
responses. Given the growth of subcontracted workers at a time of declining union 
membership and an emerging representation gap, this changing workforce 
composition presents significant challenges to unions. Unions have to decide 
whether or not to represent these workers by including them into their constituencies 
(Cerviňo, 2000; Heery, 2004). In contrast to other contingent workers directly 
employed by a user company, the representation of subcontracted workers requires 
the expansion of representation beyond the workplace where a branch is mainly 
based, as seen in the case of UNISON and KHMU. Faced with this situation, some 
unions have sought to expand their representational domain to cover contingent 
workers through a ‘beyond the enterprise’ approach (Heery et al., 2004b: 31), which 
helps us understand that the union structure, in some cases, may be in need of reform 
to make it possible to recruit and organise these workers into its constituency. 
 
The term union structure here is used for two aspects of structure: external and 
internal. The former refers to the scope and the boundary of membership; and the 
latter means its governance, in other words representation and administration (Fiorito 
and Jarley, 2008: 189). This study calls external structure ‘union structure’, and 
internal structure ‘union governance’, for convenience.  
 
The issue of union structure is closely related to the question of how unions 
represent whose and which interests. As Simms and Charlwood (2010) note, trade 
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unions as agencies whose main role is to represent members’ or, more broadly, 
workers’ interests have to answer these fundamental questions. Drawing on Hyman’s 
work (1997b: 516-521) concerning unions and interest representation, the question 
of whose interests involves a union’s constituency, i.e. the boundary of membership. 
Once a union decides its constituency, it tends to prioritise the interests of a certain 
group of workers which could be detrimental to others. Hence setting the bounds of 
membership is a union’s vital strategic choice because ‘unions tend to act on behalf 
of specific constituencies and to focus on distinctive aspects of their constitutions’ 
needs, aspirations and experiences’ (Hyman, 1996: 55). It might be an exaggeration 
or a misinterpretation to say that unions represent only the interests of their members. 
But it is the case that the scope of unions’ capacity of representation tends to be 
forced to be confined in part by the constraint of labour law based on the 
employment contract at the enterprise level at least in England and Korea (Eun et al., 
2012a; Wills, 2009) (see Chapters 1 and 6 for more discussion of distinctive features 
of labour law). Even if a group of subcontracted workers falls within union 
demarcations, whether or not the interests of these workers get represented relies in 
part on how effective they make their interests heard within the union (Simms, 2010: 
28).  
 
The question of which interests refers to the agenda that a union tries to push in 
relation to its counterpart(s), usually an employer or an association of employers, or 
sometimes the government. Interests here vary, ranging from a traditional core 
agenda of bread-and-butter and workplace rights and career opportunities to issues 
which address the role of the state such as social wage and labour market policy, and 
broader issues on community and environment. The issue of how to represent is 
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associated with the question of organisational form, capacity, democracy and 
activism. Even if branch membership is open to subcontracted workers, the ways in 
which these workers’ interests get represented remains an important issue as the 
increase of heterogeneity of members might make it difficult for branches to 
represent the interests of its constituency. As Hyman (1997a: 311) argues, ‘more 
diversified patterns of employee interests intensify the problem of filtering and 
aggregating constituents’ expectations’.  
 
For this reason, it is important to examine the ways union branches have responded 
when faced with emerging subcontracted workers with potentially conflicting 
interests compared to those of existing members. This chapter analyses branches’ 
responses to subcontracted labour, by raising these fundamental questions with a 
particular focus on union structure and governance. 
 
The data collected showed significant differences in patterns of branches’ responses 
between UNISON and KHMU. While all three UNISON branches accepted 
subcontracted workers as their members, three of the five KHMU branches did not 
offer their membership to those workers. Furthermore, UNISON branches have 
represented the interests of subcontracted workers relatively well by allowing them 
to participate in branch activities and to be branch representatives, putting branches’ 
efforts into organising regardless of employment status, and paying attention to 
handling their grievances in addition to collective bargaining procedures with private 
contractors. In the three Korean branches whose strategies have been established to 
be dominant within KHMU, as identified in Chapter 3 through interviews and desk 
research studying each branch rulebook, the limited membership provision made it 
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nearly impossible to represent interests of subcontracted workers. Despite the recent 
change in the bargaining system being centralised since 2004 (see Chapter 6 a fuller 
discussion of this point), where some agreements concerning pay, and terms and 
conditions of subcontracted workers were made, these branches have seemingly 
closed branch governance systems which did not include subcontracted workers as 
members nor representatives for subcontracted workers. The two remaining KHMU 
branches, however, present different responses from the typical response, by 
accepting subcontracted workers into its representational domain (Branch K4) or by 
actively supporting a separate branch for these workers (Branch K5). The analysis in 
this chapter examines how and under what circumstances the branches’ choices have 
been exercised in a different or similar way in the case of subcontracted workers. 
 
These findings raise a question about why the dominant strategy of branches 
between the two countries differs. If this is because of different institutional 
arrangements in industrial relations, this study raises another question about how to 
explain the emergence of two exceptional Korean cases within a given institutional 
setting. This requires investigating other, non-institutional factors which may have 
helped union branches organise and represent subcontracted workers, which may 
include features of the branches’ structure.  
 
Drawing on empirical evidence, this chapter argues that distinctive features of union 
structures between the two unions are likely to provide only a partial explanation of 
patterns of union responses to subcontracted workers. As Wailes et al. (2003) argue, 
institutions alone cannot explain both similarities and differences, despite the 
importance of institutions in shaping union strategy. Under a dominant union 
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structure in a given setting, union branches can make a difference depending on the 
role of leaders and the willingness to act of subcontracted workers, as confirmed in 
experience of Branches K4 and K5. This underlies the need for an integrated 
approach combining both institutional and non-institutional factors in explaining 
union behaviour.  
 
The chapter is structured in four sections. Section 7.1 examines patterns of union 
branch structures in the two countries with a focus on membership provisions in their 
rulebooks and collective agreements, and the ways in which a branch has exercised 
those provisions in organising strategies and outcomes. This helps establish whose 
interests a union branch seeks to represent. Differences in the trajectory of trade 
union formation of UNISON and KHMU are also illuminated to explore the origin 
of those behaviours. Section 7.2 investigates the ways in which each branch has been 
governed. Union governance provides a useful focus for examining how and why 
unions reconfigured in response to the introduction of the new type of employment 
arrangement. This section also deals with the issue concerning which interests and 
how these are represented other than through collective bargaining. This inquiry 
allows us to understand the influence of union branch structure and governance on 
daily activities including recruitment and organising, communication at work, and 
grievance settlements for subcontracted workers. In Section 7.3, the cases of two 
outlier branches of KHMU are analysed with a focus on what has driven the different 
responses within a given institutional setting. This chapter concludes with an 
evaluation of the explanatory power of the institutionalist approach and an emphasis 
on an integrated approach.  
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7.1 Union structure: theory and practice 
 
This section explores the ways in which features of and changes in union structure 
have contributed to patterns of responses to subcontracted workers. For this, it 
examines the types of union structure in the two countries with a focus on 
membership provisions in rulebooks and collective agreements, and how unions 
have exercised these provisions in their organising strategies. As Gumbrell-
McCormick (2011: 297) points out, union structure is one of the factors which 
conditions how unions respond to the need to represent the interests of subcontracted 
workers. This helps us understand whose interests unions seek to represent. What 
contributed to those decisions is also illuminated by exploring differences in the 
trajectory of unions’ structural form in each country over time. 
 
7.1.1 Structure and membership 
 
First, the organisational structure of the two unions is considered, which allows us to 
capture structural similarities and differences between the two, with questions of 
where the branch is located within the union and who can be branch members. Data 
collected showed that UNISON and KHMU have a similar structure, although there 
is a difference in the scope of membership: UNISON covers public services which 
consist of seven service groups including health care, local government, and 
transport, whilst membership of KHMU includes only workers in the health sector. 
The two unions’ rulebooks (KHMU, 2011; UNISON, 2006b) show a typical three-
tier structure of a general or industrial union: national headquarters, regions, and 
branches allocated to each region. The definition of a branch, the unit of analysis of 
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this study, is almost the same, locating it mainly on a workplace basis. Crucial to the 
union structure of UNISON and KHMU is an understanding that the structure of a 
union branch was not confined within the workplace. 
 
UNISON says that a union branch is made up of people working for the same 
employer or sometimes working for the company which is used by the main 
employer (UNISON, 2013). In a similar vein, the KHMU’s rulebook states that a 
branch shall establish at workplace level or in an administrative district (KHMU, 
2011) and hence can be established beyond an area covered by a single employer 
within a region, across several regions, or nationally with the permission of the 
national executive committee (Rule 3.10.1). Furthermore, UNISON explicitly 
addresses outsourced workers in the Code of Branch Practice by stating that: 
 
Branches may be established to organise the employees of one principal 
employer, but should then also seek to organise the employees of any other 
employers providing parallel services (for example where services are 
outsourced). (UNISON, 2011: 6) 
 
This clause serves to encourage a branch to establish its scope of representation on 
the basis of an area ‘covered by the principal employer’ (UNISON, 2011: 6). 
Although KHMU did not have such a clear clause as UNISON, membership 
provisions of the two unions allow their members to establish a branch based not just 
on the workplace but beyond, which means that all branches can form their structure 
to include subcontracted workers in theory. Despite the similar structure of the two 
unions, the scope of representation in practice differed markedly. Whilst the three 
UNISON branches included subcontracted workers in their constituencies, the three 
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typical branches of KHMU did not allow subcontracted workers into membership. 
The membership provision in the rulebooks makes this much clearer. 
 
Membership of UNISON is open to all who work in public services (UNISON, 
2006b: 4, Rule C. 2.1), which means that all who work to deliver public services are 
eligible to be members regardless of employer. Membership in KHMU is not 
significantly different. The KHMU Rulebook states that any person working for, 
seeking a job in, or who had worked for health service can join KHMU (Rule 3.7.1). 
As shown, there is no barrier in theory for subcontracted workers to join either union. 
However, the issue of which branch they shall belong to remains critical because 
once a person joins UNISON or KHMU, individual member shall belong to a branch 
as a bedrock of the union (KHMU, 2011: 2, Rule 3.8.1; UNISON, 2006b: 27, Rule G 
1.1). The problem is that once subcontracted workers join the union, they may have 
different kinds of membership with full-time regular members with different 
contractual employers. 
 
This is one of stark differences between the two national unions. In contrast to 
KHMU, UNISON specifies explicitly the scope of branch membership, defining that 
people working for the company which is used by the main employer shall belong to 
the branch (UNISON, 2013). This is a useful starting point for differentiating types 
of union responses. 
 
7.1.2 Inclusion 
 
With respect to the challenge of emerging subcontracted labour facing unions, a 
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branch might decide to expand its coverage to subcontracted workers in two ways of 
either by including them into unions’ own constituency, in some cases through 
revisions to union structure for instance amendment of the membership provision, or 
by supporting them either to establish or to join a separate union branch. These two 
can be said to be unions’ inclusive strategies. The responses of three UNISON and 
two KHMU branches (K4 and K5) belong to this type. These branches included 
transferred workers and even new recruits into their representational domain and also 
recruited and organised them, though the K5 branch’s experience was slightly 
different by supporting formation of a separate branch for subcontracted workers. 
 
The membership of all three UNISON branches studied (E1, E2 and E3) was open to 
workers employed by not only the Hospital Trust but private contractors. Although 
there were variations in the numbers of subcontracted workers at the workplace and 
in their participation rate in the branch, all three branches had included them as 
members and had been negotiating with private companies. For the branch 
representatives interviewed, it was obvious to organise contracted-out workers into 
their branches because they thought that nothing had changed in terms of union 
representation, since transferred workers had still been working at the same 
workplace even after contracting-out. Several reasons can be proposed to explain 
why three UNISON branches implemented inclusive strategies in comparison to 
three typical KHMU branches. First, there were many who already had membership 
in the branch even before transfer took place and accordingly there was little 
incentive to exclude them from the branch. The representatives of the branches 
interviewed took the continuity of membership for granted, saying that: 
 
229 
 
I have no doubt that we all are the same union members. They were originally 
our branch members and would always be. (Branch E3) 
 
Another interviewee commented in a like-minded vein: 
 
We [regular and contracted-out workers] were the members of the same union. 
[After being contracted-out] what has changed? In terms of union 
representation, there was nothing to be changed. They were still working in 
this hospital with regular workers. (Branch E1) 
 
Second, the ethos of public health care has influenced the inclusive policy. All 
interviewees asserted that they vigorously opposed subcontracting of public health 
services and that the services privatised should be brought back in-house. 
 
If we exclude transferred members from the branch, it would be considered 
that we abandoned our principle to keep services in-house. Whether some 
members are transferred to private contractors [or not], we are all delivering a 
public health service. (Branch E2) 
 
This comment helps us understand that for the English union branches with a public 
sector ethos and shared experiences as branch members, integrating the interests of 
members with different employment contracts within the same branch was not a 
strain. 
 
Third, the TUPE regulations helped the branches to keep contracted-out workers’ 
membership. As explained in Chapter 5, regarding recognition of the union by the 
previous employer, the obligation shall transfer over to the new employer, so that the 
new employer is obliged to recognise a trade union where there is a recognition 
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agreement between the transferor and a recognised trade union (TUPE regulations 6 
(1)). Accordingly, even after being contracted-out, the transferred workers with 
membership of a branch were able to keep membership, coupled with the transfer of 
any collective agreements by or on behalf of the transferor. This supports the 
argument that legal provisions may act as opportunities for union representation 
(Booth and Francesconi, 2003). 
 
Fourth, what is interesting is that outliers were not found in England in contrast to 
the case of Korea. A National Officer responsible for issues on contracting-out said 
that: 
 
As far as I know, there is no branch that has its rule to bar membership to the 
transferred workers and new starters. It would not be acceptable. (National 
Officer, UNISON) 
 
This is largely because, in terms of the boundary of membership, it is a breach of 
UNISON’s national rulebook for a branch to decide to exclude private subcontracted 
members from its membership. One interviewee said that: 
 
Where members have been transferred from a hospital to a private company as 
part of contracting-out, the branch would not be able to exclude these members 
from membership (National Officer, UNISON).  
 
In other words, there is no barrier to subcontracted workers including new recruits 
employed by a subcontractor joining a branch. This is probably why this study did 
not find any exceptional cases in England. The majority of branches have a mix of 
public and private membership as the result of widespread contracting-out that has 
taken place in the health sector. 
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Some distinctive features such as shared experiences as union members, the public 
ethos, legal regulations, and the relatively articulated structure between different 
levels of the union provided the branches of UNISON with more favourable contexts 
to include subcontracted workers into their representation domain. This inclusive 
policy would in turn be of great help for UNISON in keeping membership levels 
relatively high and not to ebb away in effectiveness in representing the interests of 
actual and potential members. UNISON believes that it should not ‘make transferred 
members feel cut off from the union or develop the belief that being a member of the 
union is no longer worthwhile’ (UNISON, 2012d: 4) 
 
7.1.3 Exclusion 
 
At one end of a spectrum, exclusion can be divided into two types: one is to 
explicitly exclude subcontracted workers; and the other is not to do anything for 
them, although without a clear exclusion from the constituency. Unions in the first 
category may limit membership to those with a particular contract of employment or 
with different employers and may refuse to organise subcontracted workers. This 
may be because they consider that organising these workers would legitimise this 
type of employment arrangement (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011: 300). This strategy 
may result in a positive outcome, turning these workers into regular ones with better 
pay and working conditions. However, it is also possible for unions to be less 
concerned with defending the rights of subcontracted workers than opposing such 
work per se. Unions may consider that it is almost impossible to turn the tide of the 
trend to use workers employed by a third party. This study found that no branch was 
in the first category. 
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Unions in the second category are those that undertake no activities for 
subcontracted workers, although there is scope for them to organise these workers 
according to their rulebooks, as previously explained (see Section 7.1). Rather, in 
return for unions’ acquiescence concerning the inferior conditions of employment of 
these workers, unions may enjoy the prerogative of advocating for existing members 
through enhancing their employment security, pay, and working conditions. The 
three typical KHMU branches (K1, K2 and K3) are amongst these. Furthermore, as 
explained in Chapter 3, desk research analysing rulebooks of 140 out of 165 
branches revealed that no branch other than the two outliers, Branches K4 and K5, 
included subcontracted workers explicitly in their rulebook. Some rulebooks had 
scope for interpretation in their membership provisions but in fact these branches did 
not organise subcontracted workers. Under KHMU’s rulebook, as mentioned earlier 
in this chapter and in Chapter 3, there was no barrier to accept subcontracted workers 
into a branch’s membership but the membership provision in most branches’ 
rulebooks was confined to workers who were employed by a hospital. These 
explicitly excluded workers employed by subcontractors despite sharing the same 
workplace. The legacy of enterprise-level unionism encouraged these branches to 
consider subcontracted workers as ‘others’, coupled with little control over the 
membership provision wielded at national level. One National Officer of KHMU 
summed up as follows: 
 
A long history of enterprise unionism made the interests of members work 
only within a workplace. It is very hard for members to accept the idea of 
organising people employed by other employers. They think it has no 
relevance to their interests. Hence it is very demanding and time consuming to 
organise subcontracted workers because we [representatives of the union] have 
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to persuade existing members while working for subcontracted workers. 
(National Officer, KHMU, italics added for emphasis) 
 
Furthermore, a ‘union-shop’ provision may prove to be a source of exclusion. Before 
transforming its organisational structure into industrial level in 1998, the ‘union-
shop’ provision was considered as one of the labour movement’s triumphs in Korea. 
This is because it enabled a union to recruit members more effectively by requiring 
that ‘employees joined the union within a specified period of time after obtaining 
employment’ (Gaebler, 1981: 592). One example was Branch K1 where this 
provision was enacted in its collective agreement, regulating that ‘employees eligible 
to be union members shall join the branch as soon as possible after obtaining 
employment’ (Branch K1 collective agreement, 2009: 1.7). The discussion of the 
provision in this branch being subject to an employment contract led to an 
exploration of the boundary of membership in the union branch’s rulebook. Despite 
the amendment of its rulebook after joining the industry union, KHMU, there was 
little difference in membership provision. Branch K1 rulebook defines the boundary 
of membership as ‘the branch is made up of people who belong to Hospital K1’ 
(Rule 2.6). The meaning of ‘belong to’ is generally interpreted in Korean as ‘are 
employed by’ (Interview, Branch K1). This is consistent with Koo (2001: 205), who 
claimed that workers in Korea are preoccupied with factory-specific problems and 
are less interested in, or could not afford to divert attention to, issues about changes 
in the labour market or problems in the wider community. 
 
Even in the case of some branches where union-shop provision was not put in their 
collective agreements, branch rulebooks have changed little after the organisational 
reform. Branches K2 and K3 belong to this group. This is rooted in the strong 
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enterprise consciousness represented by ‘them and us’ or ‘insider and outsider’. 
Perceptions of branch members employed directly via a permanent contract toward 
subcontracted workers are evident from the following extracts. 
 
Do you know how our members responded to issues of subcontracted workers? 
When I spread our branch’s intention to recruit cleaners or workers in 
maintenance sector, the first reaction I got was “why?” Our members asked 
with a doubtful look as if “how dare subcontracted workers be members of our 
union?” (Branch K1, italics added for emphasis) 
 
Although members are working with cleaners and porters in the hospital, 
members think these workers are in a separate group. Some think that it is 
irrational that subcontracted workers are under inferior working condition but, 
this is at best sympathetic. There is no further step. (Branch K2) 
 
This study found two compelling factors helping explain why this enterprise 
consciousness has been sustained. First is the relatively short period of a service 
contract – mainly one or two years. This is a marked difference from the English 
case, where service contracts usually last twenty or thirty years. What is worse is that 
there are many ways for a user hospital to replace a subcontractor with another when 
encountering any issues where a union could get involved. Generally what causes 
subcontracted workers to join a union is a threat of losing their job or deteriorating 
conditions of employment. Since joining a union per se requires them to take the risk 
of causing an immediate protest, existing members may be reluctant to accept an 
inclusive policy. Second is a less stable industrial union. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
‘disorganized centralisation’ (Lee, 2011c: 768) in terms of collective bargaining at 
sectoral level and union governance, in particular the issue of articulation 
encouraged existing members to settle for the status quo. 
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7.1.4 Summary 
 
As such, the boundary of membership at the branch level compared between 
UNISON and KHMU varied markedly. In UNISON branches, if a subcontracted 
worker decided to join a union branch, she or he was able to be a member without 
any barriers, unless her or his job was classified as a restricted non-union job. In 
contrast, in the three typical KHMU branches, even if subcontracted workers wanted 
to be union members, more specifically to be members of a branch established at the 
workplace they were working in, it was nearly impossible to do regardless of the 
jobs they held. In other words, these workers have not been recruitment targets of the 
three branches both in theory (rulebooks) and in reality. Only in the two branches K4 
and K5 were subcontracted workers allowed to join branches along with regular 
workers. Although the separate contractual status of subcontracted workers might 
create practical and formal legal difficulties for unions, as Gumbrell-McCormick 
(2011: 299) argues, in attempting ‘to represent the different and sometimes 
conflicting interests of these workers along with the interests of other workers at the 
same site’, the branches of UNISON included subcontracted workers into their own 
structures. By contrast, the three KHMU branches presenting typical responses in 
Korea did not create new structures to represent potential members among 
subcontracted workers. In other words, the union structures of these branches were 
not yet appropriate for incorporating the interests of these emerging workers. 
 
Having examined union responses in relation to union structure, the next section 
examines how union governance has influenced union behaviour towards 
subcontracted workers. Union governance is also an important focus for exploring 
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how union branches seek to reconfigure the way they are operated in response to 
emerging, more dynamic, employment relationships.  
 
7.2 Union governance 
 
This section investigates ways in which branches have been governed, which 
provides a useful focus for examining how and why they sought to reconfigure the 
ways they were operated as the new type of employment arrangement began to 
increase. As Hyman (1997b) argues, the issue of how to represent is associated with 
that of organisational form, capacity, democracy and activism. An analysis of 
branches’ responses is presented here, by answering the question of how to represent 
the interests of subcontracted workers with a particular focus on branch governance. 
 
The questions can be summarised in two parts: first is whether a union branch 
governing structure is appropriate to represent the interests of subcontracted workers 
in terms of membership meetings, and whether there is a specialised branch official 
for subcontracted workers; and second is whether organised subcontracted workers 
can take part in union activities in terms of the right to elect officials, to be elected, 
and to participate and to speak in meetings. The former is related to the issue of 
branch governing structure and the latter is to do with subcontracted workers’ 
involvement as branch members. 
 
These issues are closely related to that of priorities in union governance. There had 
been similar debates on the representation of women within unions. Cockburn 
(1991) and Rees (1992) show the lack of representation among and for female 
237 
 
members and then point out the structural barriers in the way of women expressing 
their interests within unions. More specifically, Terry (1996: 91-94) describes the 
debates about male domination of union government when establishing the 
government of UNISON. In a similar vein, the discussion in this section focuses on 
the question of how to get the interests of those regarded as the minority within 
unions represented. 
 
In addition to the issue of union governance, this section deals with another question: 
unions’ vertical co-ordinating capacity resulting from the articulation between 
different levels of the union, in particular between national union and branches. In 
what follows, each of these questions is analysed and presented with empirical 
evidence from three branches of UNISON and three typical branches of KHMU. The 
experience of two outliers (K4 and K5) in KHMU is discussed in the subsequent 
section. 
 
Before moving on to the discussion on these questions, it is necessary to note that the 
differences in the scope of membership discussed in the previous section have 
strongly affected the union branches’ internal structure. In the three English branches 
whose memberships are open to all types of workers in their workplaces, 
subcontracted workers can be included in the governing structure and can take part 
in branches’ activities in order to make their voice heard. In contrast, the three 
KHMU branches do not have that sort of mechanism for subcontracted workers. 
These findings seemingly support the institutional approach in that differences in 
union governance between branches in the two countries have contributed to 
different responses. However, this argument encounters difficulties in explaining the 
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two outlying cases of KHMU, which present similar patterns in union governance 
shown in the English case study, discussed in Section 7.3. 
 
7.2.1 Governing structure 
 
This section examines the union branches’ governing structure with a focus on 
whether the existing structure fits with representing the interests of subcontracted 
workers. Under the rulebooks of the national unions, UNISON and KHMU, the 
framework of branch governing structures presents a similar trend. The top decision-
making body in all branches studied is the branch meeting that all members of the 
branch shall be entitled to attend and in which matters of branch policy are decided 
by the membership. There is also a branch committee as the main organ for 
administering branch business, which consists of branch officials including a 
chairperson, a branch secretary, and other officials elected (or in some cases 
appointed) in order to co-ordinate negotiations at branch level, recruit and organise 
members, represent members’ interests and exercise relevant functions (KHMU, 
2011; UNISON, 2006b). 
 
However, this study found distinct features of the UNISON branches. Branches have 
been operating a joint branch secretary system. An example includes Branch E3 with 
separate branch secretaries: one responsible for employees of the Trust; and the other 
with responsibility for employees of private companies. This branch thought the best 
way to represent members effectively was to have a dual representation system. 
 
239 
 
We are one branch with officials and stewards for Trust and C [the name of a 
private subcontractor, anonymous]. There is a Trust Joint Negotiating 
Committee and the company C JNC. The same applies to Health and Safety 
Committees. (Branch E3) 
 
The same is true in Branch E1. This branch also operated a joint branch secretary 
system. Although it currently has one branch secretary, the intention is to have a dual 
system. 
 
We did have a joint secretary system. We wanted to share our roles as branch 
representatives. But the other secretary retired. ... In an ideal world, we would 
have a section allocated the role with company A [the name of a private 
contractor, anonymous] and we hope somebody among subcontracted workers 
will be prepared to take that joint branch secretary role. But we just don’t have 
that at the moment. (Branch E1) 
 
The branches of UNISON had a dual representative system under the rule of ‘one 
branch at a workplace’ regardless of the employers of the members. As a 
consequence all members of the branches were likely to have equal rights within the 
branch by attending meetings and events for members and thereby were able to 
communicate with each other, which enhanced the branch’s ability to coordinate 
inter-firm relations and reconcile interests between members employed by different 
employers. 
 
Experiences in Korea differ considerably. The three typical branches did not allow 
subcontracted workers to join even in theory so they had no experiences with these 
workers within branch governance. The Korean branches have seemingly closed 
branch governance systems without any members or representatives among 
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subcontracted workers, despite the recent change in the bargaining system which was 
centralised since 2004 in the wake of transforming union structure from enterprise 
into industrial unionism. This shows that although unions in the Korean health sector 
changed their organisational structure at industry level in order to counter the 
casualisation of labour, they did not succeed in establishing branch governing 
structure to represent subcontracted workers. This means that existing governance 
institutions were not suitable for representing the interests of these workers. 
 
7.2.2 Members’ participation 
 
Another issue about representing subcontracted workers is whether branches allow 
them to have equal status in branch activities such as in electing officials, the right to 
be elected as branch officials, and to attend and speak in branch meetings. This study 
found that there was no structural barrier in the way of subcontracted workers having 
influence within UNISON branches E1, E2 and E3. 
 
All staff have the right to join the branch and all members shall be eligible for 
full rights and benefits. ... Members should pay subscriptions according to the 
rulebook. Within the Trust and [company B], we have an arrangement for 
members to pay their union subscription through their salary (Branch E2). 
 
This study also found through observation of Annual General Meetings of these 
three branches in March 2012 that there was no barrier to members employed by 
private companies attending and speaking at branch meetings. The workers with 
membership were also entitled to elect and to be elected as branch officials. Branch 
E1 has recently elected a person employed by the private company A as one of 
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branch officials. The newly elected official is supposed to work as a health and 
safety representative for all members not just for subcontracted workers, although 
she is an employee of the private company. Nevertheless she reported that she was 
the only person elected as a branch official among subcontracted workers so was 
intending to represent them as well. 
 
I am going to represent everybody. As a representative of the branch, I will 
deal with health and safety issues for all members. But at the same time I will 
work for members of company A [the name of the private contractor, 
anonymous]. I think I can better represent outsourced workers than other 
officials from the Trust. Issues they raise are much easier for me to understand 
and handle. I already know what they do and what they suffer from (Branch 
E1). 
 
This comments recall previous studies (Heery and Kelly, 1988; Simms, 2012) which 
suggest that female officials are likely to effectively represent female workers’ 
interests by prioritising the organisation and representation of these workers. In a 
similar vein, the direct involvement of subcontracted workers in branch activities 
might present incentives for branches, as subcontracted workers’ involvement serves 
to raise the profit of organising activity among subcontracted workers. This, in turn, 
is likely to contribute to the ways in which interests of these workers are formed and 
represented within a branch. As can be assumed, the three KHMU branches had no 
subcontracted workers in representative positions as they had no subcontracted 
workers as members. This shows that differences in union governance have 
contributed to differences in representational activities for subcontracted workers. 
Furthermore, as shown particularly in the experience of branch E3 with 
approximately 80 percent unionisation among subcontracted workers, the principle 
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of ‘‘like recruits like’ – employing organisers who match the target workers in terms 
of age, gender and ethnicity’ (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011: 302) has been also 
influential in organising subcontracted workers in England. 
 
7.2.3 Articulation 
 
The discussion on branch governance leads us to explore the idea of articulation, and 
vertical integration within unions. The most resilient union movements refer to those 
that maintain effective articulation between central and local levels with strong 
organisation at both levels (Kjellberg, 1983, cited in Hyman, 1997a: 313). While the 
two national unions, UNISON and KHMU have similarities in that they launched 
major organisational drives into the merger or at the industry level respectively, there 
was a subtle distinction in the directions of rule on articulation. 
 
Taking the case of UNISON first, the three partner-unions, NUPE, NALGO and 
COHSE which had amalgamated to form UNISON in 1993, had been characterised 
as the union with ‘strong central leadership and weak branch organization’ until 
1970s, although to varying degrees (Terry, 1996: 89). Through the period of 1980s 
when faced with hostile government and employer strategies, the issue of ‘the 
primacy of the decentralized, shop-steward-based approach’ was questioned (Terry, 
1996: 91). UNISON can be seen to be located in between official-led unions (NUPE) 
and lay-controlled unions (NALGO). This positioning, as Terry (1996: 107-108) 
points out, might be also influenced by the size, power and resources of workplace 
and branch organisation as well as by the proportion of members who had 
experienced a different organisational culture before the merger. 
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In contrast, KHMU with a long tradition of enterprise unionism has more focused on 
how to redistribute upward the organisational resources centred on enterprises unions. 
KHMU represents a relatively centralised structure compared to other industrial 
unions in the Korean metal and financial sectors  (Lee, 2011c) by allocating fifty 
percent of branch financial resources based on subscriptions of rank-and-file 
members to the national and regional unions and by having control over the 
bargaining procedure of its branches. 
 
Across the country, there were 11 regions and 165 branches. Members pay their 
membership dues with one percent of normal wage per month and thereby the 
budget allocated to the national headquarters is 39 percent of membership dues, with 
11 percent to regions and the rest (50 percent) allocated to branches. (KHMU, 2012) 
 
An example includes the fact that wage rates negotiated through sectoral agreements 
have generally been respected at the local bargaining table. Despite these efforts, it 
would be premature to assume that KHMU has a strong influence over the decisions 
of branches. This is because, given a tradition of enterprise unionism and members’ 
concerns over sectoral bargaining, which could be used as an instrument for wage 
restraints  (Lee, 2011c: 778), branch officials are likely to demand autonomy in 
implementing policies of the central union. This tension contributed to a sort of 
closed branch structure with a focus on full time permanent workers directly 
employed by hospitals. As discussed earlier, the three branches prevent 
subcontracted workers from joining their representational domain, for instance by 
holding a union-shop provision in collective agreements or by not organising these 
workers. Contrary to UNISON, KHMU did not have a ‘one branch in the workplace 
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or at major employer level’ principle which would mean that all members regardless 
of employment contract are able to belong to one branch as far as they are working at 
the same workplace. This principle is used in other industrial unions like Korea 
Metal Workers’ Union but KHMU did not set such a policy explicitly. An 
interviewee summed it up this way: 
 
We did not need to have this sort of policy because there have been few 
controversial cases which required guidelines from above to be drawn up. We 
would take any action deemed necessary. But organisational structure at the 
branch level did not spell trouble for our union so far (National Officer, 
KHMU). 
 
This comment can be interpreted as meaning that the national union did not actively 
encourage its branches to include subcontracted workers into their representational 
domain because National Officers did not feel the need to do. This strategy seems to 
be a compromise between the ultimate goal of reorganising its structure to cope with 
casualisation of workforce and the stabilisation of the industrial union supported by 
rank and file members who experienced enterprise unionism culture. The hospital 
sector trade union movement played an important role in initiating a movement 
beyond workplace interests by, for instance, establishing the first industrial union in 
Korea, KHMU, in 1998 and expanding its agenda to improve the rights of patients 
and beyond. The national union has announced that it pursued the social movement 
unionism and one of its priorities was organising contingent workers (National 
Officer, KHMU). 
 
KHMU’s leaders were, however, been still experiencing two major constraints: 
redistributing the organisational resources that had been owned by enterprise unions; 
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and catering to the needs of rank-and-file members working standard full-time 
permanent jobs. As a consequence, the union did not seem to build adequately 
articulated union structures and activities. Although Branches K4 and K5 had to deal 
with issues of subcontractors in their collective bargaining, sufficient additional 
resources such as supporting full-time officials for bargaining and extra funding 
were not provided to these branches. Though majority of braches still had a tradition 
of enterprise unionism, for instance, represented by a union-shop provision which is 
likely to cause ‘factory consciousness’ (Blanchflower, 2007), corrective measures 
were not yet adequately taken. Nevertheless, this study found two outlying cases in 
spite of difficulties under the given national and sectoral context, which tells us that 
the will of branch leaders, coupled with willingness of subcontracted workers to 
unionise, made different responses possible, as discussed in more detail in the next 
section. 
 
7.3 Variations in union responses 
 
This chapter has, so far, argued that the despite similar provision concerning 
branches according to the rulebooks of UNISON and KHMU, the way of applying 
the rulebook in each branch differed markedly, which resulted in differences in 
union responses to subcontracted workers. The more inclusive strategy of UNISON 
branches has resulted from the relatively favourable contexts of the UK such as the 
TUPE regulations, a long tradition of industrial (or general) union beyond workplace 
level, and the public sector ethos rooted in the distinctive feature of the public health 
service. 
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There are the two KHMU branches K4 and K5 which directly or indirectly include 
subcontracted workers into their representational domain and thereby allow 
subcontracted workers to participate in branch activities in a similar way found in 
those of UNISON. This finding casts doubt on the explanatory power of the 
institutionalist approach. Central to answering this question is an understanding that 
institutions alone cannot explain both similarities and differences, despite the 
importance of institutions that matters in shaping union strategy. As a consequence 
there is a need to extend the focus beyond institutions to explain what else matters. 
For this purpose, this section seeks to answer a question of why these two branches 
have presented different responses from the typical type of KHMU within a single 
national setting. 
 
7.3.1 Two kinds of inclusion 
 
All branches of KHMU can, as explained in Section 7.1, be formed at workplace 
level or beyond according to KHMU’s rulebook (KHMU, 2011). Despite this clause, 
the representational domain of the three branches K1, K2 and K3 was limited to 
workers employed by hospitals not by subcontractors. In contrast, the membership of 
Branches K4 and K5 was open to all workers including subcontracted workers. 
Although the ways to include these workers differed slightly between the two 
branches: the former included them as part of branch members while the latter 
supported formation of a separate branch for subcontracted workers, both are 
categorised into the same group, inclusion. One branch official summed up the 
reason for that very succinctly: 
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It doesn’t seem to be important whether a branch organises subcontracted 
workers directly or indirectly, in so far as it seeks to represent their interests. 
What matters is what we are actually doing, finding flexible ways under 
unfavourable conditions. (Branch K5) 
 
What is particularly interesting about this quotation is that given the long tradition of 
enterprise unionism, representing the interests of workers with different contractual 
employers must be a big step forward, and hence branch structure would not matter 
greatly. 
 
Branch K4 
 
Branch K4 included subcontracted workers into its representational domain and 
hence some of these who joined the branch can enjoy the same rights as other 
members with full-time permanent employment contracts. This branch began to 
organise them long after some services were contracted-out. The cleaning service 
was contracted-out before the branch was established in the late 1980s. When the 
catering service was contracted-out in the mid-1990s, the branch did not exercise 
enough power to turn the tide. The trigger for organising these workers was a 
transfer of a subcontractor in the catering service in the mid-2000s. The transferred 
workers from Hospital K4 enjoyed relatively better pay and conditions compared to 
the new recruits since the transfer, but a new subcontractor announced it would scrap 
the two-tier system and lower their pay and conditions in order to level off at those 
of new comers. 
 
They [workers in the catering service] needed a union in order to fight against 
deteriorating wages and working conditions. When a new subcontractor took 
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over the hospital’s catering service, their wage was severely cut, by 40-50 
percent. Some subcontracted workers showed their intention to join our branch 
and we began to actively organise them. (Branch K4) 
 
Organising workers in the catering service made it easier for the branch to organise 
cleaners who also suffered from wage cut whenever a transfer took place. As a 
consequence, workers in the catering and cleaning services began to join the branch. 
 
It is worth noting that at the outset of organising subcontracted workers Branch K4 
considered establishing a separate union branch for them as in Branch K5. This was 
because the representatives of Branch K4 had concerns about potentially conflicting 
interests between workers, the limited resources of the branch in terms of the number 
of representatives and the amount of finance available and likelihood of employers’ 
resistance. But branch officials drew the conclusion that accepting them as branch 
members would be more effective for representing their interests. A branch official 
commented: 
 
Although we were already fraught with difficulties in operating the branch, we 
could not sit back and watch what was happening regarding issues of 
subcontracted workers. We intended to support them to form their union. But it 
seemed to be very hard because they have little experience and little idea about 
labour movement. (Branch K4) 
 
Officials of the branch thought that there was nothing but to extend its representation 
to subcontracted workers under considerable pressure despite difficulties facing them. 
In order to clarify the extended boundary of membership this branch amended its 
rulebook to explicitly state that subcontracted workers can join the branch, by saying 
that ‘regardless of employment contract and status, all workers including full-time 
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permanent, temporary, part-time, outsourced and other forms of precarious workers 
are allowed to be members of the branch if they are working for Hospital K4’ 
(Branch K4 rulebook, Rule 2.6). This branch has the most similar membership 
provision to the English branches with a mixed membership compassing both 
employees of the hospital trust and of private contractors. This is a stark difference 
from the three branches of KHMU where no branch had that provision in its 
rulebooks. 
 
Before moving on to the case of Branch K5, it should be mentioned that in 
comparison to other branches, with mostly above 50 percent unionisation level 
among full-time permanent workers, the density of the branch K4 was very low, at 
10 percent. This branch has organised and represented these workers as part of 
boosting its weak collective power resulting from the low level of unionisation. This 
shows that although management tried to use contingent workers as part of offsetting 
the effect of unions, because a peripheral group is less likely to take part in unions 
(Osterman, 1994; Pfeffer and Baron, 1988), union could exercise leadership to 
improve the effectiveness of union activity through organising and representing 
peripheral groups. 
 
Branch K5 
 
Branch K5 had chosen to support the establishment of a separate union branch of 
KHMU for subcontracted workers and involved itself in the activities of organising 
them, offering useful resources such as its office, computers, a printer, and so on. A 
branch official explained the reason for the decision: 
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We [branch officials] mainly considered what would be most appropriate for 
representing them. We needed to take into account all resources we had at that 
moment. Considering the fact that these workers are vulnerable and insecure, 
we had to prepare for all possible scenarios including the case we need to deal 
with everything concerning issues raised by and targeted at them from A to Z 
when they joined the branch. But we had a limited number of branch officials 
and could not say for sure that existing members would agree with that 
situation. (Branch K5, italics added for emphasis) 
 
One reason why it decided to support the separate branch was that there was an 
experienced union activist amongst the subcontracted workers, which was not the 
case in Branch K4. Before this activist was elected as the separate branch secretary 
he had experience in union activities and then played an essential role in organising 
and maintaining the membership with the support from the branch K5. 
 
Branch K5 had, however, experienced a decline in existing members due to its active 
support for subcontracted workers. The number of members dropped by 200 from 
around 800 in 2004 to 600 in 2005 (Interview, Branch K5). Furthermore, for the first 
time in the history of the branch, two candidates were running for the election of 
branch secretary in 2005 and the challenger pledged to withdraw branch activities 
dealing with issues of subcontracted workers. Although the challenger lost that 
election, it confirmed that the branch had encountered resistance amongst existing 
members. As a result, this branch had to spend more than two years overcoming the 
aftermath of the election by persuading existing members to understand the need for 
branch activities for subcontracted workers. 
 
We won the election, but we had to spend lots of efforts persuading existing 
members to understand the need for union activities for subcontracted workers. 
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Although we encountered difficulties in reconciling interests among workers, 
we still believe that we were right and we could overcome the resistance of 
existing members through intensive training about what unions do. (Branch 
K5) 
 
As such, the two branches K4 and K5 illustrated similar patterns in representing 
subcontracted workers and showed seemingly different branch governance from that 
of the other three KHMU branches. A stark difference between the two groups in 
KHMU is that Branches K4 and K5 made a constant effort to construct a common 
interest between workers on different employment contracts. What follows is to 
explore why the outliers in Korea took a different approach from the dominant trend 
of branch responses in KHMU. 
 
7.3.2 Branches’ capacity for representation 
 
Whichever strategies branches chose of the two kinds of inclusion, they were likely 
to struggle with some problems. If a branch decided to accept subcontracted workers 
into its constituency, it needed to accommodate likely conflicts of interests among 
workers with different contractual terms and conditions of employment (Gumbrell-
McCormick, 2011: 301). Even if a branch supported these workers to join a separate 
union branch, there would be potential pitfalls such as the risk of marginalising the 
branch. Organising these workers into separate unions seems to be easier than 
reconciling them within existing union bodies, but, as Gumbrell-McCormick points 
out (2011: 302), it might be in danger of isolating or marginalising the separate 
unions from the core union structures. This gives rise to questions of what made it 
possible for the two outliers to implement inclusive strategies, despite these potential 
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difficulties, coupled with institutional and historical constraints contributing to 
exclusive strategies found in the other three KHMU branches. 
 
Drawing on empirical evidence that highlights the micro-politics of two union 
branches, this study identified three key features that led to branches taking a 
different response from the dominant behaviour in KHMU. First, the focus of branch 
leaders was beyond representing full-time regular members, second, there were 
subcontracted workers willing to join a union and act as union members, and third, a 
relatively favourable context in which a branch operated with allies, was identified. 
Each is examined in turn. 
 
The leadership, first and foremost, has been crucial to the inclusive policies of both 
branches in branch structure and governance. Despite common difficulties across the 
board in operating a union branch such as lack of facility time for branch 
representatives, limited financial resources, a deep-seated enterprise consciousness, 
and other unfavourable conditions caused by employers’ hostility towards unions, 
leaders of the two branches adhered closely to their ideological position in 
representing the interests of subcontracted workers doing something different from 
other branches by organising these workers through amending rulebooks or 
collaborating with the separate branch. Borrowing Cerviňo arguments (2000: 9-13) 
about incentives and costs in union organising, leaders of these two branches made 
good use of ideological and organisational incentives despite the risk of paying costs 
such as losing their existing membership, which might weaken a branch’s collective 
power against the counterpart, the employer. As clearly shown in the experience of 
Branch K5, existing members are likely to withdraw from the union whenever they 
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do not feel satisfied with it. Representatives of the branch have managed this 
challenge by emphasising the need to work with subcontracted workers many times, 
which eventually helps existing members to realise that this is the way to enhance 
not only their rights but the interests of working class as a whole. 
 
Second, in this process, the attitude of subcontracted workers also played an 
important role. As shown in both cases, the intention of these workers to join a 
branch was perfectly timed as it coincided with the willingness of representatives of 
the two branches to make changes. As Cerviňo (2000: 11-12) points out, the attitude 
of these workers provided an appropriate context to develop each branch’s inclusive 
strategy. This is well contrasted with Branch K1 where when asked by subcontracted 
workers, the representative told them to visit a regional office instead of the branch. 
Furthermore, this reminds us of the principle of ‘like recruits like’ (Gumbrell-
McCormick, 2011: 302), as mentioned in Section 7.2. One official of KHMU 
summed up how important this principle was and how well it worked in organising 
subcontracted worker in the case of Branch K5: 
 
Organising subcontracted workers from amongst themselves would be the 
most effective way. The secretary of the separate branch scratched 
subcontracted workers where they itched by fulfilling their long-cherished 
desires, for example having a rest room. He did it because he knew what they 
wanted. The other day he made an enlarged copy of a ballot paper before an 
election and then used it in teaching them how to vote. Many subcontracted 
workers are older people who have a problem with reading. (Branch K5) 
 
In particular, as found in the experience of Branch K5, activities in conjunction with 
leaders of the separate branch resulted in not only improving the conditions of 
employment for subcontracted workers but enhancing worker solidarity. 
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Last, this study needs to mention some distinct contexts in which these two branches 
operate. As mentioned earlier, the unionisation level of the branch K4 has gradually 
dropped to 10 percent which is a very low density in the Korean context. Although 
this has probably weakened the branch’s collective power and influence, the branch 
made use of this crisis as an opportunity in order to boost its organisational capacity. 
One representative of Branch K4 summed up the constraints and opportunities facing 
the branch: 
 
Ironically, the low density helped us to organise subcontracted workers. If we 
[the branch] had got quite a number of members among regular workers it 
could have been more difficult to do that. I expect that more regular workers 
would get inspired by the fact that an organised power can make a difference, 
which will encourage them to join the branch. (Branch K4) 
 
As commented, the challenge of the low density of the branch highlighted the 
opportunity to organise subcontracted workers. Furthermore, a relatively strong 
collective power against the employer lies behind the inclusive strategy, which is 
confirmed by the fact that the number of full-time paid officials is three in the branch 
with less than 100 members among regular workers. 
 
Another point is distinct characteristics of the area in which the two hospitals K4 and 
K5 are located. Given the feature of the health service with, to some degree, a 
geographical limit, the climate of industrial relations within the area and the 
reputation of the hospitals are likely to affect actors’ behaviour. Both areas have 
witnessed industrial actions including strikes against precarious work with increased 
frequency and intensity, which provided circumstances propitious for unions to unite 
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with allies within the community and adverse for management to unilaterally ignore 
unions’ demands. 
 
7.4 Concluding summary 
 
This chapter explored how union structures have affected patterns in union responses 
to subcontracted workers with a focus on two aspects of union structures: external 
structure, the scope and the boundary of membership and internal structure, union 
governance. Regarding the questions of whose interests and how union branches 
have represented those, this chapter found that the typical responses of union 
branches studied in the two countries differed. The three UNISON branches included 
subcontracted workers into their representational domain and represented their 
interests by allowing them to be involved in all branch activities in their capacity of 
members just like regular workers employed by hospitals. In contrast, subcontracted 
workers in the three KHMU branches did not fall into these branches’ demarcations 
and thereby their interests were hardly represented within the branches. The findings 
tell us that the three UNISON branches placed emphases on reconciling likely 
diverse interests coming from different employment contracts, while the three typical 
KHMU branches have tended to more focus on representing the interests of existing 
members. However, this chapter also found two outlier branches in KHMU whose 
responses differed from the typical one. These two branches represented the interests 
of subcontracted workers by accepting them as branch members or actively 
supporting the establishment of a separate branch for these workers.  
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Throughout this chapter, the following questions were analysed: why the typical 
strategy of branches between the two differed; why the exceptional cases were found 
in Korea; and how to explain differences and similarities not only between but also 
within countries. The differences mainly emerged in relationship to differences in 
institutional contexts in which the two unions, UNISON and KHMU, were operating. 
The relatively stable union structure of UNISON at national level has led three 
branches to include subcontracted workers into their representational domain and 
hence the interests of subcontracted workers were represented. In contrast, despite 
the structural change of KHMU into sectoral level, the three branches studied have 
still focused on interests within the workplace based on employment contracts, 
which means that there is little evidence that branch structures and governance of 
KHMU are equipped to deal with potential members among subcontracted workers. 
However, as shown in the two outliers of KHMU, despite differences in union 
structures, there was still scope to make a difference depending on the role of leaders, 
active involvement of subcontracted workers and the extent of reconciling seemingly 
different interests between workers on different employment contracts.  
As the wider relevance of this point is discussed in Chapter 8, the findings of this 
chapter support the argument that institutions alone cannot explain similarities and 
differences in union responses, despite the importance of institutions in shaping 
union strategy. Hence other, non-institutional, factors have also contributed to 
different and similar patterns of union responses in terms of union structure: the wills 
and the ability of branch leaders to reconcile potential conflicting interests among 
members; the extent of enterprise consciousness which has spread out throughout a 
branch; and shared experiences between workers with different employment 
contracts as members in a union branch. 
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Chapter 8 Discussion  
    
This study so far has explored similarities and variations in union responses to 
subcontracted workers in a thematic way, focusing on distinctive features of 
institutional arrangements between the English and Korean health care sectors. This 
chapter now returns to the literature summarised in Chapter 2 in order to discuss 
what this study added to existing ideas and theories.  
 
The findings were that typical responses of unions between the two countries varied: 
union branches in England (E1, E2 and E3) included subcontracted workers into 
their representation domain and accepted subcontractors as counterparts in their 
collective bargaining, while those in Korea (K1, K2 and K3) neither included 
subcontracted workers within union demarcations nor accepted subcontractors as 
counterparts in their collective bargaining unit, seeking instead to regulate these 
workers’ conditions of employment to some extent. This study also found two 
outlying cases in Korea whose response was similar to those in England.  
 
These results illuminate the importance of an integrated approach between 
institutional and non-institutional factors in comparative industrial relations study. 
Although it is an accepted truism that ‘institutions matter’ in comparative political 
economy literature, the findings discussed in the previous chapters only partly 
support the institutionalist approach and require some non-institutional factors, such 
as the role of leadership, the attitude of the represented and the feature of locations 
where the branches studied operate. Accordingly, this chapter examines theoretical 
approaches in order to investigate to what extent the findings support the approaches 
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reviewed earlier respectively and discusses how far the analytical framework 
presented in Chapter 2 is useful to explain underlying relationships that contribute to 
patterns of union responses.  
 
Not only do the findings help expand the understanding of union responses to 
contingent workers by exploring unions’ link to the triangular employment 
relationships with the third party involved, but also they give an insight into whether 
existing structures both within and surrounding unions and their branches are well-
equipped to represent the interests of subcontracted workers. For the sake of an 
effective account, this chapter starts with the latter two themes first, the link between 
unions and subcontracted labour, and comparative study on union strategies in 
Sections 8.1 and 8.2 respectively and then discusses the theoretical contribution in 
Section 8.3. The final section concludes by emphasising the importance of an 
integrated approach.  
 
8.1 Unions and subcontracted labour 
 
Much of the prior research on union responses to contingent workers (Cerviňo, 2000; 
Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011; Heery and Abbott, 2000; Heery et al., 2004b) focused 
on the link between unions and these workers in general with less attention to a 
particular type of flexible work arrangements and have tended to pay much attention 
to mapping and evaluating union responses. As is well known, contingent workers 
are not a homogeneous group (MacKenzie, 2008: 6) and among a variety of contract 
types, there are different levels of labour market power (Kunda et al., 2002). Dealing 
with them as a whole may hinder us from understanding distinctive features of each 
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contingent employment arrangement. The challenges facing unions in representing 
contingent workers might differ depending on the type of contingent work 
arrangements (Gallagher and Sverke, 2005: 196; Malo, 2006). Variations in 
employment arrangements also affect union responses on the grounds that workers’ 
attitudes to unions and the working environment might have various impacts on 
unions. Although there are a few studies that have explicitly addressed the link 
between unions and a particular type of contingent workers, agency workers (Heery, 
2004) and freelancers (Heery et al., 2004b), the link between unions and 
subcontracted employment had not been examined in detail until now. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, studies on subcontracting mainly focus on the analysis 
of management perspectives (Eun, 2008), the state of these workers (Allen and 
Henry, 1996; Cooke et al., 2004), the union involvement in the process and 
outcomes of contracting-out (Hayakawa and Simard, 2001), and the social relations 
among workers (Lee and Frenkel, 2004). The issue of how unions have represented 
these workers appears to be a gap in knowledge which this study addresses. 
Investigating union representation in relation to subcontracted workers is important 
because it enables us to understand whether existing union representation structures 
and functions are capable of incorporating the interests of emerging subcontracted 
workers employed by the third party (subcontractors). In this regard, this study also 
makes an important link between studies on union responses to contingent work and 
those on subcontracting.    
 
Apart from the fact that most subcontracted workers as shown in other types of 
contingent workers are locked in precarious employment (Allen and Henry, 1996), 
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distinctive features of subcontracted workers studied in this research can be 
summarised as follows: first, they have experienced a dual relationship with two (or 
more) employers, which helps define this group distinctively from those with a 
single employer; second, they tend to have an open-ended employment contract with 
their contractual employer compared to those with fixed-term contracts with a set 
period of service; and third, they were likely to work for at least eight hours a day 
unlike part-timers. When compared with temporary agency work, the evidence tells 
us that these workers were most likely to be carrying out a distinct function from 
workers in conventional employment at the place of work such as catering or 
cleaning, and less likely to have direct relationship with management at a user 
company. These unique characteristics of subcontracted workers require special 
attention for unions in representing these workers’ interests, ranging from decisions 
about the legitimacy of this type of indirect employment, through recruitment and 
organising, to representing their interests.  
 
This study sought to address this shortcoming by analysing a union’s link to 
subcontracted work in the English and Korean health sectors, especially focusing on 
union branches as the unit of analysis. As shown in previous Chapters 5, 6 and 7, 
studying this linkage is important in that it allows us to understand particular 
challenges union branches have encountered as subcontracted labour has been 
emerging.  
 
First, given that a union branch, as the cornerstone of union organisation, was 
primarily based on a workplace with a single employer in the English and Korean 
health sectors, subcontracting per se provided union branches with the question of 
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whether to accept workers with different employers. Although the two unions, 
UNISON and KHMU gave their branches scope to include these workers by 
allowing branches to form their structure beyond the place at work, the branches 
studied have struggled with the separation of employers in that it required branches 
make additional efforts to reconcile potential different interests among members (or 
workers) with different contractual conditions.    
 
Second, the union branches studied were faced with the issue of how to deal with the 
third party, subcontractors. As can be seen in the case of agency work (Heery, 2004), 
to accept subcontractors as union branches’ counterparts may be perceived as 
conferring legitimacy of this type of employment arrangements. This form of 
indirect employment is clearly a breach of ILO declaration (ILO, 1944) which states 
that ‘labour is not a commodity’, as mentioned in Chapter 1. Although Davidov 
(2004: 728) notes that the legitimacy of intermediaries in the selling of labour is 
hardly contested anymore, data collected for this study highlights that union 
branches in both countries were still opposed to the business practice of 
subcontracting, albeit to varying degrees. Even if this opposition is mainly associated 
with unions’ ideological positions, it is evident that unions’ perception of 
subcontracting had an influence on their responses in either positive or negative 
ways.  
 
Linking back to the findings in Chapter 6, the evidence shows that the three 
UNISON branches had a two-track approach: while they opposed contracting-out 
which facilitated the proliferation of indirect employment, they also expended effort 
to improve conditions of employment for subcontracted workers through collective 
262 
 
bargaining with subcontractors. It can thereby be interpreted that UNISON branches 
made a compromise between their ideological position and practical issues in the 
light of their insufficient power resources to stem the rising tide of employers’ 
initiatives to contract-out services. However, it was not surprising that there were 
some other branches that have hardly done anything in relation to subcontracted 
workers and their contractual employers, as shown in the three typical KHMU 
branches. Although it can be interpreted that the ways in which these branches 
behaved are predicated upon their principles aiming at the abolition of indirect 
employment in the labour market, it may be closer to the truth to say that their 
behaviour was due to organisational apathy, or, more precisely, lack of ability to deal 
with issues concerning subcontracted workers.  
 
Another issue related to the third party is the nature of this triangular relationship. 
Compared to the agency work, there were no relations between management of a 
user employer and subcontracted workers in theory since subcontractors supervised 
their employees’ work, but the degree of control by the user company might not 
always have been clear-cut (Kalleberg, 2000: 350; Olsen, 2006: 97). As addressed in 
Chapter 5, one of the Korean branches (K5) succeeded in making subcontracted 
workers obtain full-time permanent regular workers’ status by proving that managers 
of a user hospital substantially ordered and supervised these workers, which was 
considered as illegally-used agency workers according to labour law (Act on the 
Protection, etc., of Dispatched Workers). As such, labour movement must probe the 
nature of the triangular employment relationships in order to clarify who should be 
considered the real employer. 
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Third, if it is decided to represent these workers, union branches may need to form 
an appropriate representation structure. Although it can be said that dealing with the 
issue of contingent work is not a new challenge facing unions, representing 
subcontracted workers requires fresh forms of representation that ‘break with the 
dominant, workplace centred pattern’ (Heery et al., 2004b: 20). This study found that 
the branches that represented subcontracted workers better than others formed a 
structure beyond the workplace or collaborated closely with a separate branch for 
subcontracted workers. This study supports the need to form union structure at a 
level above the workplace enterprise, which has also been suggested by some who 
studied trade union representation of contingent workers (Heery, 2009; Heery et al., 
2004b; Kretsos, 2011; Wills, 2009; Wills and Simms, 2004). In this regard, existing 
forms of representation of the typical union branches in Korea (K1, K2 and K3) are 
not effective in protecting subcontracted workers.  
 
In respect of better union structures, some have argued for regionally based forms of 
representation, while others emphasise sectoral or occupational representation 
(Cobble, 1991; Cobble and Vosko, 2000; Herzenberg et al., 1998; Milkman, 2006; 
Vosko, 2000). This study does not intend to insist that there is a ‘best’ form of union 
representation of subcontracted workers. Rather it adds the evidence in previous 
studies with a focus on the representation structure beyond the individual enterprise. 
 
8.2 Comparative study of union strategies 
   
This study sought to add the evidence about patterns of union strategies concerning 
subcontracted workers collected from a comparative study. This attempt is expected 
264 
 
to help explain both variations and underlying causes of strategies made by unions 
with different institutional arrangements.  
 
First, in order to present patterns of union responses to subcontracted workers, this 
study used Heery’s typology (2004: 435) which comprises four distinctive responses 
characterised by a combined policy towards agency workers and on agency suppliers. 
Although this typology is designed for union responses to agency work, it is 
functional for this study with a focus on subcontracted workers. This is because the 
typology explicitly works with the features of triangular employment relationships. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, temporary agency workers have different features from 
subcontracted workers in terms of the supervision over these workers and work 
arrangements in relation to regular workers. Nevertheless, these two types of 
employment arrangements share the common feature, the triangular employment 
relationships involving with at least three parties. Hence Heery’s typology was 
useful to classify union responses to subcontracted workers not only in England but 
in Korea. In this regard, it extends the usefulness of Heery’s typology (2004) to the 
study of union responses to subcontracted labour, and shows its applicability to 
Korean context as well as the English one. 
 
However, studies with a focus on classification of union behaviour have difficulty in 
developing an understanding of why unions respond in a particular way. As Frege 
and Kelly (2003: 10) point out, existing comparative studies in industrial relations 
have paid more attention either to explaining cross-country variations focusing on 
quantitative indices or to classifying various types, structure or identities of unions. 
Although some literature exists with a focus on unions’ strategic choices in 
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collective negotiations over outsourcing (Doellgast, 2008; Hayakawa and Simard, 
2001), not enough attention has been paid to how unions have responded to 
contingent workers, in particular subcontracted workers. Such issues in addition have 
not previously been addressed through comparative study. This study contributed to 
existing comparative industrial relations literature by moving beyond mapping and 
classification and by revealing factors shaping a particular type of responses. The 
analysis beyond classification, as discussed in more detail in the following section, 
helps us understand which factors have reliable explanatory power to explain 
complex dynamics of union behaviour.  
  
It found that different institutional arrangements in the English and Korean health 
sectors have played a crucial role in shaping various patterns: the source of 
restructuring which caused growth in the number of subcontracted workers, legal 
regulations, collective bargaining systems, and union structures. These institutional 
factors were very useful to help explain why the typical responses between the two 
countries varied. In this regard, it is clearly the case that institutions matter. However, 
what were the compelling findings of this study is that institutions alone were not 
sufficient enough to explain variations of union responses. As the experiences of two 
outlying branches of KHMU have shown, variations in union responses were found 
within a single institutional setting and interestingly, the strategic choices of these 
two branches were similar to those of UNISON with different institutional 
arrangements. Hence, this study derived some factors other than institutions from the 
literature such as the role of leaders, the willingness of the represented and the 
potential to strengthen ties with allies in a community. The empirical evidence 
functions as a cornerstone to give the analytical framework (presented in Chapter 2) 
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explanatory power by suggesting the importance of an integrated approach between 
institutions and non-institutional factors. 
 
In the next section, theoretical contributions of this study are discussed by showing 
how these factors have contributed to unions’ strategic choices towards 
subcontracted workers.         
 
8.3 Theoretical implications  
 
Comparative industrial relations scholars have long relied on the institutional 
approach in international political economy literature, rejecting a simple 
globalisation view emphasising the market forces associated with globalisation. The 
findings of this study did not support a simple globalisation approach because the 
typical union responses between the two countries differed. Although this study 
found similarities in patterns of union responses by showing the two outlier branches 
in Korea, it is hard to say that this similar response resulted from global market 
forces. Rather, this study suggested other non-institutional factors shaping this 
similar response.  
 
This section seeks to show that data collected do not fully support the institutionalist 
approach, despite the importance of institutions of correcting the convergence logic 
argued by the simple globalisation thesis. It was almost impossible to explain not 
just differences within a country but also similarities between countries with the 
institutionalist approach, which is in line with the critique of Bamber and colleagues 
(2004: 60). This study drew on literature concerning actors’ strategic choices, which 
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helped understand why variations in union responses within a given national setting 
and similarities between different institutional settings were found. Hence this study 
arrived at a conclusion that was drawn from these findings: the need for an integrated 
approach between institutions and actors’ roles.  
 
There has been some research in favour of the integrated approach (Frege and Kelly, 
2003; Lee, 2009; Wailes et al., 2003), but those researchers have mainly focused on 
attempting to present the potential of an integrated approach. Little emphasis has 
been placed on explaining how far this approach has explanatory power with detailed 
empirical evidence drawing on a ‘most different case’ comparison. In this regard, 
what this study contributes to existing literature on unions’ strategic choices is not 
just extending the focus on institutions but also showing the need to integrate 
institutional and non-institutional factors into a single analytical framework.  
 
In what follows, each of these currents in political economy literature is analysed 
with data collected from union branches in the English and Korean health sectors. 
For each theoretical current this section presents strengths and weaknesses by 
showing to what extent data collected for this study supports each current. It 
therefore, beyond the principle of ‘institutions matter’ which hitherto has influenced 
much discussion, presents the importance and adequacy of the integrated framework 
between institutional and non-institutional factors for analysing union responses 
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8.3.1 Institutional factors 
  
In comparison to the simple globalisation approach emphasising convergence of 
patterns in industrial relations and the effects on actors including unions, the 
institutionalist approach is more effective to explain between-country divergence. As 
Kelly (2011: 57) sums up, ‘one of the staple propositions of recent comparative 
political economy is that institutions matter’. Scholars in this area, new 
institutionalism (e.g. Dore, 1986; Hall and Soskice, 2001a; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 
1997; Weiss, 2003) pay much attention to the independent role of institutions, 
starting with the premise that differences in industrial relations institutions are likely 
to be enduring and suggests that globalisation is unlikely to lead to a general 
convergence in national patterns of industrial relations (Locke et al., 1995). In this 
regard, Locke and Thelen argue that:  
 
By pushing the core categories of institutionalist analyses, we demonstrate 
how various international trends are not in fact translated into common 
pressures in all national economies but rather are mediated by national 
institutional arrangements and refracted into divergent struggles over particular 
national practices’ (Locke and Thelen, 1995: 338, italics in original).  
 
This study sought to investigate the ways in which unions with different institutional 
arrangements coped with a similar challenge, the rise of subcontracted workers. As 
addressed in previous Chapters 5, 6 and 7, there were not only variations but 
similarities in patterns of union responses. These findings are now analysed with the 
institutionalist approach. It was found out that the typical responses in the two 
countries markedly differed: while the UNISON branches included subcontracted 
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workers into their representational domain and regulated their terms and conditions 
by negotiating with private contractors, the three KHMU branches presenting the 
typical type of responses in the national union did not include these workers, nor 
negotiate with their employers, subcontractors. Contrary to case of UNISON where 
no exceptional cases found due to the articulated union structure and the 
encompassing collective bargaining system, there were two outlying cases in KHMU, 
which presented similar responses to UNISON branches.  
 
This study considered the source of restructuring, legal regulation, collective 
bargaining systems, and union structure as crucial institutional factors shaping union 
responses. These four factors were closely related to how unions responded to 
subcontracted workers. As such issues were examined ranging from the emergence 
of subcontracting in each context, to how subcontracted workers were treated at their 
workplaces, and how subcontracted workers’ terms and conditions of employment 
were determined.  
 
The source of restructuring   
 
Linking back to the findings in Chapters 4 and 5, the characteristics of the health 
sector in England and Korea varied in terms of the main financing source and the 
provision of health care service. The NHS is a publicly funded health service with 
budget in large part coming from general taxation, while Korean hospitals are 
financed by a mix of taxation, social insurance contributions and hospital bills paid 
by patients. In contrast to England, where health services are almost entirely 
delivered by public organisations within the NHS, even though some services are 
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now provided by private companies, the main health service providers in Korea are 
private hospitals. Despite different features of the two health sectors, the 
proliferation of subcontracting was found in both countries since the 1980s. The 
main body of health service in each country – the government in England and private 
hospitals in Korea – has initiated the restructuring by subcontracting some services, 
mainly those not directly related to the essential medical services such as cleaning, 
catering or maintenance. The two unions and their branches studied opposed the 
management-initiated restructuring, but responses differed. Drawing on empirical 
data, this study found the government-led restructuring in England towards 
externalisation of workforce had triggered more pragmatic and centralised responses 
nationally, whilst the market-driven change in Korea had contributed to more 
fragmented responses at branch level.  
 
All branches of UNISON studied adopted realistic policies. In large part this seemed 
to be because they thought there was less possibility to stem the tide of the 
government’s policy, although they opposed contracting-out practices. Even during 
the Labour’s term of government between 1997 and 2010, the drive towards 
outsourcing changed little, which encouraged unions to become more focused on 
pragmatic and realistic strategies for subcontracted workers.  
 
In contrast, the contracting-out drive in Korea was more affected by fierce market 
competition than direct pressure from the government. It is the case that government 
policies which applied to public hospitals, whose proportion stood at around 10 per 
cent, had an impact on privately-owned hospitals but the latter did not have a strict 
obligation to follow those policies. The outsourcing drive in Korea was initiated by 
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hospitals under market pressure, and showed a phased approach over a long period 
without unions’ involvement in the process. This seems to have made union 
branches adopt conservative decisions with a focus on existing members’ interests 
rather than expanding their representation. As such, differences in hospital sector and 
the source of restructuring have led to variations in union responses. 
 
Legal regulation 
 
This study investigated the regulatory effect of labour laws associated with 
subcontracting and the affected workers in relation to union responses. The ways in 
which legal regulations were involved in the emergence and management of 
subcontracted workers also, albeit to a varying degree, affected union branches’ 
responses. In combination with findings addressed in Chapter 5, the two countries 
presented different legal situations: in Korea there was a lack of regulations on the 
conditions of workers involved in contracting-out, there were regulations in England, 
represented by the TUPE Regulations. Despite some criticisms of TUPE on the 
grounds of narrow coverage and limited effects, it is the case that TUPE provided a 
basis for protection of employees’ terms of employment and collective rights. 
Turning to the Korean case, the role of legal regulations is much less clearer. Lack of 
legal mechanisms regulating employment relations and the rights of transferred 
workers at the time of a transfer (Kim et al., 2012) precluded subcontracted workers 
from being given legal protection in terms of both individual and collective rights.  
 
The differences in legal contexts also influenced union branches in making their 
strategies. In situations where relatively favourable legal regulations apply such as 
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TUPE in England, union branches were more likely to adopt inclusive policies 
towards subcontracted workers without making too much extra effort to forge 
common interests between workers on different employment contracts. Hence this 
study argues that the higher the level of legal protection for pay, working conditions, 
and collective rights of subcontracted workers, the more actively union branches 
have organised and represented them.  
 
This finding supports the alternative position of Booth and Francesconi (2003) 
arguing that legal provisions may act as opportunities for union representation. This 
is in line with the way in which the institutionalist literature conceptualises 
institutions as ‘beneficial constraints’, which refers to the situation where an 
institution which may function as a constraint rather acts a facilitator in achieving a 
certain goal. An example includes a legal minimum wage: while it causes difficulty 
for firms competing on low labour cost, it also encourages them to compete more on 
productivity (Kelly, 2011: 64-65) .  
 
Legal provisions such as TUPE, the minimum wage legislation or EU directives 
might weaken unions’ efforts to recruit subcontracted workers since it could be 
possible that such initiatives may discourage them from joining a union (Baccaro et 
al., 2003). This is because these workers may think that they can be protected by 
these legal regulations without union membership. However, the English union 
branches utilised these legal contexts as opportunities to attract subcontracted 
workers by monitoring compliance with the law, which has led to more inclusive 
union policies. In this regard, data collected does not support the study of Baccaro et 
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al. (2003) which argue that unions with a weak institutional position are more likely 
to move toward organising.  
 
Collective bargaining     
 
Among various kinds of unions’ representation methods, collective bargaining is 
regarded as part and parcel of industrial relations since it determines the terms and 
conditions (Clegg, 1976; Marchington et al., 2011). In particular, Clegg, one of the 
prominent institutionalists, argues that ‘differences in collective bargaining can 
explain variations in union behaviour’ (1976: 8). However, data collected for this 
study do not entirely support that argument. In line with other criticisms (Frege and 
Kelly, 2003; Heery, 2009; Shalev, 1980), this study criticises it mainly because of 
the direction of causality and the deterministic view. The case of KHMU shows that 
the reform of union structure has led to a reform of collective bargaining structures, 
although it is premature to say that the reformed, centralised bargaining structure has 
been well stablised and organised. Furthermore, the outlier branches (K4 and K5) 
clearly highlight the weaknesses of Clegg’s argument. Despite a shared collective 
bargaining system, only these two branches among the others in KHMU accepted 
subcontractors as counterparts in their collective bargaining units and negotiated 
terms and conditions of subcontracted workers. Nevertheless it is believed that 
Clegg’s terms, the level and the extent of bargaining (1976: 8-11) are important 
criteria to compare each country’s bargaining system and its related influences on 
union branches. Here the level of bargaining means where it takes place with whom, 
and the extent of bargaining refers to its coverage. 
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Another importance of collective bargaining comes from the feature of triangular 
employment relationships with three parties involved, rather than two as in 
traditional relations. The complexities have, in general, made it difficult for unions to 
represent subcontracted workers through existing channels (Kalleberg, 2000: 358). 
Data collected for this study underline that differences in collective bargaining 
system have led to different union responses to subcontracted workers. The UNISON 
branches where the bargaining system is relatively well centralised under the Agenda 
for Change have negotiated at sectoral level as well as with private contractors in 
order to present the interests of these workers. In contrast, branches in KHMU where 
the centralised bargaining structure has not been well established (Eun et al., 2012b; 
Lee, 2011c) have hardly negotiated with either hospital employers or subcontractors 
for the issues related to these workers. This means that the more centralised and 
stablised bargaining system paved the way for more propitious circumstances for the 
UNISON branches to include and represent subcontracted workers. In contrast, the 
‘disorganized centralization’ (Lee, 2011c: 768) bargaining system in the Korean 
health sector made it difficult for the three branches to actively address the concerns 
of subcontracted workers, coupled with the legacy of enterprise unionism.  
 
Union structure    
 
This study considered union structure as one of the institutions contributing to 
similarities and variations in union responses. Faced with changing workforce 
composition such as the rise of subcontracted workers unions have to decide whether 
or not to represent these workers by including them into their constituencies 
(Cerviňo, 2000; Heery, 2004). Unlike with other contingent workers directly 
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employed by a user company, the issue of subcontracted workers requires the 
expansion of representation beyond the enterprise (Heery et al., 2004b: 31), in 
particular where a branch is mainly based on a workplace, as seen in the case of the 
UNISON and KHMU. This study explored this issue with a focus on union branch 
external structure and internal governance in order to understand whose interests 
union branches sought to represent and how. 
 
In contrast with other institutional factors examined, the two unions have something 
in common in union structure at national level. They all allowed subcontracted 
workers to join a branch based on the place at work, albeit to varying degree. But 
behaviour of each branch between the two unions differed: the UNISON branches 
opened their membership to subcontracted workers, whilst the three KHMU 
branches maintained closed membership among full-time permanent workers with a 
single employer, the hospital. Faced with the rise of subcontracted workers, while 
the former began to organise and represent them, the latter have done little such 
activity at branch level. As Peetz (1998: 9) argues, union membership is ‘influenced 
by both employee preferences and the extent to which employees are able or 
required to join a union’. Reflecting this explanation, the typical Korean branches 
gave subcontracted workers limited opportunities in terms of supply-related aspects. 
The difference in union membership between the two unions is explained by 
historical embeddedness and the issue of articulation between levels of union. This 
study found that the legacy of enterprise unionism encouraged Korean branches to 
consider subcontracted workers as ‘others’, which was coupled with the national 
level of the union having little control over branch membership provision.  
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The structural difference in turn affected variations in union branch governance. The 
UNISON branches with subcontracted workers amongst their members operated a 
joint branch secretary system by appointing two branch secretaries with 
responsibility for direct employees of the hospital trust and employees of private 
companies respectively. Furthermore there was no barrier for members employed by 
private companies to attend or to speak at members’ meetings to elect or to be 
elected as branch representatives. In contrast, the three typical Korean branches had 
no experience with subcontracted workers within branch governance and not 
surprisingly, no presence of these workers in representative positions.  
 
Strengths and weaknesses of institutionalist approach 
 
This section has so far discussed how far the institutional factors considered explain 
the variations in union responses between the two countries. The different 
institutions in each country were useful to help understand the differences in union 
responses by reinforcing and complementing each other, which Hall and Soskice 
conceptualise as ‘institutional complementarities’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001a: 9). The 
findings suggest that the distinctive features of national and sectoral institutions play 
a key role in shaping a particular union’s behaviour by refracting the pressures 
associated with the rise of subcontracted workers. For this reason, as Wailes and 
colleagues (2003: 617) comment on the institutionalist view, the institutionalists 
predict that this form of diverse patterns of industrial relations would continue. This 
is because they see that ‘institutions possess a remarkable degree of resilience even 
in the face of powerful market pressures’ (Kelly 2011: 64), which reveals a strong 
degree of ‘path dependency’ when institutional changes occur. If this view is 
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convincing, it would be the case that the less favourable and less adequate 
institutions in Korea for representing the interests of subcontracted workers would 
continue to preclude unions from actively representing these workers.  
 
However, the data collected showed a different picture since there were two KHMU 
branches that presented similar responses to those of UNISON, which means that 
even under different national and sectoral institutional arrangements union behaviour 
can be similar. With institutionalist arguments, it is hard to explain both why unions 
with different institutional contexts behaved in a similar way and why unions under 
the same context acted in a different way. The findings clearly show that institutional 
accounts have trouble accounting for these phenomena, as Pontusson (1995) points 
out. The evidence of this study suggests that there is a need to develop theoretical 
understanding further in comparative industrial relations. For this reason, this study 
seeks to identify non-institutional factors to contribute to similarities between 
countries and differences within a country in the following section. 
 
8.3.2 Non-institutional factors 
 
This study, as mentioned above, found variations in branches’ responses not only 
between but also within countries, which required an explanation beyond 
institutionalism. This study thereby argues that union strategies are influenced by 
institutions but the latter is far from fully determining them, which is in line with the 
argument of Kelly and Frege (2004: 182). Furthermore, it shows that despite national 
and sectoral context, unions at branch level can have an independent voice in 
responding to emerging subcontracted workers. Drawing on empirical evidence 
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presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, it now addresses which non-institutional sources 
encouraged these two union branches to adopt inclusive policies similar to those in 
England. Much of the explanation seems to lie in the role of leaders who mobilise 
organisational resources, and in the attitude of subcontracted workers.  
 
First, it pays a great attention to the role of the leadership. Union representatives of 
the two KHMU branches adhered closely to their ideological position of representing 
the interests of subcontracted workers and did something different from other 
branches by organising these workers through amending their rulebooks or 
collaborating with a separate branch for subcontracted workers. Given common 
difficulties across the board in operating a union branch such as lack of facility time 
for branch representatives, limited financial resources available, a deep seated 
enterprise consciousness, and other unfavourable conditions caused by employers’ 
hostility towards unions, the importance of the leaders’ role in the two branches 
becomes much clearer. Leaders made good use of ideological and organisational 
incentives (Cerviňo, 2000: 9-13), despite the risk of paying costs such as losing their 
existing membership, which might weaken a branch’s collective power against the 
counterpart, the employer. As clearly shown in the experience of Branch K5, 
existing members are likely to withdraw from the union whenever they do not feel 
satisfied with the branch. Representatives of the branch have managed this challenge 
by arguing for the need to work with subcontracted workers over time, which 
eventually helps existing members to understand that this is the way to enhance not 
only their rights but the interests of the working class as a whole. Branch K4, with a 
very low density in the Korean context standing at around 10 percent, made use of 
this unfavourable situation in terms of collective power and influence caused by low 
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unionisation level as an opportunity in order to boost its organisational capacity. The 
challenge of the low density for the branch mirrored the opportunity to organise 
subcontracted workers. There were expectations of an increase in membership 
among full-time permanent workers, though there had not been a marked 
improvement in unionisation by the time of the study.  
 
Interestingly, in implementing this inclusive strategy towards subcontracted workers, 
these two branches were not properly supported by the national union, despite the 
latter’s importance of organising contingent workers including subcontracted 
workers. This analysis more supports the agency account of union behaviour than the 
articulation account (Heery, 2006). Nevertheless the importance of articulation 
between national leadership and branch organisation should not be neglected (Kelly 
and Heery, 1989: 210) because workplace activities alone are less likely to be 
sufficient to expand membership among unorganised groups of workers 
(Cunningham and James, 2010: 39).  
 
Second, in this process, the attitude of subcontracted workers also played an 
important role. The intention of these workers to join a branch was, to some degree, 
timed with the willingness of union representatives. Borrowing the argument of 
Cerviňo (2000: 11-12), the active attitude of subcontracted workers provided an 
appropriate context to develop each branch’s inclusive strategy. This is well 
contrasted with Branch K1 where when asked about union membership by 
subcontracted workers, branch representatives left a regional or national office with 
this issue. Furthermore, unionised subcontracted workers accelerated organising 
those under the similar conditions and, as seen in the case of Branch K5, underlined 
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the importance of the principle of ‘like recruits like’ (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2011: 
302). 
 
Third, it is worth mentioning distinct characteristics of the area in which the two 
Hospitals K4 and K5 are located. Given the feature of the health service which has, 
to some degree, a geographical limit, the climate of industrial relations within the 
area and the reputation of the hospitals, as discussed in Chapter 5, are likely to affect 
actors’ behaviour. Both areas have witnessed industrial actions including strikes 
against precarious work with increased frequency and intensity, which provided 
circumstances propitious for unions to unite with allies within the community and 
adverse for management to unilaterally ignore unions’ demands. This finding is in 
line with Milkman’s findings (2006) from union campaigns in southern California 
arguing that successful organising of low paid migrant workers rests on the extent to 
which unions made concerted efforts to build supportive community. For 
management of the hospitals, in particular, this geographical limit was directly 
related to their market share within the area in which each hospital mainly operated 
so that management tended not to be hostile to unions for preventing the situation 
where patients left for another medical service.   
 
Apart from three factors mentioned above, this study also considered the role of 
material interest (Wailes et al. 2003) throughout the research but found out that it 
was premature to say whether or not data collected supported this view. According to 
interest-based theorists, material interests are likely to contribute to variations in 
policy preferences, as workers may have different policy preferences depending on 
whether they are skilled blue-collar or white-collar workers, and whether they work 
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in trade-affected industries or sheltered industries such as the public sector 
(Rogowski, 1989; Swenson, 1991). Applying that approach to this study, it can be 
argued that different features of the hospital industry in the two countries, in terms of 
government-led versus market-driven, might have generated distinct interests of 
unions and their members on the issue of subcontracted workers, which resulted in 
turn in differences in union responses. But, with interest-based accounts it would not 
be easy to explain in what ways policy preferences contributed to a certain policy 
outcome and rather, as Wailes et al. (2003: 623) point out, is in danger of a 
reductionist or instrumentalist explanation. Furthermore, it would be almost 
impossible to explain differences in union strategies without considering the 
importance of distinct institutional arrangements in each country. Despite the 
importance of this view, there is difficulty in explaining the similarities found 
between countries. It is hard to explain how similar interests, causing policy 
preferences, are generated in such contrasting contexts.  
 
8.3.3 An integrated approach  
 
An integrated approach, which includes a role for institutions as well as some non-
institutional factors in shaping union responses to subcontracted workers, can 
explain both differences and similarities in patterns of union responses in UNISON 
and KHMU. As discussed above, while England and Korea shared different 
institutions of industrial relations, when faced with a similar challenge, the 
emergence of subcontracted workers, union responses between the two countries 
presented not only differences but similarities. The findings underline that although 
union strategies were largely affected by institutional differences underpinning 
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different policy preference, there was scope for unions to have an independent voice. 
For this reason, if this study considers only the role of either institutional or non-
institutional factors, it would provide a partial explanation. 
 
8.4 Concluding summary 
 
It is widely accepted, as Kelly (2011: 71) argues, that institutions can refract market 
forces in a way which either attenuates or amplifies such forces, and although actors’ 
strategic choices play a role in this process, there is a limit to their power. Scholars in 
comparative industrial relations have stressed the principle that institutions matter, 
whilst relatively little attention has been paid to competing approaches, which 
emphasise on the role of interests and of other non-institutional factors.  
 
As shown in this study, the findings show that institutions alone are not sufficient to 
explain variations in union responses and underline the need to consider non-
institutional factors alongside institutional ones. Three non-institutional factors – the 
role of leaders, the attitude of the represented, and a favourable for uniting with allies 
in a community – were accentuated throughout this study. Given that one of the 
challenges facing comparative researchers is to identify precisely ‘the conditions 
under which each of these set of ‘factors’ is more or less effective’ (Kelly, 2011: 71), 
this study adds evidence through the integrated approach with the comparison of 
union branches’ responses between UNISON and KHMU. Furthermore, as presented 
earlier, this study contributes to the debate on union responses to contingent workers 
by suggesting a link between unions and subcontracted labour as a form of triangular 
employment relationships. 
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 As such, this study contributes to the field of comparative industrial relations 
research in three ways. First, it extends the scope of research on union responses to 
contingent workers by investigating how unions have responded to subcontracted 
workers. In doing so, it enhances the possibility of applying Heery’s typology (2004) 
to the study of union responses to subcontracted labour as well as those in the 
Korean context. Second, this study goes beyond classifying union responses by 
presenting underlying dynamics of union responses. Third, this study challenges 
existing ways of conducting comparative industrial relations studies predicated upon 
the staple proposition that ‘institutions matter’. By investigating union responses to 
subcontracted workers between countries with different institutional settings, 
England and Korea, this study provides support for a claim that institutional factors 
alone are not sufficient to examine the complex dynamics of union behaviour and 
then suggests the need to integrate institutional and non-institutional factors into a 
single analytical framework. 
 
The next chapter includes a review of what has been achieved in this research. It 
contains the summary of findings and analysis, the implications and discussion of the 
potential contribution, and finally, the suggestions for further research.     
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Chapter 9 Conclusion        
 
This concluding chapter summarises the key findings and arguments of the thesis 
and offers suggestions for future research. This study examined the ways in which 
unions have responded to subcontracted workers and which factors have contributed 
to patterns of union responses. The emergence of subcontracted workers has 
provided unions with a new challenge of triangular employment relationships. 
Subcontracting leads to separation of employers and places existing union structure 
and resources, and traditional collective bargaining systems subject to two parties 
involved under strain. A study of subcontracted workers in relation to union 
representation is important because it can tell us about how unions deal with more 
complex employment relationships. This also enables us to understand whether 
existing union representation structures and functions are capable of incorporating 
the interests of emerging subcontracted workers employed by a third party.  
 
A comparative study was conducted of eight branches of the largest unions in the 
health sectors in England and Korea, UNISON and KHMU. This study employed 
qualitative case studies using fifty-three semi-structured interviews with union 
officials, observation of union activities, and document analysis. Evidence shows 
that these two unions are operating in different institutional settings in terms of the 
source of restructuring, legal provisions, collective bargaining systems, and union 
structures. This study found as follows: the typical responses of union branches 
between the two varied, but there were two outlying cases in Korea, showing similar 
responses to those in England. Drawing on empirical evidence, it is argued that 
despite the importance of institutions in shaping union responses, they are not 
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sufficient alone to explain variations in union responses. It is necessary to consider 
both institutional and non-institutional factors in a single analytical framework to 
understand the dynamics of union responses.   
 
9.1 Key findings and argument 
 
Prior to the analysis of underlying dynamics of union responses, this study examined 
first how union have responded in order to identify whether there were differences 
and similarities between and within countries. Heery’s typology (2004: 435) was 
used which characterises four responses distinctively, each comprising a combined 
policy on agency workers and on agency suppliers. The typology was designed for 
union responses to agency work, but it was useful for this study because it explicitly 
pointed out the distinctiveness of the triangular employment relationships.  
 
This study found that the three UNISON branches studied (E1,  E2 and E3) 
included subcontracted workers into their representation domain and accepted 
subcontractors as counterparts in their collective bargaining unit. In contrast, the 
three typical branches of KHMU (K1, K2 and K3) neither included subcontracted 
workers nor accepted subcontractors as counterparts. However, interestingly, this 
study identified the two outlier branches of KHMU (K4 and K5) whose behaviour 
was similar to that of UNISON branches. As such, the typical union responses 
differed between the two countries but similar responses were also found.  
 
Throughout this study, the questions of why typical union responses differed, why 
similar responses were also found between countries with different institutional 
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settings, and which factors have contributed to similarities and differences were 
examined. These questions were analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
 
First, these questions were analysed in relation to the source of restructuring and 
legal regulations in Chapter 5. This study found that government-initiated 
restructuring encouraged more centralised and practical responses in England, while 
that driven by employers in Korea caused fragmented responses at branch level. 
Legal regulations that were designed to reduce, to some extent, the gap in conditions 
of employment between workers on different employment contracts, and to secure 
the continuity of employment and collective rights for subcontracted workers helped 
branches organise and represent these workers, in the English case.  
 
Second, the ways in which collective bargaining systems have contributed to union 
responses were examined in Chapter 6. More centralised bargaining structures in 
England contributed to unions’ inclusive strategy which encompassed bargaining 
agenda for subcontracted workers by negotiating with not only a user company but 
also with subcontractors. The bargaining structures in the Korean health sector, 
classified as ‘disorganized centralisation’ (Lee, 2011c: 768), was less capable of 
incorporating the interests of subcontracted workers.  
 
Third, regarding the issue of which interests get represented within unions and how, 
results presented in Chapter 7 show that the English union branches had represented 
the interests of subcontracted workers by allowing them to join unions, to participate 
in union activities, and to elect and to be elected as representatives. In contrast, the 
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limited membership provision of the typical Korean branches made it almost 
impossible to get these workers’ interests represented. 
 
Lastly, throughout the research, this study found that despite opportunities and 
constraints under a given institutional setting, unions can make a difference in their 
representation towards subcontracted workers. As clearly shown in the two outlier 
branches in Korea, union responses differed from those in the same setting as well as 
were resembling those in different institutional setting. The process of constructing 
union responses was closely related to the way in which collective interests of a 
branch towards subcontracted workers were formed and implemented. 
 
As such, differences in the institutional contexts of the source of restructuring, legal 
regulations, collective bargaining systems, and union structures explain some major 
differences in how unions have responded to subcontracted workers. However, the 
findings revealed that union responses were also influenced by some non-
institutional factors such as branch leadership, the attitude of the represented and 
effective working with allies in the community. The findings highlighted the 
importance of an integrated approach between institutional and non-institutional 
factors in explaining union behaviour. 
 
Drawing on the empirical evidence, on one hand, it is the case that institutions matter 
in shaping union responses. The institutionalist approach asserts that the way in 
which social actors behave is strongly affected by their national and sectoral 
institutional arrangements (Allen, 2004; Pontusson, 1995). According to this 
approach, however there remains little scope for social actors to shape outcomes 
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towards their own aims. Despite the importance of this approach, institutions are not 
sufficient to explain both similarities and differences in union branches’ responses to 
subcontracted workers, as shown in the two outlier cases in Korea. Rather, the role 
of leaders and willingness of the represented to act played an important role in 
shaping different responses of these two branches from the other Korean branches. 
Hence it is necessary to consider both institutional and non-institutional factors in a 
single analytical framework.  
 
This study contributes to the field of comparative industrial relations research in 
three ways. First, it extends the scope of research on union responses to contingent 
workers by investigating how unions have responded to subcontracted workers. In 
doing so, it extends the possibility of applying Heery’s typology (2004) to the study 
of union responses to subcontracted labour as well as beyond the English context to 
those in the Korean context. Second, this study goes beyond classifying union 
responses by presenting underlying dynamics of union responses. Third, this study 
challenges the existing ways of conducting comparative industrial relations study 
predicated upon the staple proposition that ‘institutions matter’. By investigating 
union responses to subcontracted workers between countries with different 
institutional settings, England and Korea, this study provides support for a claim that 
institutional factors alone are not sufficient to examine the complex dynamics of 
union behaviour and then shows the need to integrate institutional and non-
institutional factors into a single analytical framework. 
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9.2. Suggestions for further research 
 
This study suggests several important implications for further research. With regard 
to generalisation of the findings, different features of sectors need elaboration. 
Compared to manufacturing or other service sectors, the health care sector is 
relatively sheltered from international competition  (Lee, 2011c: 787), and thus, the 
bargaining power of industrial unions in the health sectors in both countries was 
relatively stronger when compared to those in other sectors within each country. 
Although union density in the Korean health sector was much lower than that in 
England, standing at 10 percent, KHMU played an important role by taking the lead 
in union renewal by a move towards industrial unionism in Korea where enterprise 
unionism had – and still in many other sectors and in terms of unions’ real activities 
– dominated. A comparison with union responses to subcontracted workers in other 
sectors, such as the car industry, may reveal greater cross-national variations in 
union behaviour. This is because there would be differences in bargaining systems, 
union structures, the power and influence of unions, workforce composition, and 
legal regulations, compared to those in the health sector.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, this study paid attention to the representation functions 
of unions subject to the fact that unions were mainly composed of regular full-time 
workers. Other actors that might have influenced union behaviour, in particular 
management and subcontracted workers were not considered as main source of the 
analysis. Instead, this study explored how unions have interpreted these other actors’ 
behaviour so as to adopt their own strategies. This reflected the fact that this study 
was designed to investigate what unions have done, how and why, when faced with 
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the emergence of subcontracted labour which posed a challenge of triangular 
employment relationships. Nevertheless, further empirical evidence could be 
supplied by other actors who might have played a role in shaping union behaviour. 
This would help enrich the understanding of union representation.  
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